§1. Definitions of God.
§2. Divine Attributes.
§3. Classification of the Divine Attributes.
§4. Spirituality of God. §
5. Infinity.
§ 6. Eternity.
§ 7. Immutability.
§8. Knowledge.
§ 9. The Will of God. §10.
The Power of God. § 11. Holiness of
God.
§ 12. Justice.
§ 13. The Goodness of God.
§ 14. The Truth of God. §
15. Sovereignty.
§1. Definitions of
God.
THE question whether God can be defined, depends for
its answer on what is meant by definition. Cicero1
says, "Est definitio, earum rerum, quae sunt ejus rei propriae, quam definire
volumus, brevis et circumscripta quaedam explicatio." In this sense God cannot
be defined. No creature, much less man, can know all that is proper to God;
and, therefore, no creature can give an exhaustive statement of all that God
is.
To define, however, is simply to bound, to separate, or
distinguish; so that the thing defined may be discriminated from all other
things. This may be done (1.) By stating its characteristics. (2.) By stating
its genus and its specific difference. (3.) By analyzing the idea as it lies
in our minds. (4.) By an explanation of the term or name by which it is
denoted. All these methods amount to much the same thing. When we say we can
define God, all that is meant is, that we can analyze the idea of God as it
lies in our mind; or, that we can state the class of beings to which He
belongs, and the attributes by which He is distinguished from all other
beings. Thus, in the simple definition, God is ene perfectissimum, the
word ens designates Him as a being, not an idea, but as that which has
real, objective existence; and absolute perfection distinguishes Him from all
other beings. The objection to this and most other definitions of God is, that
they do not bring out with sufficient fulness the contents of the idea. This
objection bears against such definitions as the following: Ens absolutum,
the self-existent, independent being; and that by Calovius, "Dens est
essentia spiritualis infinita;" and Reinhard's2
"Deus est, Natura necessaria, a mundo diversa, summas complexa perfectiones et
ipsius mundi causa;" or Baumgarten's "Spiritus perfectissimus, rationem rui
ipsius rerumque contingentium omnium seu mundi continens;" or, that of Morus,
"Spiritus perfectissimus, conditor, conservator, et gubernator mundi."
Probably the best definition of God ever penned by man, is that given in the
"Westminster Catechism": "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and
unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and
truth." This is a true definition; for it states the class of beings to which
God is to be referred. He is a Spirit; and He is distinguished from all other
spirits in that He is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being and
perfections. It is also a complete definition, in so far as it is an
exhaustive statement of the contents of our idea of God.
In what sense, however, are these terms used? What is
meant by the words "being," and "perfections," or "attributes" of God? In what
relation do his attributes stand to his essence and to each other? These are
questions on which theologians, especially during the scholastic period,
expended much time and labor.
Being of God.
By being is here meant that which has a real,
substantive existence. It is equivalent to substance, or essence. It is
opposed to what is merely thought, and to a mere force or power. We get this
idea, in the first place, from consciousness. We are conscious of self as the
subject of the thoughts, feelings, and volitions, which are its varying states
and acts. This consciousness of substance is involved in that of personal
identity. In the second place, a law of our reason constrains us to believe
that there is something which underlies the phenomena of matter and mind, of
which those phenomena are the manifestation. It is impossible for us to think
of thought and feeling, unless there be something that thinks and feels. It is
no less impossible to think of action, unless there be something that acts; or
of motion, unless there be something that moves. To assume, therefore, that
mind is only a series of acts and states, and that matter is nothing but
force, is to assume that nothing (nonentity) can produce effects.
God, therefore, is in his nature a substance, or
essence, which is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable; the common subject of
all divine perfections, and the common agent of all divine acts. This is as
far as we can go, or need to go. We have no definite idea of substance,
whether of matter or mind, as distinct from its attributes. The two are
inseparable. In knowing the one we know the other. We cannot know hardness
except as we know something hard. We have, therefore, the same knowledge of
the essence of God, as we have of the substance of the soul. All we have to do
in reference to the divine essence, as a Spirit, is to deny of it, as we do of
our own spiritual essence, what belongs to material substances; and to affirm
of it, that in itself and its attributes it is infinite, eternal, and
unchangeable. When, therefore, we say there is a God, we do not assert merely
that there is in our minds the idea of an infinite Spirit; but that, entirely
independent of our idea of Him, such a Being really exists. Augustine3
says, "Deus est quaedam substantia; nam quod nulla substantia est, nihil
omnino est. Substantia ergo aliquid esse est."
If, therefore, a divine essence, infinite, eternal, and
unchangeable, exists, this essence existed before and independent of the
world. It follows also that the essence of God is distinct from the world The
Scriptural doctrine of God is consequently opposed to the several forms of
error already mentioned; to Hylozoism, which assumes that God, like man, is a
composite being, the world being to Him what the body is to us; to
Materialism, which denies the existence of any spiritual substance, and
affirms that the material alone is real; to extreme Idealism, which denies not
only the reality of the internal world, but all real objective existence, and
affirms that the subjective alone is real; to Pantheism, which either makes
the world the existence form of God, or, denying the reality of the world,
makes God the only real existence. That is, it either makes nature God, or,
denying nature, makes God everything.
§2. Divine Attributes.
To the divine essence, which in itself is infinite,
eternal, and unchangeable, belong certain perfections revealed to us in the
constitution of our nature and in the word of God. These divine perfections
are called attributes as essential to the nature of a divine Being, and
necessarily involved in our idea of God. The older theologians distinguished
the attributes of God, (1.) From predicates which refer to God in the
concrete, and indicate his relation to his creatures, as creator, preserver,
ruler, etc. (2.) From properties, which are technically the distinguishing
characteristics of the several persons of the Trinity. There are certain acts
or relations peculiar or proper to the Father, others to the Son, and others
to the Spirit. And (3.) From accidents or qualities which may or may not
belong to a substance, which may be acquired or lost. Thus holiness was not an
attribute of the nature of Adam, but an accident, something which he might
lose and still remain a man; whereas intelligence was an attribute, because
the loss of intelligence involves the loss of humanity. The perfections of
God, therefore, are attributes, without which He would cease to be God.
Relation of the Attributes to
the Essence of God.
In attempting to explain the relation in which the
attributes of God stand to his essence and to each other, there are two
extremes to be avoided. First, we must not represent God as a composite being,
composed of different elements; and, secondly, we must not confound the
attributes, making them all mean the same thing, which is equivalent to
denying them all together. The Realists of the Middle Ages tended to the
former of these extremes, and the Nominalists to the other. Realists held that
general terms express not merely thoughts, or abstract conceptions in our
minds, but real or substantive, objective existence. And hence they were
disposed to represent the divine attributes as differing from each other
realiter, as one res or thing differs from another. The Nominalists,
on the other hand, said general terms are mere words answering to abstractions
formed by the mind. And consequently when we speak of different attributes in
God, we only use different words for one and the same thing. Occam, Biel, and
other Nominalists, therefore, taught that "Attributa divina nec rei, nec
rationis distinctione, inter se aut ab essentia divina distingui; sed omnem
distinctionem esse solum in nominibus." The Lutheran and Reformed theologians
tended much more to the latter of these extremes than to the former. They
generally taught, in the first place, that the unity and simplicity of the
divine essence precludes not only all physical composition of constituent
elements, or of matter and form, or of subject and accidents; but also all
metaphysical distinction as of act and power, essence and existence, nature
and personality; and even of logical difference, as genus and specific
difference.
In the second place, the theologians were accustomed to
say that the attributes of God differ from his essence non re, sed ratione.
This is explained by saying that things differ ex natura rei, when
they are essentially different as soul and body; while a difference ex
ratione is merely a difference in us, i. e., in our conceptions,
i. e., "quod distincte solum concipitur, cum in re ipsa distinctum non
sit." Hence the divine attributes are defined as "conceptus essentiae divinae
inadequatae, ex parte rei ipsam essentiam involventes, eandemque intrinsice
denominantes." Aquinas says, "Deus est unus re et plures ratione, quia
intellectus noster ita multipliciter apprehendit Deum, sicuti res
multipliciter ipsum representant." The language of the Lutheran theologian
Quenstedt4
exhibits the usual mode of reprosenting this subject: "Si proprie et accurate
loqui velimus, Deus nullas habet proprietates, sed mera et simplicissima est
essentia quae nec realem differentiam nec ullam vel rerum vel modoruni
admittit compositionem. Quia vero simplicissimam Dei essentiam uno adequato
conceptu adequate concipere non possumus, ideo inadequatis et distinctis
conceptibus, inadequate essentiam divinam repraesentantibus, eam apprehendimus,
quos inadequatos conceptus, qui a parte rei essentiae divinae identificantur,
et a nobis per modum affectionum apprehenduntur, attributa vocamus." And
again, "Attributa divina a parte rei et in se non multa sunt, sed ut ipsa
essentia divina, ita et attributa, quae cum illa identificantur, simplicissima
unitas sunt; multa vero dicuntur (1.) sugkatabatikw/j,
ad nostrum concipiendi modum, . . . . (2.) evnerghtikw/j,
in ordine ad effecta."5
The favorite illustration to explain what was meant by this unity of the
divine attributes, was drawn from the sun. His ray, by one and the same power
(as was then assumed) illuminates, warms, and produces chemical changes, not
from any diversity in it, but from diversity in the nature of the objects on
which it operates. The force is the same; the effects are different. The
meaning of these theologians is further determined by their denying that the
relation of attribute and essence in God is analogous to the relation of
intelligence and will to the essence of the soul in man; and also by the
frequently recurring declaration, borrowed from the schoolmen, that God is
actus purus. Schleiermacher goes still further in the same direction. With
him the divine attributes are mere Beziehungen, or relations of God to us. He
commonly resolves them into mere causality. Thus he defines the holiness of
God to be that causality in Him which produces conscience in us.
Divine Attributes.
A third and less objectionable way of representing the
matter is adopted by those who say with Hollazius: "Attributa divina ab
essentia divina et a se invicem, distinguuntur non nominaliter neque realiter
sed formaliter, secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, non sine certo
distinctionis fundamento."6
This is very different from saying that they differ ratione tautum.
Turrettin says the attributes are to be distinguished not realiter, but
virtualiter; that is, there is a real foundation in the divine nature
for the several attributes ascribed to Him.
It is evident that this question of the relation of the
divine attributes to the divine essence merges itself into the general
question of the relation between attributes and substance. It is also evident
that this is a subject about which one man knows just as much as another;
because all that can be known about it is given immediately in consciousness.
This subject has already been referred to. We arc
conscious of ourselves as a thinking substance. That is, we are conscious that
that which is ourselves has identity, continuance, and power. We are further
conscious that the substance self thinks, wills, and feels. Intelligence,
will, and sensibility, are its functions, or attributes, and consequently the
attributes of a spirit. These are the ways in which a spirit acts. Anything
which does not thus act, which has not these functions or attributes, is not a
spirit. If you take from a spirit its intelligence, will, and sensibility,
nothing remains its, substance is gone; at least it ceases to be a spirit.
Substance and attributes are inseparable. The one is known in the other. A
substance wituout attributes is nothing, i. e., no real existence. What
is true of spiritual substances is true of matter. Matter, without the
essential properties of matter, is a contradiction.
We know, therefore, from consciousness, as far as it
can be known, the relation between substance and its attributes. And all that
can be done, or need be done, is to deny or correct the false representations
which are so often made on the subject.
The Divine Attributes do not
differ merely in our Conception.
To say, as the schoolmen, and so many even of
Protestant theologians, ancient and modern, were accustomed to say, that the
divine attributes differ only in name, or in our conceptions, or in their
effects, is to destroy all true knowledge of God. Thus even Augustine
confounds knowledge and power, when he says,7
"Nos ista, quae fecisti videmus quia sunt: tu autem quia vides ea, sunt." So
Scotus Erigena8
says, "Non aliud est ei videre, aliud facere; sed visio illius voluntas ejus
est, et voluntas operatio." Thomas Aquinas9
says the same thing: "Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit
suum intelligere." And again, "Scientia (Dei) causat res; nostra vero causatur
rebus et dependat ab eis." Even Mr. Mansel,10
to aggravate our ignorance of God, speaks of Him as "an intellect whose
thought creates its own object." It is obvious that, according to this view,
God is simply a force of which we know nothing but its effects. If in God
eternity is identical with knowledge, knowledge with power, power with
ubiquity, and ubiquity with holiness, we are using words without meaning when
we attribute any perfection to God. We must, therefore, either give up the
attempt to determine the divine attributes from our speculative idea of an
infinite essence, or renounce all knowledge of God, and all faith in the
revelation of Himself, which He has made in the constitution of our nature, in
the external world, and in his Word. Knowledge is no more identical with power
in God than it is in us. Thought in Him is no more creative than is thought in
us. Otherwise creation is eternal, and God creates everything -- all the
thoughts, feelings, and volitions of his creatures, good and evil; and God is
the only real agent, and the only real being in the universe. According to
this doctrine, also, there can be no difference between the actual and the
possible, for the one as well as the other is always present to the divine
mind. It would also follow that the creation must be infinite, or God finite.
For if knowledge is causative, God creates all He knows, and you must limit
his knowledge if you limit creation. It need hardly be remarked that this
doctrine is derogatory to God. It is not only a much higher idea, but one
essential to personality, that there should be a real distinction between the
divine attributes. That which from its nature and by necessity does all that
it can do, is a force, and not a person. It can have no will. The doctrine in
question, therefore, is essentially pantheistic. "However much," says
Martensen, "we must guard our idea of God from being degraded by anything that
is merely human, from all false Anthropomorphism, yet we can find in
Nominalism only the denial of God as He is revealed in the Scriptures. It is
the denial of the very essence of faith, if it is only in our thoughts that
God is holy and righteous, and not in his own nature; if it is we who so
address Him, and not He who so reveals Himself. We teach, therefore, with the
Realists (of one class), that the attributes of God are objectrvely true as
revealed, and therefore have their ground in the divine essence." There is a
kind of Realism, as Martensen admits, which is as destructive of the true idea
of God as the Nominalism which makes his attributes differ only in name. It
grants, indeed, objective reality to our ideas; but these ideas, according to
it, have no real subject. "The idea of omnipotence, righteousness, and
holiness," he says, "is a mere blind thought, if there be not an omnipotent,
righteous, and holy One."11
The Divine Attributes not to be
resolved into Causality.
It amounts to much the same doctrine, to resolve all
the attributes of God into causality. It was a principle with some of the
schoolmen, "Affectus in Deo denotat effectum." This was so applied as to limit
our knowledge of God to the fact that God is the cause of certain effects.
Thus, when we say God is just, we mean nothing more than that He causes misery
to follow sin; when we say He is holy, it only means that He is the cause of
conscience in us. As a tree is not sweet, because its fruit is luscious, so
God is not holy, he is only the cause of holiness. Against this application of
the principle, Aquinas himself protested, declaring, "Cum igitur dicitur, Deus
est bonus; non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis; vel Deus non est malus.
Sed est sensus: Id, quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in Deo;
et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur, quod Deo
competat esse bonum, in quantum causat bonitatem; sed potius e converso, quia
est bonus, bonitatem rebus diffundit."12
And the Lutheran theologian, Quenstedt, says, "Dicunt nonnulli, ideo Deum dici
justum, sanctum, misericordem, veracem, etc., non quod revera sit talis, sed
quod duntaxat sanctitatis, justitiae, misericordiae, veritatis, etc., causa
sit et auctor in aliis. Sed si Deus non est vere misericors, neque vere
perfectus, vere sanctus, etc., sed causa tantum misericordiae et sanctitatis
in aliis, ita etiam et nos pariter juberemur esse non vere misericordes, non
vere perfecti, etc., sed sanctitatis saltem et misericordiae in aliis auctores."13
The Divine Attributes differ
Virtualiter.
Theologians, to avoid the blank ignorance of God which
must follow from the extreme view of the simplicity of his essence, which
requires us to assunie that the divine attributes differ only in our
conceptions, or as expressing the diverse effects of the activity of God, made
a distiniction between the ratio rationantis and the ratio
rationatae. That is, the reason as determining, and the reason as
determined. The attributes, they say, differ not re, but ratione;not
in our subjective reason only; but there is in God a reason why we think of
Him as possessing these diverse perfections. This idea, as before stated, was
often expressed by saying that the divine attributes differ neither
realiter, nor nominaliter, but virtualiter. If this be
understood to mean that the divimie perfections are really what the Bible
declares them to be; that God truly thinks, feels, and acts; that He is truly
wise, just, and good, that He is truly omnipotent, and voluntary, acting or
not acting, as He sees fit; that He can hear and answer prayer; it may be
admitted. But we are not to give up the conviction that God is really in
Himself what He reveals Himself to be, to satisfy any metaphysical
speculations as to the difference between essence and attribute in an infinite
Being. The attributes of God, therefore, are not merely different conceptions
in our minds, but different modes in which God reveals Himself to his
creatures (or to Himself); just as our several faculties are different modes
in which the inscrutable substance self reveals itself in our consciousness
and acts. It is an old saying, "Qualis homo, talis Deus." And Clemens
Alexandrinus14
says, "If any one knows himself, he will know God." And Leibnitz expresses the
same great truth when he says,15
"The perfections of God are those of our own souls, but He possesses them
without limit. He is an ocean of which we have only received a few drops.
There is in us something of power, something of knowledge, something of
goodness; but these attributes are in entireness in Him." There is indeed
danger in either extreme, danger of degrading God in our thoughts, by reducing
Him to the standard of our nature, and danger of denying Him as He is
revealed. In our day, and among educated men, and especially among students of
philosophy, the latter danger is by far the greater of the two. We should
remember that we lose God, when we lose our confidence in saying Thou! to Him,
with the assurance of being heard and helped.
§3. Classification of
the Divine Attributes.
On few subjects have greater thought and labor been
expended than on this. Perhaps, however, the benefit has not been commensurate
with the labor. The object of classification is order, and the object of order
is clearness. So far as this end is secured, it is a good. But the great
diversity of the methods which have been proposed, is evidence that no one
method of arrangement has such advantages as to secure for it general
recognition.
1. Some, as has been seen, preclude all necessity of a
classification of the attributes, by reducing them all to unity, or regarding
them as different phases under which we contemplate the Supreme Being as the
ground of all things. With them the whole discussion of the divimie attributes
is an analysis of the idea of the Infinite and Absolute.
2. Others arrange the attributes according to the mode
in which we arrive at the knowledge of them. We form our idea of God, it is
said, (1.) By the way of causation; that is, by referring to Him as the great
first cause every virtue manifested by the effects which He produces. (2.) By
the way of negation; that is, by denying to Him the limitations and
imperfections which belong to his creatures. (3.) By the way of eminence, in
exalting to an infinite degree or without limit the perfections which belong
to an infinite Being. If this is so, the attributes conceived of by one of
these methods belong to one class, and those conceived of, or of which we
attain the knowledge by another method, belong to another class. This
principle of classification is perhaps the one most generally adopted. It
gives rise, however, really but to two classes, namely, the positive and
negative, i. e., those in which something is affirmed, and those in
which something is denied concerning God. To the negative class are commonly
referred simplicity, infinity, eternity, immutability; to the positive class,
power, knowledge, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. Instead of calling
the one class negative and the other positive, they are often distinguished as
absolute and relative. By an absolute attribute is meant one which belongs to
God, considered in Himself, and which implies no relation to other beings; by
a relative attribute is meant one which implies relation to an object. They
are also distinguished as immanent and transient, as communicable and
incommunicable. These terms are used interchangeably. They do not express
different modes of classification, but are different modes of designating the
same classification. Negative, absolute, immanent, and incommunicable, are
designations of one class; and positive, relative, transitive, and
communicable, are designations of the other class.
3. A third principle of classification is derived from
the constitution of our own nature. In man there is the substance or essence
of the soul, the intellect, and the will. Hence, it is said, we can most
naturally arrange the attributes of God under three heads. First, those
pertaining to his essence; second, those referring to his intellect; and
third, those referring to his will, the word "will" being taken in its most
comprehensive sense.
4. Others again seek the principle of classification in
the nature of the attributes themselves. Some include the idea of moral
excellence, and others do not. Hence they are distinguished as natural and
moral. The word natural, however, is ambiguous. Taking it in the sense of what
constitutes or pertains to the nature, the holiness and justice of God are as
much natural as his power or knowledge. And on the other hand, God is infinite
and eternal in his moral perfections, although infinity and eternity are not
distinctively moral perfections. In the common and familiar sense of the word
natural, the terms natural and moral express a real distinction.
5. Schleiermacher's method is, of course, peculiar. It
is based on the characteristic principle of his system, that all religion is
founded on a sense of dependence, and all theology consists in what that sense
of dependence teaches us. He does not treat of the divine attributes in any
one place, but here and there, as they come up according to his plan. Our
sense of dependence does not awaken in our consciousness a feeling of
opposition to God's eternity, omnipotence, omnipresence, or omniscience.
These, therefore, are treated of in one place. But we, as dependent creatures,
are conscious of opposition to God's holiness and righteousness. These,
therefore, belong to another head. And as this opposition is removed through
Christ, we are brought into relation to God's grace or love, and to his
wisdom. These form a third class.
That so many different principles of classification
have been adopted, and that each of those principles is carried out in so many
different ways, shows the uncertainty and difficulty attending the whole
subject. It is proposed in what follows to accept the guidance of the answer
given in the "Westminster Catechism," to the question, What is God? It is
assumed in that answer that God is a self-existent and necessary Being; and it
is affirmed of Him, I. That He is a Spirit. II. That as such He is infinite,
eternal, and immutable. III. That He is infinite, eternal, and immutable, (1.)
In his being. (2.) In all that belongs to his intelligence, namely, in his
knowledge and wisdom. (3.) In all that belongs to his will, namely, his power,
holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. Whatever speculative objections may be
made to this plan, it has the advantage of being simple and familiar.
§4. Spirituality of
God.
A. The Meaning of the
Word "Spirit."
The fundamental principle of interpretation of all
writings, sacred or profane, is that words are to be understood in their
historical sense; that is, in the sense in which it can be historically proved
that they were used by their authors and intended to be understood by those to
whom they were addressed. The object of language is the communication of
thought. Unless words are taken in the sense in which those who employ them
know they will be understood, they fail of their design. The sacred writings
being the words of God to man, we are bound to take them in the sense in which
those to whom they were originally addressed must inevitably have taken them.
What is the meaning of the word "spirit?" or rather, What is the usus
loquendi of the Hebrew and Greek words to which our word "spirit"
corresponds? In answering this question, we learn what our Lord meant when he
said God is a Spirit. Originally the words x;Wr and
pneu/ma meant the moving air, especially the
breath, as in the phrase pneu/ma bi,ou;then any
invisible power; then the human soul. In saying, therefore, that God is a
Spirit, our Lord authorizes us to believe that whatever is essential to the
idea of a spirit, as learned from our own consciousness, is to be referred to
God as determining his nature. On this subject consciousness teaches, and has
taught all men, --
1. That the soul is a substance; that our thoughts and
feelings have a common ground, of which they are the varying states or acts.
Substance is that which has an objective existence, and has permanence and
power. Even Kant says: "Wo Handlung, mithin Thatigkeit und Kraft ist, da ist
auch Substanz," where operation, and consequently activity and power are,
there is substance.16
This is not only the common oonviction of men, but it is admitted by the vast
majority of philosophers. As before remarked, that there should be action
without something acting, is as unthinkable as that there should be motion
without something moving.
2. Consciousness teaches that the soul is an individual
subsistence. This is included in the consciousness of the unity, identity, and
permanence of the soul. It is not that we are conscious simply of certain
states of the soul, from which we infer its substance and subsistence; but
that such are the contents of the knowledge given to us in the consciousness
of self. Des Cartes famous aphorism, Cogito ergo sum, is not a
syllogism. It does not mean that existence is inferred from the consciousness
of thought; but that the consciousness of thought involves the consciousness
of existence. Des Cartes himself so understood the matter, for he says: "Cum
advertimus nos esse res cogitantes, prima quaedam notio est quae ex nullo
syllogismo concluditur; neque etiam cum quis dicit 'Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive
existo,' existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit, sed tanquam rem
per se notam simplici mentis intuitu agnoscit."17
Mansel says: "Whatever may be the variety of the phenomena of consciousness,
sensations by this or that organ, volitions, thoughts, imaginations, of all we
are immediately conscious as affections of one and the same self. It is not by
any after-effort of reflection that I combine together sight and hearing,
thought and volition, into a factitious unity or compounded whole, in each
case I am immediately conscious of myself seeing and hearing, willing and
thinking. This self-personality, like all other simple and immediate
presentations, is indefinable, but it is so because it is superior to
definition."18
This individual subsistence is thus involved in the consciousness of self,
because in self-consciousness we distinguish ourselves from all that is not
ourselves.
3. As power of some kind belongs to every substance,
the power which belongs to spirit, to the substance self, is that of thought,
feeling, and volition. All this is given in the simplest form of
consciousness. We are not more certain that we exist, than that we think,
feel, and will. We know ourselves only as thus thinking, feeling, and willing,
and we therefore are sure that these powers or faculties are the essential
attributes of a spirit, and must belong to every spirit.
4. Consciousness also informs us of the unity or
simplicity of the soul. It is not compounded of different elements. It is
composed of substance and form. It is a simple substance endowed with certain
attributes. It is incapable of separation or division.
5. In being conscious of our individual subsistence, we
are conscious of personality. Every individual subsistence is not a person.
But every individual subsistence which thinks and feels, and has the power of
self-determination, is a person; and, therefore, the consciousness of our
subsistence, and of the powers of thought and volition, is the consciousness
of personality.
6. We are also conscious of being moral agents,
susceptible of moral character, and the subjects of moral obligation.
7. It need not be added that every spirit must possess
self-consciousness. This is involved in all that has been said. Without
self-consciousness we should be a mere power in nature. This is the very
ground of our being, and is necessarily involved in the idea of self as a real
existence.
It is impossible, therefore, to overestimate the
importanc of the truth contained in the simple proposition, God is a Spirit.
It is involved in that proposition that God is immaterial. None of the
properties of matter can be predicated of Him. He is not extended or
divisible, or compounded, or visible, or tangible. He has neither bulk nor
form. The Bible everywhere recognizes as true the intuitive convictions of
men. One of those convictions is that spirit is not matter, or matter spirit;
that different and incompatible attributes cannot belong to the same
substance. In revealing, therefore, to us that God is a Spirit, it reveals to
us that no attribute of matter can be predicated of the divine essence. The
realistic dualism which lies at the bottom of all human convictions, underlies
also all the revelations of the Bible.
B. Consequences of the
Spirituality of God.
If God be a spirit, it follows of necessity that He is
a person -- a self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent. As all this is
involved in our consciousness of ourselves as spirit, it must all be true of
God, or God is of a lower order of being than man.
It follows also that God is a simple Being, not only as
not composed of different elements, but also as not admitting of the
distinction between substance and accidents. Nothing can either be added to,
or taken from God. In this view the simplicity, as well as the other
attributes of God, are of a higher order than the corresponding attributes of
our spiritual nature. The soul of man is a simple substance; but it is subject
to change. It can gain and lose knowledge, holiness, and power. These are in
this view accidents in our substance. But in God they are attributes,
essential and immutable.
Finally, it follows from God's being a spirit, that He
is a moral as well as an intelligent Being. It is involved in the very nature
of rational voluntary being, that it should be conformed to the rule of right,
which in the case of God is his own infinite reason. These are primary truths,
which are not to be sacrificed to any speculative objections. It is vain to
tell us that an infinite spirit cannot be a person, because personality
implies self-consciousness, and self-consciousness implies the distinction
between the self and the not-self, and this is a limitation. It is equally
vain to say that God cannot have moral excellence, because moral goodness
implies conformity to law, and conformity to law again is inconsistent with
the idea of an absolute Being. These are empty speculations; and even if
incapable of a satisfactory solution, would afford no rational ground for
rejecting the intuitive truths of reason and conscience. There are mysteries
enough in our nature, and yet no sane muan denies his own personal existence
and moral accountability. And he is worse than insane who is beguiled by such
sophistries into renouncing his faith in God as a pcrsonal Spirit and a loving
Father.
The Scriptures confirm these
Views.
It need hardly be remarked that the Scriptures
everywhere represent God as possessing all the above-mentioned attributes of a
spirit. On this foundation all religion rests; all intercourse with God, all
worship, all prayer, all confidence in God as preserver, benefactor, and
redeemer. The God of the Bible is a person. He spoke to Adam. He revealed
himself to Noah. He entered into covenant with Abraham. He conversed with
Moses, as a friend with friend. He everywhere uses the personal pronouns. He
says, "I am," that "is my name." I am the Lord your God. I am merciful and
gracious. Call upon me, and I will answer you. Like as a father pitieth his
children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him. O thou that hearest prayer,
to thee shall all flesh come. Our Lord has put into our lips words which
reveal that God is a spirit, and all that being a spirit implies, when He
teaches us to say: "Our Father who art in heaven. Hallowed be thy name. Thy
kingdom come. Thy will be done." Everywhere the God of the Bible is contrasted
within the gods of the heathen, as a God who sees, hears, and loves. These are
not regulative, they are real truths. God does not mock us when He thus
presents Himself to us as a personal Being within whom we can have
intercourse, and who is everywhere present to help and save. "To human
reason," says Mansel, "the personal and the infinite stand out in apparently
irreconcilable antagonism; and the recognition of the one in a religious
system almost inevitably involves the sacrifice of the other."19
This cannot be so. According to the Bible, and according to the dictates of
our own nature, of reason as well as of conscience, God is a spirit, and being
a spirit is of necessity a person; a Being who can say I, and to whom we can
say Thou.
§ 5. Infinity.
Although God reveals Himself as
a personal Being capable of fell worship with man, whom we can worship and
love, and to whom wc can pray with the assurance of being heard and answered;
nevertheless He fills heaven and earth; He is exalted above all we can know or
think. He is infinite in his being and perfections. The ideas with which we
are most familiar are often those of which we are the least able to give an
intelligent account. Space, time, and infinity, are among the most difficult
problems of human thought. What is space? is a question which has never been
satisfactorily answered. Some say it is nothing; where nothing is space is
not; it is "negation defined by boundary lines;" others, with Kant and
Hamilton, say that it is "a condition of thought," "the subjective condition
of sensibility;" others that it is an attribute or accident of God; others
that it is that in which real existences can act and move. Notwithstanding
these conflicting statements of philosophers, and the real obscurity of the
subject, every man knows clearly and definitely what the word "space" means,
although no man may be able to define it satisfactorily. It is much the same
with the idea of infinity. If men would be content to leave the word in its
integrity, as simply expressing what does not admit of limitation, there would
be no danger in speculating about its nature. But in all ages wrong views of
what the infinite is, have led to fatal errors in philosophy and religion.
Without attempting to detail the speculations of philosophers on this subject,
we shall simply endeavor to state what is meant when it is said that God is
infinite in his being and perfections.
The Idea of Infinity not merely
Negative.
Being, in this connection, is that which is or exists.
The being of God is his essemice or substance, of which his perfections are
the essential attributes or modes of manifestation. When it is said that God
is infinite as to his being, what is meant is, that no limitation can be
assigned to his essence. It is often said that our idea of the infinite is
merely negative. There is a sense in which this may be true, but there is a
sense in which it is not true. It is true that the form of the proposition is
negative when we say that no limit can be assigned to space, or possible
duration, or to the being of God. But it implies the affirmation that the
object of which infinity is predicated is illimitable. It is as much a
positive idea which we express when we say a thing is infinite as when we say
that it is finite. We cannot, indeed, form a conception or mental image of an
infinite object, but the word nevertheless expresses a positive judgment of
the mind. Sir William Hamilton and others, when they say that the infinite is
a mere negation, mean that it implies a negation of all thought. That is, we
mean nothing when we say that a thing is infinite. As we know nothing of the
inhabitants of the other planets of our system, if such there be, or of the
mode in which angels and disembodied spirits take cognizance of material
objects, our ideas on such subjects are purely negative, or blank ignorance.
"The infinite," Mansel says, "is not a positive object of human thought."20
Every man, however, knows that the propositions "Space is infinite," and
"Space is finite," express different and equally definite thoughts. When,
therefore, we say that God is infinite, we mean something; we express a great
and positive truth.
A. The Infinite not the All.
The infinite, although illimitable and incapable of
increase, is not necessarily all. An infinite body must include all bodies,
infinite space all portions of space, and infinite duration all periods of
duration. Hence Mr. Mansel says that an infinite being must of necessity
include within itself all actual and all possible forms or modes of being. So
said Spinoza, many of the schoolmen, and even many Christian theologians. The
sense in which Spinoza and Mansel make this assertion is the fundamental
principle of Pantheism. Mr. Mansel, as we have seen, escapes that conclusion
by appealing to faith, and teaching that we are constrained to believe what
reason pronounces to be impossible, which itself is an impossibility. The
sense in which theologians teach that an infinite being must comprehend within
it all being, is, that in the infinite is the cause or ground of all that is
actual or possible. Thus Howe21says,
"Necessary being must include all being." But he immediately adds, not in the
same way, "It comprehends all being, besides what itself is, as having had,
within the compass of its productive power, whatsoever hath actually sprung
from it; and having within the compass of the same power, whatsoever is still
possible to he produced." This, however, is not the proper meaning of the
words, nor is it the sense in which they are generally used. What the words
mean, and what they are generally intended to mean by those who use them is,
that there is only one being in the universe; that the finite is merely the
modus existendi, or manifestation of the Infinite. Thus Cousin says, God
must be "infinite and finite together at the summit of being and at its
humblest degree . . . ; at once God, nature, and humanity."22
Even some of the Remonstrants regard this as the necessary consequence of the
doctrine of the infinitude of the divine essence. Episcopius23
says, "Si essentia Dei sic immensa est, tum intelligi non potest quomodo et
ubi aliqua creata essentia esse possit. Essentia enim creata non est essentia
divina; ergo aut est extra essentiam divinam, aut, si non est extra eam, est
ipsa essentia illa, et sic omnia sunt Deus et divina essentia." "God is
infinite," says Jacob Bohme, "for God is all." This, says Strauss,24
is exactly the doctrine of the modern philosophy.
It has already been remarked in a previous chapter, in
reference to this mode of reasoning, that it proceeds on a wrong idea of the
infinite. A thing may be infinite in its own nature without precluding the
possibility of the existence of things of a different nature. An infinite
spirit does not forbid the assumption of the existence of matter. There may
even be many infinites of the same kind, as we can imagine any number of
infinite lines. The infinite, therefore, is not all. An infinite spirit is a
spirit to whose attributes as a spirit no limits can be set. It no more
precludes the existence of other spirits than infinite goodness precludes the
existence of finite goodness, or infinite power the existence of finite power.
God is infinite in being because no limit can be assigned to his perfections,
and because He is present in all portions of space. A being is said to be
present wherever it perceives and acts. As God perceives and acts everywhere,
He is everywhere present. This however, does not preclude the presence of
other beings. A multitude of men even may perceive and act at the same time
and place. Besides, we have very little knowledge of the relation which spirit
bears to space. We know that bodies occupy portions of space to the exclusion,
of other bodies; but we do not know that spirits may not coexist in the same
portion of space. A legion of demons dwelt in one man.
B. Infinitude of God in relation
to Space.
The infinitude of God, so far as space is concerned,
includes his immensity and his omnipresence. These are not different
attributes, but one and the same attribute, viewed under different aspects.
His immensity is the infinitude of his being, viewed as belonging to his
nature from eternity. He fills immensity with his presence. His omnipresence
is the infinitude of his being, viewed in relation to his creatures. He is
equally present with all his creatures, at all times, and in all places. He is
not far from any one of us. "The Lord is in this place," may be said with
equal truth and confidence, everywhere. Theologians are accustomed to
distinguish three modes of presence in space. Bodies are in space
circumscriptively. They are bounded by it. Spirits are in space definitively.
They have an ubi. They are not everywhere, but only somewhere. God is
in space repletively. He fills all space. In other words, the limitations of
space have no reference to Him. He is not absent from any portion of space,
nor more present in one portion than in another. This of course is not to be
understood of extension or diffusion. Extension is a property of matter, and
cannot be predicated of God. If extended, He would be capable of division and
separation; and part of God would be here, and part elsewhere. Nor is this
omnipresence to be understood as a mere presence in knowledge and power. It is
an omnipresence of the divine essence. Otherwise the essence of God would be
limited. The doctrine, therefore, taught by the older Socinians that the
essence of God is confined to heaven (wherever that may be), and that He is
elsewhere only as to his knowledge and efficiency, is inconsistent with the
divine perfections and with the representations of Scripture. As God acts
everywhere, He is present everywhere; for, as the theologians say, a being can
no more act where he is not than when he is not.
The older and later theologians agree in this view of
the divine immensity and omnipresence. Augustine25
says God is not to be regarded as everywhere diffused, as the air or the
light: "Sed in solo coelo totus, et in sola terra totus, et in coelo et in
terra totus, et nullo contentus loco, sed in seipso ubique totus." Thomas
Aquinas says,26
Deus "est in omnibus per potentiam, in quantum omnia ejus potestati subduntur;
est per praesentiam in omnibus, in quantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis
ejus. Est in omnibus per essentiam in quantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi
sicut dictum est." Quenstedt says,27
"Est Deus ubique illocaliter, impartibiliter, efficaciter; non definitive ut
spiritus, non circumscriptive ut corpora, sed repletive citra sui
multiplicationem, extensionem, divisionem, inclusionem, aut commixtionem more
modoque divino incomprehensibili." The Bible teaches the infinitude of God, as
involving his immensity and omnipresence, in the clearest terms. He is said to
fill all in all, i. e., the universe in all its parts. (Eph. i. 23.)
"Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide
himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do not I
fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." (Jer. ixiii. 23, 24.) "Whither shall I
go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up
into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there.
If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the
sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me."
(Ps. cxxxix. 7-12.) It is "in Him we (i. e., all creatures) live, and
move, and have our being." (Acts xvii.
28.) Everywhere in the Old and in the
New Testamnent, God is represented as a spiritual Being, without form,
invisible, whom no man hath seen or can see; dwelling in the light which no
man can approach unto, and full of glory; as not only the creator, and
preserver, but as the governor of all things; as everywhere present, and
everywhere imparting life, and securing order; present in every blade of
grass, yet guiding Arcturus in his course, marshalling the stars as a host,
calling them by their names; present also in every human soul, giving it
understanding, endowing it with gifts, working in it both to will and to do.
The human heart is in his hands and He turneth it even as the rivers of water
are turned. Wherever, throughout the universe, there is evidence of mind in
material causes, there, according to the Scriptures, is God, controlling and
guiding those causes to the accomplishment of his wise designs. He is in all,
and over all things; yet essentially different from all, being over all,
independent, and infinitely exalted. This immensity and omnipresence of God,
therefore, is the ubiquity of the divine essence, and consequently of the
divine power, wisdom, and goodness. As the birds in the air and the fish in
the sea, so also are we always surrounded and sustained by God. It is thus
that He is infinite in his being, without absorbing all created beings into
his own essence, but sustaining all in their individual subsistence, and in
the exercise of their own powers.
§ 6. Eternity.
A. Scriptural Doctrine.
The infinitude of God relatively to space, is his
immensity or omnipresence; relatively to duration, it is his eternity. As He
is free from all the limitations of space, so He is exalted above all the
limitations of time. As He is not more in one place than in another, but is
everywhere equally present, so He does not exist during one period of duration
more than another. With Him there is no distinction between the present, past,
and future; but all things are equally and always present to Him. With Him
duration is an eternal now. This is the popular and the Scriptural view of
God's eternity. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst
formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art
God." (Ps. xc. 2.) "Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth: and the
heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure:
yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change
them, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall
have no end." (Ps. cii. 25-27.) He is "The high and lofty One that inhabiteth
eternity." (Is. lvii. 15.) "I am the first and I am the last; and besides me
there is no God." (Is. xliv. 6.) "A thousand years in thy sight are but as
yesterday when it is past." (Ps. xc. 4.) "One day is with the Lord as a
thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." (2 Pet. iii. 8.) He is "the
same yesterday, and today, and forever." (Heb. xiii. 8.) God is He "which is
[ever is], and which was, and which is to come." (Rev. i. 4.) Throughout the
Bible He is called the eternal or everlasting God; who only hath immortality.
The primal revelation of Himself to his covenant people was as the "I am."
What is taught in these and similar passages, is,
first, that God is without beginning of years or end of days. He is, and
always has been, and always will be; and secondly, that to Him there is
neither past nor future; that the past and the future are always and equally
present to Him.
B. Philosophical View.
These are Scriptural facts, and necessarily follow from
the nature of God as self-existent, infinite, and immutable. With these
representations the teaching of theologians for the most part agrees. Thus
Augustine says: "Fuisse et futurum esse non est in ea [scil. vita divina],
sed esse solum, quoniam aeterna est: nam fuisse et futurumn esse non est
aeternum."28
"Nec tu tempore tempora praecedis, alioquin non omnia tempora praecederes sed
praecedis omnia praeterita celsitudine semper praesentis aeternitatis; et
superas omnia futura, quia illa futura sunt et cum venerint praeterita erunt;
tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficiunt."29
Aquinas, to the same effect says, "AEternitas est tota simul."30
Or, as the schoolmen generally were accustomed to say, "In aeternitate est
unicum instans semper praesens et persistens;" or, as they otherwise expressed
it, "Eternitas est interminabilis vitae simul et perfecta possessio." The same
view of this attribute is given by the later theologians. Thus Quenstedt says,
"AEternitas Dei est duratio vel permanentia essentiae divinae interminabilis,
sine principio et fine carens, et indivisibilis, omnem omnino successionem
excludens."31
The only thing open to question in these statements is,
the denial of all succession in the divine consciousness. Our idea of eternity
is arrived at from our idea of time. We are conscious of existence in space,
and we are conscious of protracted or continuous existence. The ideas of space
and duration are necessarily given in the consciousness of continuous
existence. We see also that events succeed each other, that their occurrence
is separated by a longer or shorter period of duration, just as bodies are
separated by a greater or less interval in space. We therefore know, from
consciousness or from experience, of no kind of duration which is not
successive. Instead of saying, as is commonly done, that time is duration
measured by succession, which supposes that duration is antecedent to that by
which it is measured, and independent of it, it is maintained by some that
duration without succession is inconceivable and impossible. As space is
defined to be "negation betwixt the boundary-lines of form," so time is said
to be "the negation betwixt the boundary-points of motion." Or, in other
words, time is "the interval which a body in motion marks in its transit from
one point of space to another."32
Hence, if there be no bodies having form, there is no space; and if there is
no motion, there is no time. "If all things were annihilated, time as well as
space must he annihilated; for time is dependent on space. If all things were
annihilated, there could be no transition, no succession of one object with
respect to another; for there would be no object in being, -- all would be
perfect emptiness, nothingness, non-being-ness. Under an entire annihilation,
there could be neither space nor time."33
The same writer34
elsewhere says, "Were the earth, as well as the other globes of space,
annihilated, much more would time be annihilated therewith."35
All this, however, is to be understood, it is said, of "objective time, that
is, of time as dependent upon created material conditions."36
As objective timelessness follows from the annihilation of material
existences, so timelessness as regards thinking personalities is conceivable
only on the destruction of thought. "We have seen that there can be a state of
timelessness for material creation, only by destroying its operation, that is,
its attribute of motion: precisely in analogy therewith, there can be a state
of timelessness for intellectual creation, only by destroying the laws of
intellect, that is, its operation of thinking."37If,
therefore, God be a person, or a thinking Being, He cannot be timeless; there
must be succession; one thought or state must follow another. To deny this, it
is said, is to deny the personality of God. The dictum, therefore, of the
schoolmen, and of the theologians, that eternity precludes succession -- that
it is a persistent, unmoving Now -- is according to this repudiated.
There are, however, two senses in which succession is
denied to God. Time first has reference to external events. They are ever
present to the mind of God. He views them in all their relations, whether
causal or chronological. He sees how they succeed each other in time, as we
see a passing pageant, all of which we may take in in one view. In this there
is perhaps nothing which absolutely transcends our comprehension. The second
aspect of the subject concerns the relation of succession to the thoughts and
acts of God. When we are ignoramit, it is wise to be silent. We have no right
to affirm or deny, when we cannot know what our affirmation or denial may
involve or imply. We know that God is constantly producing new effects,
effects which succeed each other in time; but we do not know that these
effects are due to successive exercises of the divine efficiency. It is,
indeed, incomprehensible to us how it should be otherwise. The miracles of
Christ were due to the immediate exercise of the divine efficiency. We utter
words to which we can attach no meaning, when we say that these effects were
due, not to a contemporaneous act or volition of the divine mind, but to an
eternal act, if such a phrase be not a solecism. In like manner we are
confounded when we are told that our prayers are not heard and answered in
time -- that God is timeless -- that what He does in hearing and answering
prayer, and in his daily providence, He does from eternity. It is certain that
God is subject to all the limitations of personality, if there be any. But as
such limitations are the conditions of his being a person and not a mere
involuntary force, they are the conditions of his infinite perfection. As
constant thought and activity are involved in the very nature of a spirit,
these must belong to God; and so far as thinking and acting involve
succession, succession must belong to God. There are mysteries connected with
chronological succession, in our nature, which we cannot explain. We know that
in dreams months may be compressed into moments, and moments extended to
months, so far as our consciousness is concerned. We know that it often
happens to those near death, that all the past becomes instantly present. Had
God so constituted us that memory was as vivid as present consciousness, there
would to us be no past, so far as our personal existence is concerned. It is
not impossible that, hereafter, memory may become a consciousness of the past;
that all we ever thought, felt, or did, may be ever present to the mind; that
everything written on that tablet is indelible. Persons who, by long
residence in foreign countries, have entirely lost all knowledge of their
native language, have been known to speak it fluently, and understand it
perfectly, when they came to die. Still more wonderful is the fact that
uneducated persons, hearing passages read in an unknown language (Greek or
Hebrew, for example), have, years after, when in an abnormal, nervous state,
repeated those passages correctly, without understanding their meaning. If
unable to comprehend ourselves, we should not pretend to be able to comprehend
God. Whether we can understand how there can be succession in the thoughts of
Him who inhabits eternity or not, we are not to deny that God is an
intelligent Being, that He actually thinks and feels, in order to get over the
difficulty. God is a person, and all that personality implies must be true of
Him.
Modern Philosophical Views.
The modern philosophy teaches that "Die Ewigkeit ist
die Einheit in dem Unterschiede der Zeitmomente -- Ewigkeit und Zeit verhalten
sich wie die Substanz und deren Accidentien."38
That is, Eternity is the unity underlying the successive momnents of time, as
substance is the unity underlying the accidents which are its manifestations.
Schleiermacher's illustration is borrowed from our consciousness. We are
conscious of an abiding, unchanging self, which is the subject of our ever
changing thoughts and feelings. By the eternity of God, therefore, is meant
nothing more than that He is the ground-being of which the universe is the
ever changing phenonmenon. The eternity of God is only one phase of his
universal causality. "Unter der Ewigkeit Gottes verstehen wir die mit allem
Zeitlichen auch die Zeit selbst bedingende schlechthin zeitlose Ursachlichkeit
Gottes."39
To attain this philosophical view of eternity, we must accept the
philosophical view of the nature of God upon which it is founded, namely, that
God is merely the designation of that unknown and unknowable something of
which all other things are the manifestations. To give up the living, personal
God of the Bible and of the heart, is an awful sacrifice to specious, logical
consistency. We believe what we cannot understand. We believe what the Bible
teaches as facts; that God always is, was, and ever will be, immutably the
same; that all things are ever present to his view; that with Him there is
neither past nor future; but nevertheless that He is not a stagnant ocean, but
ever living, ever thinking, ever acting, and ever suiting his action to the
exigencies of his creatures, and to the accomplishment of his infinitely wise
designs. Whether we can harmonize these facts or not, is a matter of minor
importance. We are constantly called upon to believe that things are, without
being able to tell how they are, or even how they can be.
§7. Immutability.
The immutability of God is intimately connected with
his immensity and eternity, and is frequently included with them in the
Scriptural statements concerning his nature. Thus, when it is said, He is the
First and the Last; the Alpha and Omega, the same yesterday, to-day, and
forever; or when in contrast with the ever changing and perishing world, it is
said: "They shall be changed, but thou art the same;" it is not his eternity
more than his immutability that is brought into view. As an infinite and
absolute Being, self-existent and absolutely independent, God is exalted above
all the causes of and even above the possibility of change. Infinite space and
infinite duration cannot change. They must ever be what they are. So God is
absolutely immutable in his essence and attributes. He can neither increase
nor decrease. He is subject to no process of development, or of
self-evolution. His knowledge and power can never be greater or less. He can
never be wiser or holier, or more righteous or more merciful than He ever has
been and ever must be. He is no less immutable in his plans and purposes.
Infinite in wisdom, there can be no error in their conception; infinite in
power, there can be no failure in their accomplishment. He is "the Father of
lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." (James i.
17.) "God is not a man that He should lie; neither the son of man that He
should repent; hath He said and shall He not do it? or hath he spoken, and
shall He not make it good?" (Num. xxiii. 19.) "I am the LORD, I change not."
(Mal. iii. 6.) "The counsel of the LORD standeth forever; the thoughts of his
heart to all generations." (Ps. xxxiii. 11.) "There are many devices in a
man's heart; nevertheless, the counsel of the LORD, that shall stand." (Prov.
xix. 21.) "The LORD of Hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely as I have thought, so
shall it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand." (Is. xiv.
24.) "I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the
beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My
counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." (Is. xlvi. 9, 10.) Those
passages of Scripture in which God is said to repent, are to be interpreted on
the same principle as those in which He is said to ride upon the wings of the
wind, or to walk through the earth. These create no difficulty.
Philosophical Statement.
Theologians, in their attempts to state, in
philosophical language, the doctrine of the Bible on the unchangeableness of
God, are apt to confound immutability with immobility. In denying that God can
change, they seem to deny that He can act. Augustine says, on this subject:
"Non invenies in Deo aliquid mutabilitatis; non aliquid, quod aliter nunc sit,
aliter paulo ante fuerit. Nam ubi invenis aliter et aliter, facta est ibi
quaedam mors: mors enim est, non esse quod fuit."40
Quenstedt uses language still more open to objection, when he says that the
immutability of God is "Perpetua essentiae divinae et omnium ejus perfectionum
identitas, negans omnem omnino motum cum physicum, tum ethicum."41
Turrettin is more cautious, and yet perhaps goes too far. He says: "Potestas
variandi actus suos, non est principium mutabilitatis in se, sed tantum in
objectis suis; nisi intelligatur de variatione internorum suorum actuum,
quos voluntas perfecta non variat, sed imperfecta tantum."42
The clause italicized in the above quotation assumes a knowledge of the nature
of God to which man has no legitimate claim. It is in vain for us to presume
to understand the Almighty to perfection. We know that God is immutable in his
being, his perfections, and his purposes; and we know that He is perpetually
active. And, therefore, activity and immutability must be compatible; and no
explanation of the latter inconsistent with the former ought to be admitted.
The Absolute Attributes of God
not inconsistent with Personality.
These attributes of infinity, eternity, and
immutability, are freely admitted by the modern philosophy to belong to the
absolute Being. But it is maintained that such a Being cannot be a person.
Personality implies self-consciousness. Self-consciousness necessarily implies
limitation, a distinction between the self and the not-self. Ohne Du kein Ich,
-- unless there be something objective and independent to which we stand
opposed, as subject and object, there can be no consciousness of self. But
nothing can be thus objective and independent in relation to the Absolute;
and, therefore, the Absolute cannot have any consciousness of self, and
consequently cannot be a personal Being. We have already seen (chap. iv.) that
this objection is founded on an arbitrary definition of the Infinite and
Absolute. It assumes that the Infinite must be all, and that the Absolute must
be alone, without relation to anything out of itself. It is here only
necessary to remark, in reference to the objection, (1.) That it may be
admitted as a fact that the slumbering consciousness of self in the human soul
is awakened and developed by contact with what is not only external to itself
but also independent of it. But God is not subject to that law. He is
eternally perfect and immutable; having in Himself the plenitude of life.
There is, therefore, no analogy between the cases, and no ground for inferring
in this case that what is true in us, who begin life as an undeveloped germ,
must be true in relation to God. (2.) In the second place, we have no right to
assume that even with regard to a finite intelligence created in the
perfection of its being, self-consciousness is dependent on what is
independent of itself. Such a being would of necessity be conscious of its own
feelings; for thought is a state of consciousness in an intelligent being. If
God, therefore, can make an intelligent being in the perfection of its limited
nature, it would be self-conscious even were it left alone in the universe.
(3.) Admitting it to be true that "without a Thou there can be no I," we know
that, according to the Scriptures and the faith of the Church universal, there
are in the unity of the Godhead three distinct persons, the Father, the Son,
and the Spirit; so that from eternity the Father can say I, and the Son Thou.
We must abide by the teachings of Scripture, and refuse
to subordinate their authority and the intuitive convictions of our moral and
religious nature to the arbitrary definitions of any philosophical system. The
Bible everywhere teaches that God is an absolute Being, in the sense of being
self-existent, necessary, independent, immutable, eternal, and without
limitation or necessary relation to anything out of Himself. It teaches
moreover that He is infinite; not in the sense of including all being, all
power, all knowledge in Himself, to the exclusion of all other intelligent
agents; but in the sense that no limit can be assigned to his being or
perfections, other than that which arises out of his own perfection itself. He
would cease to be infinite could He be unwise or untrue. It is to be
remembered that God is infinite and absolute as a spirit, and a spirit from
its nature is living, active, intelligent, self-conscious, and personal.
§8. Knowledge.
A. Its Nature.
By knowledge is meant the intellectual apprehension of
truth. It supposes a subject and object; an intelligent subject that
apprehends, and something true that is apprehended.
So far as we are concerned, knowledge is either
intuitive or discursive. Our senses give us immediate knowledge of their
appropriate objects; the understanding perceives intuitively primary truths;
our moral and aesthetic nature gives us the immediate cognition of things
right or wrong, and beautiful or deformed. Most of our knowledge, however, is
derived ab extra, by instruction, observation, comparison, deduction,
etc. In all cases there is the distinction between the mind which perceives
and the object which is perceived.
Such being the nature of knowledge, can there be
knowledge in God? Can there be this distinction between subject and object in
an absolute and infinite Being? Not only are the wicked and the worldly
disposed to think that God cannot know; that either He is too exalted to take
cognizance of earthly things; or that it is impossible even for an infinite
mind to embrace the universe and all its perpetual changes in his mental
vision; but the possibility of knowledge, in the ordinary and proper sense of
the word, is expressly denied to God by a large class of philosophers, and
virtually even by many theologians of the highest rank in the history of the
Church.
The Pantheistic Theory precludes
the possibility of Knowledge of God
1. As, according to the pantheistic theory, the
universe is the existence form of God, as the infinite comes to intelligent
consciousness and life only in the finite, there is and can be no knowledge in
the infinite as distinguished from the finite. God lives only so far as finite
beings live; he thinks and knows only so far as they think and know.
Omniscience is only the sum or aggregate of the intelligence of the transient
forms of finite beings. All this, as even Hamilton and Mansel admit,
necessarily flows from the idea of an absolute Being which precludes the
possibility of any such conditions or relations as are involved in
consciousness or intelligence. Strauss therefore says:43
"Not in Himself, but in finite intelligences is God omniscient, which together
constitute the fulness or completeness of all the possible forms or degrees of
knowledge." And Spinoza says:44
"Intellectus et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu
et voluntate toto coelo differe deberent, nec in ulla re, praeterquam in
nomine, convenire possent; non aliter scilicet, quam inter se conveniunt canis,
signum coeleste, et canis, animal latrans." This subject was considered in the
chapter on Pantheism.
Knowledge and Power not to be
confounded.
2. The possibility of knowledge in God is virtually
denied by those who deny any distinction between knowledge and power.
Knowledge, which is power, ceases to be knowledge; and therefore if
omniscience is only a different name for omnipotence, it ceases to be a
distinct attribute of God. It makes little difference whether we expressly
deny a given perfection to God, or whether we so determine it as to make it
mean nothing distinctive. It is deeply to be regretted that not only the
Fathers, but also the Lutheran and Reformed theologians, after renouncing the
authority of the schoolmen, almost immediately yielded themselves to their
speculations. Instead of determining the nature of the divine attributes from
the representations of Scripture and from the constitution of man as the image
of God, and from the necessities of our moral and religious nature, they
allowed themselves to be controlled by a priori speculations as
to the nature of the infinite and absolute. Even Augustine, as before stated,
says: "Nos ista, qum fecisti videmus, quia sunt: tu autem quia vides ea, sunt."45
And
Scotus Erigena says,46
"Voluntas illius et visio et essentia anum est."47
. . . . "Visio Dei totius universitatis est conditio. Non enim aliud est ei
videre, aliud facere; sed visio illius voluntas ejus est, et voluntas operatio."
Thomas Aquinas also says,48
"Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere.
Unde necesse est, quod sua scientia sit causa rerum."
The Lutheran and Reformed theologians represent God as
simplicissima simplicitas, admitting of no distinction between faculty
and act, or between one attribute and another. Thus Gerhard says: "Deus est
ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum."49
"Solus Deus summe simplex est, ut nec actus et potentiae, nec esse et
essentiae compositio ipsi competat."50
"Essentia, bonitas, potentia, sapientia, justitia, et reliqua attributa omnia
sunt in Deo realiter unum."51
He also says: "In Deo idem est esse et intelligere et velle." In like manner
the Reformed theologian Heidegger52
says: "Voluntas ab intellectu non differt, quia intelligendo vult et volendo
intelligit. Intelligere et velle ejus idemque perpetuus indivisus actus." This
does not mean simply that in an intelligent being, every act of the will is an
intelligent act. He knows while he wills, and knows what he wills. The meaning
is, that knowledge and power in God are identical. To know a thing is, and to
will it, are the same undivided and perpetual act. From this it would seem to
follow, that as God knows from eternity He creates from eternity; and that
"all He knows, is." We are thus led, by these speculations, into pantheistical
views of the nature of God and of his relation to the world.
This mode of representation is carried still further by
the modern philosophical theologians. With Schleiermacher, all the attributes
of God are virtually merged into the idea of causality. With him God is ens
summum prima causa.53He
says that God's thinking and willing are the same, and that his omnipotence
and omimiscience are identical. When we say that He is omnipotent, we only
mean that He is the cause of all that is. And when we say that He is
omniscient, we only mean that He is an intelligent cause. His power and
knowledge are limited to the actual. The possible is nothing; it is the object
neither of knowledge nor of power. "Gott," says Schleiermacher, "weiss Alles
was ist; und Alles ist, was Gott weiss und dieses beides ist nicht zweierlei
sondern einerlei, weil sein Wissen und sein allmachtiges Wollen eines und
dasselbe ist," i. e., God knows all that is, and all is that God knows.
God, therefore, is limited to the world, which is the phenomenon of which He
is the substance.
Another philosophical view of this subject, adopted
even by those who repudiate the pantheistic system and maintain that God and
the world are distinct, is, that as God is immanent in the world, there is in
Him no difference between self-consciousness and world-consciousness, as they
express it, i. e., between God's knowledge of Himself and his knowledge
of the world. They therefore define omniscience by saying, "Insofern Gott
gedacht wird als die Welt mit seinem Bewusstseyn umfassend, nennen wir ihn den
Allwissenden."54
That is, "So far as we conceive of God as embracing the world in his
consciousness, we call him omniscient." Whatever such language may mean to
those who use it, to the ordinary mind it conveys the revolting idea that all
the sins of men enter into the consciousness of God.
The Doctrine of the Scriptures
on this Subject.
The Scriptural view of this subject, which
distinguishes the attributes in God as distinct, and assumes that knowledge in
Him, in its essential nature, is what knowledge is in us, does not conflict
with the unity and simplicity of God as a spiritual being. There is a sense in
which knowledge and power, intellect and will, may be said to be identical in
man. They are not different substances. They are different modes in which the
life or activity of the soul manifests itself. So in God when we conceive of
Him as a spirit, we do not think of Him as a compound being, but as
manifesting his infinite life and activity, in knowing, willing, and doing.
What, therefore, we must hold fast to, if we would hold fast to God, is, that
knowledge in God is knowledge, and not power or eternity; that it is what
knowledge is in us, not indeed in its modes and objects, but in its essential
nature. We must remove from our conceptions of the divine attributes all the
limitations and imperfections which belong to the corresponding attributes in
us; but we are not to destroy their nature. And in determining what is, and
what is not, consistent with the nature of God as an infinitely perfect being,
we are to be controlled by the teachings of the Scriptures, and by the
necessities (or laws) of our moral and religions nature, and not by our
speculative notions of the Infinite and Absolute. God, therefore, does and can
know in the ordinary and proper sense of that word. He is an ever present eye,
to which all things are perfectly revealed. "All things," says the Apostle,
"are naked and opened unto the eyes of Him with whom we have to do." (Heb. iv.
13.) "The darkness and the light are both alike" to Him. (Ps. cxxxix. 12.) "He
that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not
see?" (Ps. xciv. 9.) "O Lord thou hast searched me, and known me. Thou knowest
my down-sitting and my up-rising, thou understandest my thought afar off."
(Ps. cxxxix. 1, 2.) "The eyes of the LORD are in every place, beholding the
evil and the good" (Prov. xv. 3.) "Hell and destruction are before the Lord:
how much more then the hearts of the children of men?" (Prov. xv. 11.) "Great
is our Lord and of great power: his understanding is infinite." (Ps. cxlvii.
5.) "O house of Israel I know the things that come into your mind, every one
of them." (Ezek. xi. 5.) "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning
of the world." (Acts. xv. 18.) "The very hairs of your head are all numbered."
(Matt. x. 30.)
This knowledge of God is not only all-comprehending,
but it is intutive and immutable. He knows all things as they are, being as
being, phenomena as phenomena, the possible as possible, the actual as actual,
the necessary as necessary, the free as free, the past as past, the present as
present, the future as future. Although all things are ever present in his
view, yet He sees them as successive in time. The vast procession of events,
thoughts, feelings, and acts, stands open to his view.
This infinite knowledge of God is not only clearly and
constantly asserted in Scripture, but is also obviously included in the idea
of an absolutely perfect being. Such a being cannot be ignorant of anything;
his knowledge can neither be increased nor diminished. The omniscience of God
follows also from his omnipresence. As God fills heaven and earth, all things
are transacted in his presence. He knows our thoughts far better than they are
known to ourselves. This plenitude of divine knowledge is taken for granted in
all acts of worship. We pray to a God who, we believe, knows our state and
wants, who hears what we say, and who is able to meet all our necessities.
Unless God were thus omniscient, He could not judge the world in
righteousness. Faith in this attribute in its integrity is, therefore,
essential even to natural religion.
B. The Objects of Divine
Knowledge.
Various distinctions are made by theologians as to the
objects of the divine knowledge.
1. God is said to know Himself and all things out of
Himself. This is the foundation of the distinction between the scientia
necessarta and the scientia libera. God knows Himself by the
necessity of his nature; but as everything out of Himself depends for its
existence or occurrence upon his will, his knowledoe of each thing as an
actual occurrence is suspended on his will, and in that sense is free.
Creation not being necessary, it depended on the will of God whether the
universe as an object of knowledge should exist or not. This distinction is
not of much importance. And it is liable to the objection that it makes the
knowledge of God dependent. Being the cause of all things, God knows
everything by knowing Himself; all things possible, by the knowledge of his
power, and all things actual, by the knowledge of his own purposes.
2. This distinction between the possible and actual, is
the foundation of the distinction between the knowledge of simple intelligence
and the knowledge of vision. The former is founded on God's power, and the
latter upon his will. This only means that, in virtue of his omniscient
intelligence, He knows whatever infinite power can effect; and that from the
consciousness of his own purposes, He knows what He has determined to effect
or to permit to occur. This is a distinction which the modern philosophical
theologians ignore. Nothing, according to their philosophy is possible, but
the actual. All that can be, either is, or is to be. This follows from the
idea of God as mere cause. He produces all that can be; and there is in Him no
causality for what does not exist.
The Actual and the Possible.
It seems to be an inconsistency in those orthodox
theologians who deny the distinction in God between knowledge and power, to
admit, as they all do, the distinction between the actual and possible. For if
God creates by thinking or knowing, if in Him, as they say, intelligere et
facere idem est, then all he knows must be, and must be as soon as He
knows or thinks it, i. e., from eternity. If, however, we retain the
Scriptural idea of God as a spirit, who can do more than He does; if we
ascribe to Him what we know to be a perfection in ourselves, namely, that our
power exceeds our acts, that a faculty and the exercise of that faculty are
not identical, then we can understand how God can know the possible as well as
the actual. God is not limited to the universe, which of necessity is finite.
God has not exhausted Himself in determining to cause the present order of
things to be.
C. Scientia Media.
Intermediate between things possible and actual, some
theologians assume a third class of events, namely, the conditionally future.
They do not actually occur, but they would occur provided something else
should occur. Had Christ come a thousand years sooner than the date of his
actual advent, the whole history of the world would have been different. This
is a popular mode of regarding the concatenation of events. It is constantly
said, that if Cromwell had been permitted to leave England; or, if Napoleon
had failed to escape from Elba, the state of Europe would have been very
different from what it is at present. God, it is assumed, knows what would
have been the sequence of events on any or every possible hypothesis. It is
therefore said that there must be in God, besides the knowledge of simple
intelligence by which He knows the possible, and the knowledge of vision by
which He knows the actual, a scientia media, by which He knows the
conditionally future. Illustrations of this form of knowledge, it is thought,
are found in Scripture. In 1 Samuel xxiii. 11, it is said that David inquired
of the Lord whether the men of Keilah would deliver him, should he remain
among them, into the hands of Saul; and was answered that they would. Here, it
is argued, the event was not merely possible, but conditionally certain. If
David remained in Keilah, he certainly would have been delivered up. Thus our
Lord said, that if his mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon, the
people of those cities would have repented. Here again is declared what would
have happened, if something else had happened.
The Origin of this Distinction.
This distinction was introduced into theology by the
Jesuit theologians Fonseca and Molina; by the latter in his work "De Concordia
Providentiae et Gratiae Divinae cum Libero Arbitrio Hominis." Their object was
to reconcile the foreordination of God with the freedom of man, and to explain
the reason why some, and not others, were elected to eternal life. God foresaw
who would repent and believe, if they received the knowledge of the Gospel and
the gift of the Spirit, and these He elected to salvation. This theory of a
scientia media was, for a like purpose, adopted by the Lutheran and
Remonstrant theologians, but was strenuously opposed by the Reformed or
Augustinians. (1.) Because all events are included under the categories of the
actual and possible; and, therefore, there is no room for such a class as
events conditionally future. It is only possible, and not certain, how men
would act under certain conditions, if their conduct be not predeterminmod,
either by the purpose of God, or by their own decision already formed.
Besides, it is the fundamental principle of the theologians who adopt this
theory, or at least of many of them, that a free act must from its nature be
uncertain as to its occurrence. A free agent, it is said, can always act
contrary to any amount of influence brought to bear upon him, consistent with
his free agency. But if free acts must be uncertain, they cannot be foreseen
as certain under any conditions. (2.) The futurition of events, according to
the Scriptures, depends on the foreordination of God, whc foreordains whatever
comes to pass. There is no certainty, therefore, which does not depend on the
divine purpose. (3.) The kind of knowledge which this theory supposes cannot
belong to God, because it is inferential. It is deduced from a consideration
of second causes and their influence, and therefore is inconsistent with the
perfection of God, whose knowledge is not discursive, but independent and
intuitive. (4.) This theory is inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine of
God's providential government, as it assumes that the free acts of men are not
under his control. (5.) It is contrary to the Scriptural doctrine, inasmuch as
it supposes that election to salvation depends on the foresight of faith and
repentance, whereas it depends on the good pleasure of God. (6.) The examples
quoted from the Bible do not prove that there is a scientia media in
God. The answer of God to David, about the men of Keilah, was simply a
revelation of the purpose which they had already formed. Our Lord's
declaration concerning Tyre and Sidon was only a figurative mode of stating
the fact that the men of his generation were more hardened than the
inhabitants of those ancient cities. It is not denied that God knows all
events in all possible combinationis and connections, but as nothing is
certain but what he ordains to effect or permit, there can be no class of
events conditionally future, and therefore there can be no scientia media.
By conditionally future is meant what is suspended on a condition
undetermined by God.
D. Foreknowledge.
Among the objects of the divine kniowledge are the free
acts of men. The Scriptures abundantly teach that such acts are foreknown.
Such knowledge is involved in the prediction of events which either concern
the free acts of men, or are dependent on them. If God be ignorant of how free
agents will act, his knowledge must be limited, and it must be constantly
increasing, which is altogether inconsistent with the true idea of his nature.
His government of the world also, in that case, must be precarious, dependent,
as it would then be on the unforeseen conduct of men. The Church, therefore,
in obedience to the Scripuires, has, almost with one voice, professed faith in
God's foreknowledge of the free acts of his creatures.
The Socinians, however, and some of the Remonstrants,
unable to reconcile this foreknowledge with human liberty, deny that free acts
can be foreknown. As the omnipotence of God is his ability to do whatever is
possible, so his omniscience is his knowledge of everything knowable. But as
free acts are in their nature uncertain, as they may or may not be, they
cannot be known before they occur. Such is the argument of Socinus. This whole
difficulty arises out of the assumption that contingency is essential to free
agency. If an act may be certain as to its occurrence, and yet free as to the
mode of its occurrence, the difficulty vanishes. That free acts may be
absolutely certain, is plain, because they have in a multitude of cases been
predicted. It was certain that the acts of Christ would be holy, yet they were
free. The continued holiness of the saints in heaven is certain, and yet they
are perfectly free. The foreknowledge of God is inconsistent with a false
theory of free agency, but not with the true doctrine on that subject.
After Augustine, the common way of meeting the
difficulty of reconciling foreknowledge with liberty, was to represent it as
merely subjective. The distinction between knowledge and foreknowledge is only
in us. There is no such difference in God. "Quid est praescientia," asks
Augustine, "nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia
supergreditur tempora? Si enim scientia Dei res ipsas habet, non sunt ei
futurae, sed praesentes, ac per hoc non jam praescientia, sed tantum scientia
dicipotest."55
E. The Wisdom of God.
Wisdom and knowledge are intimately related. The former
is manifested in the selection of proper ends, and of proper means for the
accomplishment of those ends. As there is abundant evidence of design in the
works of nature, so all the works of God declare his wisdom. They show, from
the most minute to the greatest, the most wonderful adaptation of means to
accomplish the high end of the good of his creatures and the manifestation of
his own glory. So also, in the whole course of history, we see evidence of the
controlling power of God making all things work together for the best
interests of his people, and the promotion of his kingdom upon earth. It is,
however, in the work of redemption that this divine attribute is specially
revealed. It is by the Church, that God has determined to manifest, through
all ages, to principalities and powers, his manifold wisdom.
Of course those who deny final causes deny that there
is any such attribute as wisdom in God. It is also said that the use of means
to attain an end is a manifestation of weakness. It is further urged that it
is derogatory to God, as it supposes that He needs or desires what He does not
possess. Even Schleiermacher says: "Bei Gott is Allwissenheit und Weisheit so
ganzlich einerlei, dass die Unterscheidung keinen Werth hat, die Weisheit ware
nichts als auch wider absolute Lebendigkeit der Allmacht, also Alwissenheit."
Wisdom is omniscience, omniscience is omnipotence, omnipotence is simply
causality of all that is. Thus God sinks into the mere cause or ground of all
things. It is not thus the Scriptures speak. We are called on to worship, "The
only wise God." "O LORD, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast Thou made
them all," is the devout exclamation of the Psalmist. (Ps. civ. 24.) And in
contemplation of the work of redemption the Apostle exclaims, "O the depth of
the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!" (Rom. xi. 33.)
§9. The Will of God.
A. The Meaning of the Term.
If God is a spirit He must possess all the essential
attributes of a spirit. Those attributes, according to the classification
adopted by the older philosophers and theologians, fall under the heads of
intelligence and will. To the former, are referred knowledge and wisdom; to
the latter, the power of self-determination, efficiency (in the case of God,
omnipotence), and all moral attributes. In this wide sense of the word, the
will of God includes: (1.) The will in the narrow sense of the word. (2.) His
power. (3.) His love and all his moral perfections. In our day, generally but
not always, the word "will" is limited to the faculty of self-determination.
And even the older theologians in treating of the will of God treat only of
his decrees or purposes. In their definitions, however, they take the word in
its wide sense. Thus Calovius56
says, "Voluntas Dei est, qua Deus tendit in bonum ab intellectu cognitum." And
Quenstedt defines it as "ipsa Dei essentia cum, connotatione inclinationis ad
bonum concepta."57
Turrettin says, the object of the intellect is the true; the object of the
will, the good. Hence it is said, that God wills Himself necessarily, and all
things out of Himself freely. Although the word seems to be taken in different
senses in the same sentence, God's willing Himself means that He takes
complacency in his own infinite excellence: his willing things out of Himself,
means his purpose that they should exist. Although the theologians start with
the wide definition of the word, yet in the prosecution of the subject they
regard the will as simply the faculty of self-determination, and the
determinations themselves. That is, the power to will, and volitions or
purposes. It is altogether better to confine the word to this its proper
meaning, and not make it include all the forms of feeling involving
approbation or delight.
God then as a spirit is a voluntary agent. We are
authorized to ascribe to Him the power of self-determination. This the Bible
everywhere does. From the beginning to the end, it speaks of the will of God,
of his decrees, purposes, counsels, and commands. The will is not only an
essential attribute of our spiritual being, but it is the necessary condition
of our personality. Without the power of rational self-determination we should
be as much a mere force as electricity, or magnetism, or the principle of
vegetable life. It is, therefore, to degrade God below the sphere of being
which we ourselves occupy, as rational creatures, to deny to Him the power of
self-determination; of acting or not acting, according to his own good
pleasure.
B. The Freedom of the Divine
Will.
The will of God is free in the highest sense of the
word. An agent is said to be free, (1.) When he is at liberty to act or not to
act, according to his good pleasure. This is liberty in acting. (2.) He is
free as to his volitions, when they are determined by his own sense of what is
wise, right, or desirable.
Freedom is more than spontaneity. The affections are
spontaneous, but are not free. Loving and hating, delighting in and abhorring,
do not depend upon the will.
God is free in acting, as in creating and preserving,
because these acts do not arise from the necessity of his nature. He was free
to create or not create; to continue the universe in existence or to cause it
to cease to be. He is free also in keeping his promises, because his purpose
so to do is determined by his own infinite goodness. It is indeed
inconceivable that God should violate his word. But this only proves that
moral certainty may be as inexorable as necessity.
C. The Decretive and Preceptive
Will of God.
The decretive will of God concerns his purposes, and
relates to the futurition of events. The preceptive will relates to the rule
of duty for his rational creatures. He decrees whatever he purposes to effect
or to permit. He prescribes, according to his own will, what his creatures
should do, or abstain from doing. The decretive and preceptive will of God can
never be in conflict. God never decrees to do, or to cause others to do, what
He forbids. He may, as we see He does, decree to permit what He forbids. He
permits men to sin, although sin is forbidden. This is more scholastically
expressed by the theologians by saying, A positive decretive will cannot
consist with a negative preceptive will; i. e., God cannot decree to
make men sin. But a negative decretive will may consist with an affirmative
preceptive will; e. g., God may command men to repent and believe, and
yet, for wise reasons, abstain from giving them repentance.
The distinction between voluntas beneplaciti et
signi, as those terms are commonly used, is the same as that between the
deeretive and preceptive will of God. The one referring to his decrees,
founded on his good pleasure; the other to his commands, founded on what He
approves or disapproves.
By the secret will of God, is meant his purposes, as
still hidden in his own mind; by his revealed will, his precepts and his
purposes, as far as they are made known to his creatures.
D. Antecedent and Consequent
Will.
These terms, as used by Augustinians, have reference to
the relation of the decrees to each other. In the order of nature the end
precedes the means, and the purpose of the former is antecedent to the purpose
of the latter. Thus it is said, that God by an antecedent will, determined on
the manifestation of his glory; and by a consequent will, determined on the
creation of the world as a means to that end.
By Lutherans and Remonstrants these terms are used in a
very different sense. According to their views, God by an antecedent will
determined to save all men; but, foreseeing that all would not repent and
believe, by a subsequent will He determined to save those who he foresaw would
believe. That is, He first purposed one thing and then another.
E. Absolute and Conditional
Will.
These terms, when employed by Augustinians, have
reference not so much to the purposes of God, as to the events which are
decreed. The event, but not the purpose of God, is conditional. A maw reaps,
if he sows. He is saved, if he believes. His reaping and salvation are
conditional events. But the purpose of God is absolute. If He purposes that a
man shall reap, He purposes that he shall sow; if He purposes that he shall be
saved, He purposes that he shall believe. Anti-Augustinians, on the other
hand, regard the purposes of God as conditional. He purposes the salvation of
a man, if he believes. But whether he believes or not, is left undetermined;
so that the purpose of God is suspended on a condition not under his control,
or, at least, undecided. A father may purpose to give an estate to his son, if
he be obedient; but whether the son will fulfil the condition is undetermined,
and therefore the purpose of the father is undecided. It is, however,
manifestly inconsistent with the perfection of God, that He should first will
one thing and then another; nor can his purposes be dependent on the
uncertainty of human conduct or events. These are questions, however, which
belong to the consideration of the doctrine of decrees. They are mentioned
here because these distinctions occur in all discussions concerning the Divine
Will, with which the student of theology should be familiar.
In this place it is sufficient to remark, that the
Greek word qe,lw, and the corresponding English
verb, to will, sometimes express feeling, and sometimes a purpose. Thus
in Matt. xxvii. 48, the words eiv qe,lei auvto,nare
correctly rendered, "if he delight in him." Comp. Ps. xxii. 8. It is in this
sense the word is used, when it is said that God wills all men to be saved. He
cannot be said to purpose or determine upon any event which is not to come to
pass. A judge may will the happiness of a man whom he sentences to death. He
may will him not to suffer when he wills him to suffer. The infelicity in such
forms of expression is that the word "will" is used in different senses. In
one part of the sentence it means desire, and in the other purpose. It is
perfectly consistent, therefore, that God, as a benevolent Being, should
desire the happiness of all men, while he purposes to save only his own
people.
F. The Will of God as the Ground
of Moral Obligation.
The question on this subject is, Whether things are
right or wrong, simply because God commands or forbids them? Or, does He
command or forbid them, because they are right or wrong for some other reason
than his will? According to some, the only reason that a thing is right, and
therefore obligatory, is, that it tends to promote the greatest happiness, or
the greatest good of the universe. According to others, a thing is right which
tends to promote our own happiness; and for that reason, and for that reason
alone, it is obligatory. If vice would make us happier than virtue, we should
be bound to be vicious. It is a more decorous mode of expressing substantially
the same theory, to say that the ground of moral obligation is a regard to the
dignity of our own nature. It makes little difference whether it be our own
dignity of our own happiness, which we are bound to regard. It is self, in
either case, to whom our whole allegiance is due. Others, again, place the
ground of moral obligation in the fitness of things, which they exalt above
God. There is, they affirm, an eternal and necessary difference between right
and wrong, to which God, it is said, is as much bound to be conformed as are
his rational creatures.
The common doctrine of Christians on this subject is,
that the will of God is the ultimate ground of moral obligation to all
rational creatures. No higher reason can be assigned why anything is right
than that God commands it. This means, (1.) That the divine will is the only
rule for deciding what is right and what is wrong. (2.) That his will is that
which binds us, or that to which we are bound to be conformed. By the word
"will" is not meant any arbitrary purpose, so that it were conceivable that
God should will right to be wrong, or wrong right. The will of God is the
expression or revelation of his nature, or is determined by it; so that his
will, as revealed, makes known to us what infinite wisdom and goodness demand.
Sometimes things are right simply because God has commanded them; as
circumcision, and other ritual institutions were to the Jews. Other things are
right because of the present constitution of things which God has ordained;
such as the duties relating to property, and the permanent relations of
society. Others, again, are right because they are demanded by the immutable
excellence of God. In all cases, however, so far as we are concerned, it is
his will that binds us, and constitutes the difference between right and
wrong; his will, that is, as the expression of his infinite perfection. So
that the ultimate foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God.
§10. The Power of God.
A. The Nature of Power, or, The
Origin of the Idea.
We get the idea of power from our own consciousness.
That is, we are conscious of the ability of producing effects. Power in man is
confined within very narrow limits. We can change the current of our thoughts,
or fix our attention on a particular object and we can move the voluntary
muscles of our body. Beyond this our direct power does not extend. It is from
this small measure of efficiency that all the stores of human knowledge and
all the wonders of human art are derived. It is only our thoughts, volitions,
and purposes, together with certain acts of the body, that are immediately
subject to the will. For all other effects we must avail ourselves of the use
of means. We cannot will a book, a picture, or a house into existence. The
production of such effect
