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Youngs
Literal Translation
King
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The 1599
Geneva
Study Bible
American Standard ASV-1901
Historical Book
Flavius Josephus
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(Intro)
CHAPTER III.
Rationalism
§1. Meaning and Usage of the
Word. §
2. Deistical Rationalism. § 3.
The Second Form of Rationalism.
§ 4. Dogmatism, or
the Third Form of Rationalism. § 5. Proper Office
of Reason in Matters of Religion.
§ 6. Relation of
Philosophy and Revelation. §
7. Office of the Senses in Matters of Faith.
§ 1. Meaning
and Usage of the Word.
BY Rationalism is meant the system or theory which
assigns undue authority to reason in matters of religion. By reason is not to
be understood the Logos as revealed in man, as held by some of the Fathers,
and by Cousin and other modern philosophers, nor the intuitional faculty as
distinguished from the understanding or the discursive faculty. The word is
taken in its ordinary sense for the cognitive faculty, that which perceives,
compares, judges, and infers.
Rationalism has appeared under different forms. (1.)
The Deistical, which denies either the possibility or the fact of any
supernatural revelation, and maintains that reason is both the source and
ground of all religious knowledge and conviction. (2.) That which while it
admits the possibility and the fact of a supernatural revelation, and that
such a revelation is contained in the Christian Scriptures, nevertheless
maintains that the truths revealed are the truths of reason; that is, truths
which reason can comprehend and demonstrate. (3.) The third form of
Rationalism has received the name of Dogmatism, which admits that many of the
truths of revelation are undiscoverable by human reason, and that they are to
be received upon authority. Nevertheless, it maintains that those truths when
revealed admit of being philosophically explained and establishedand raised
from the sphere of faith into that of knowledge.
Rationalism in all its forms proceeds on the ground of
Theism, that is, the belief of an extramundane personal God. When, therefore,
Monism, which denies all dualism and affirms the identity of God and the
world, took possession of the German mind, Rationalism, in its old form,
disappeared. There was no longer any room for the distinction between reason
and God, between the natural and the supernatural. No class of men, therefore,
are more contemptuous in their opposition to the Rationalists, than the
advcates of the modern, or, as it perhaps may be more properly designated, the
modern pantheistic philosophy of Germany.
Although in a measure banished from its recent home, it
continues to prevail in all its forms, variously modified, both in Europe and
America. Mansel, in his "Limits of Religious Thought,"1
includes under the head of Rationalism every system which makes the final test
of truth to be "the direct assent of the human consciousness, whether in the
form of logical deduction, or moral judgment, or religious intuition, by
whatever previous process these faculties may have been raised to their
assumed dignity as arbitrators." This, however, would include systems
radically different in their nature.
§ 2. Deistical Rationalism.
A. Possibility of a Supernatural Revelation.
The first point to be determined in the controversy
with the Deistical Rationalists, concerns the possibility of a supernatural
revelation. This they commonly deny, either on philosophical or moral grounds.
It is said to be inconsistent with the nature of God, and with his relation to
the world, to suppose that He interferes by his direct agency in the course of
events. The true theory of the universe, according to their doctrine, is that
God having created the world and endowed his creatures with their attributes
and properties, He has done all that is consistent with his nature. He does
not interfere by his immediate agency in the production of effects. These
belong to the efficiency of second causes. Or if the metaphysical possibility
of such intervention be admitted, it is nevertheless morally impossible,
because it would imply imperfection in God. If his work needs his constant
interference it must be imperfect, and if imperfect, it must be that God is
deficient either in wisdom or power.
That this is a wrong theory of God's relation to the
world is manifest. (1.) Becasse it contradicts the testimony of our moral
nature. The relation in which we stand to God, as that relation reveals itself
in our consciousness, implies that we are constantly in the presence of a God
who takes cognizance of our acts, orders our circumstances, and interferes
constantly for our correction or protection. He is not to us a God afar off,
with whom we have no immediate concern; but a God who is not far from any one
of us, in whom we live, move, and have our being, who numbers the hairs of our
head, and without whose notice a sparrow does not fall to the ground. (2.)
Reason itself teaches that the conception of God as a ruler of the world,
having his creatures in his hands, able to control them at pleasure, and to
hold communion with them, is a far higher conception and more consistent with
the idea of infinite perfection, than that on which this system of Rationalism
is founded. (3.) The common consciousness of men is opposed to this doctrine,
as is plain from the fact that all nations, the most cultivated and the most
barbarous, have been forced to conceive of God as a Being able to take
cognizance of human affairs, and to reveal himself to his creatures. (4.) The
argument from Scripture, although not admitted by Rationalists, is for
Christians conclusive. The Bible reveals a God who is constantly and
everywhere present with his works, and who acts upon them, not only mediately,
but immediately, when, where, and how He sees fit.
B. Necessity of a Supernatural Revelation.
Admitting, however, the metaphysical possibility of a
supernatural revelation, the next question is whether such a revelation is
necessary. This question must be answered in the affirmative. (1.) Because
every man feels that he needs it. He knows that there are questions concerning
the origin, nature, and destiny of man; concerning sin, and the method in
which it can be pardoned and conquered, which he cannot answer. They are
questions, however, which must be answered. So long as these problems are
unsolved, no man can be either good or happy. (2.) He is equally certain that
no man answers these questions for his felilow-men. Every one sees intuitively
that they relate to matters beyond the reach of human reason. What can reason
decide as to the fate of the soul after death? Can he who has been unable to
make himself holy or happy here, secure his own well-being in the eternal
future? Every man, without a supernatural revelation, no matter how much of a
philosopher, knows that death is the entrance on the unknown. It is the gate
into darkness. Men must enter that gate conscious that they have within them
an imperishable life combined with all the elements of perdition. Is it not
self-evident then that immortal sinners need some one to answer with authority
the question, What must I do to be saved? To convince a man that there is no
sin, and that sin does not involve misery, is as impossible as to convince a
wretch that he is not unhappy. The necessity of a divine revelation,
therefore, is a simple matter of fact, of which every man is in his heart
convinced. (3.) Admitting that philosophers could solve these great problems
to their own satisfaction, What is to become of the mass of mankind? Are they
to he left in darkness and despair? (4.) The experience of ages proves that
the world by wisdom knows not God. The heathen nations, ancient and modern,
civilized and savage, have without exception, failed by the light of nature to
solve any of the great problems of humanity. This is the testimony of history
as well as of Scripture. (5.) Even where the light of revelation is enjoyed,
it is found that those who reject its guidance, are led not only to the most
contradictory conclusions, but to the adoption of principles, in most cases,
destructive of domestic virtue, social order, and individial worth and
happiness. The reason of man has led the great body of those who know no other
guide, into what has been well called, "The Hell of Pantheism."
C. The Scriptures contain such a Revelation.
Admitting the possibility and even the necessity of a
supernatural revelation, Has such a revelation been actually made? This the
Deistical Rationalist denies, and the Christian affirms. He confidently refers
to the Bible as containing such a revelation, and maintains that its claims
are authenticated by an amount of evidence which renders unbelief unreasonable
and criminal.
1. In the first place, its authors claim to be the
messengers of God, to speak by his authority and in his name, so that what
they teach is to be received not on the authority of the writers themselves,
nor on the ground of the inherent evidence in the nature of the truths
communicated, but upon the authority of God. It is He who affirms what the
sacred writers teach. This claim must be admitted, or the sacred writers must
be regarded as fanatics or impostors. It is absolutely certain that they were
neither. It would be no more irrational to pronounce Homer and Newton idiots,
than to set down Isaiah and Paul as either impostors or fanatics. It is as
certain as any self-evident truth, that they were wise, good, sober-minded
men. That such men should falsely assume to be the authoritative messengers of
God, and to be endowed with supernatural powers in confirmation of their
misson, is a contradiction. It is to affirm that wise and good men are foolish
and wicked.
2. The Bible contains nothing inconsistent with the
claim of its authors to divine authority as teachers. It contains nothing
impossible, nothing absurd, nothing immoral, nothing inconsistent with any
well-authenticated truth. This itself is well-nigh miraculous, considering the
circumstances under which the different portions of the Scriptures were
written.
3. More than this, the Bible reveals truths of the
highest order, not elsewhere made known. Truths which meet the most urgent
necessities of our nature; which solve the problems which reason has never
been able to solve. It recognizes and authenticates all the facts of
consciousness, all the truths which our moral and religious nature involve,
and which we recognize as true as soon as they are presented. It has the same
adaptation to the soul that the atmosphere has to the lungs, or the solar
influences to the earth on which we live. And what the earth would be without
those influences, is, in point of fact, what the soul is without knowledge of
the truths which we derive solely from the Bible.
4. The several books of which the Scriptures are
composed were written by some fifty different authors living in the course of
fifteen hundred years and yet they are found to be an organic whole, the
product of one mind. They are as clearly a development as the oak from the
acorn. The gospels and epistles are but the expansion, fulfilment, the
culmination of the protevangelium, "The seed of the woman shall bruise the
serpents head," as uttered to our first parents (Gen. iii. 15). All that
intervenes is to the New Testament what the roots, stem, branches, and foliage
of the tree are to the fruit. No one book of Scripture can be understood by
itself, any more than any one part of a tree or member of the body can be
understood without reference to the whole of which it is a part. Those who
from want of attention do not perceive this organic relation of the different
parts of the Bible, cannot appreciate the argument thence derived in favor of
its divine origin. They who do perceive it, cannot resist it.
Argument from Prophecy.
5. God bears witness to the divine authority of the
Scriptures by signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy
Ghost. The leading events recorded in the New Testament were predicted in the
Old. Of this any man may satisfy himself by a comparison of the two. The
coincidence between the prophecies and the fulfilment admits of no rational
solution, except thst the Bible is the work of God; or, that holy men of old
spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. The miracles recorded in the
Scriptures are historical events, which are not only entitled to be received
on the same testimony which authenticates other facts of history, but they are
so implicated with the whole structure of the New Testament, that they cannot
be denied without rejecting the whole gospel, which rejection involves the
denial of the best authenticated facts in the history of the world.
Argument from the Effects of the Gospel.
Besides this external supernatural testimony, the Bible
is everywhere attended by "the demonstration of the Spirit," which gives to
its doctrines the clearness of self-evident truths, and the authority of the
voice of God; analogous to the authority of the moral law for the natural
conscience.
6. The Bible ever has been and still is, a power in the
world. It has determined the course of history. It has overthrown false
religion wherever it is known. It is the parent of modern civilization. It is
the only guarantee of social order, of virtue, and of human rights and
liberty. Its effects cannot be rationally accounted for upon any other
hypothesis than that it is what it claims to be, "The Word of God."
7. It makes known the person, work, the acts, and words
of Christ, who is the clearest revelation of God ever made to man. He is the
manifested God. His words were the words of God. His acts were the acts of
God. His voice is the voice of God, and He said, "The Scripture cannot be
broken" (John x. 35). If any man refuse to recognize him as the Son of God, as
the infallible teacher, and only Saviour of men, nothing can be said save what
the Apostle says, "If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost: in
whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not,
lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God,
should shine unto them. For God, who commanded the light to shine out of
darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the
glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." (2 Cor. iv. 3, 4, 6.)
Deistical Rationalism is in Germany sometimes called
Naturalism, as distinguished from Supernaturalism; as the former denies, and
the latter affirms, an agency or operation above nature in the conduct of
events in this world. More commonly, however, by Naturalism is meant the
theory which denies the existence of any higher power than nature, and
therefore is only another name for atheism. It is, consequently, not a proper
designation of a system which assumes the existence of a personal God.
§ 3. The Second Form of Rationalism.
A. Its Nature.
The more common form of Rationalism admits that the
Scriptures contain a supernatural revelation. It teaches, however, that the
object of that revelation is to make more generally known, and to authenticate
for the masses, the truths of reason, or doctrines of natural religion. These
doctrines are received by cultivated minds not on the ground of authority, but
of rational evidence. The fundamental principle of this class of Rationalists
is, that nothing can be rationally believed which is not understood. "Nil
credi posse, quod a ratione capi et intelligi nequeat." If asked, Why he
believes in the immortality of the soul? the Rationalist answers, Because the
doctrine is reasonable. To his mind, the arguments in its favor outweigh those
against it. If asked, Why he does not believe the doctrine of the Trinity? he
answers, Because it is unreasonable. The philosophical arguments against it
outweigh the arguments from reason, in its favor. That the sacred writers
teach the doctrine is not decisive. The Rationalist does not feel bound to
believe all that the sacred writers teach. The Bible, he admits, contains a
Divine revelation. But this revelation was made to fallible men, men under no
supernatural guidance in communicating the truths revealed. They were men
whose mode of thinking, and manner of arguing, and of presenting truth, were
modified by their culture, and by the modes of thought prevailing during the
age in which they lived. The Scriptures, therefore, abound with
misapprehensions, with inconclusive arguments, and accommodations to Jewish
errors, superstitions, arid popular beliefs. It is the office of reason to
sift these incongruous materials, and separate the wheat from the chaff. That
is wheat which reason apprehends in its own light to be true; that is to be
rejected as chaff which reason cannot understand, and cannot prove to be true.
That is, nothing is true to us which we do not see for ourselves to be true.
B. Refutation.
It is sufficient to remark on this form of Rationalism,
--
1. That it is founded upon a false principle. It is not
necessary to the rational exercise of faith that we should understand the
truth believed. The unknown and the impossible cannot be believed; but every
man does, and must believe the incomprehensible. Assent to truth is founded on
evidence. That evidence may be external or intrinsic. Some things we believe
on the testimony of our senses; other things we believe on the testimony of
men. Why, then, may we not believe on the testimony of God? A man may believe
that paper thrown upon fire will burn, although he does not understand the
process of combustion. All men believe that plants grow, and that like begets
like; but no man understands
the mystery of reproduction. Even the Positivist who would reduce all belief
to zero, is obliged to admit the incomprehensible to be true. And those who
will believe neither in God nor spirit because they are invisible and
intangible, say that all we know is the unknowable, -- we know only force, but
of force we know nothing but that it is, and that it persists.
If, therefore, the incomprehensible must be believed in every other department
of knowledge, no rational ground can be given why it should be banished from
religion.
2. Rationalism assumes that the human intelligence is
the measure of all truth. This is an insane presumption on the part of such a
creature as man. If a child believes with implicit confidence what it cannot
understand, on the testimony of a parent, surely man may believe what he
cannot understand, on the testimony of God.
3. Rationalism destroys the distinction between faith
and knowledge, which all men and all ages admit. Faith is assent to truth
founded on testimony, "credo quod non video." Knowledge is assent founded on
the direct or indirect, the intuitive or discursive, apprehension of its
object. If there can be no rational faith, if we are to receive as true only
what we know and understand, the whole world is beggared. It loses all that
sustains, beautifies, and ennobles life.
4. The poor cannot be Rationalists. If we must
understand what we believe, even on the principles of the Rationalists, only
philosophers can be religious. They alone can comprehend the rational grounds
on which the great truths of even natural religion are to be received.
Widespread, therefore, as has been the influence of a Rationalistic spirit, it
has never taken hold of the people; it has never controlled the creed of any
church; because all religion is founded on the incomprehensible and the
infinite.
5. The protest, therefore, which our religious nature
makes against the narrow, cold, and barren system of Rationalism, is a
sufficient proof that it cannot be true, because it cannot meet our most
urgent necessities. The object of worship must be infinite, and of necessity
incomprehensible.
6. Faith implies knowledge. And if we must understand
in order to know, faith and knowledge become alike impossible. The principle,
therefore, on which Rationalism is founded, leads to Nihilism, or universal
negation. Even the latest form of philosophy, taking the lowest possible
ground as to religious faith, admits that we are surrounded on every side by
the incomprehensible.
Herbert Spencer, in his "First Principles of a New
Philosophy," asserts, p. 45, "the omnipresence of something which passes
comprehension." He declares that the ultimate truth in which all forms of
religion agree, and in which religion and science are in harmony, is, "That
the Power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable."2
The inscrutable, the incomprehensible, what we cannot understand, must
therefore of necessity be rationally the object of faith. And consequently
reason, rational demonstration, or philosophical proof is not the ground of
faith. We may rationally believe what we cannot understand. We may be assured
of truths which are encompassed with objections which we cannot satisfactorily
answer.
C. History.
The modern form of Deistic Rationalism had its rise in
England during the latter part of the seventeenth, and the first half of the
eighteenth centuries. Lord Herbert, who died as early as 1648, in his work,
"De Veritate, prout distinguitur a Revelatione," etc., taught that all
religion consists in the acknowledgment of the following truths: 1. The
existence of God. 2. The dependence of man on God, and his obligation to
reverence him.
3. Piety consists in the harmony of the human faculties.
4. The
essential difference between good and evil.
5. A future state of rewards and
punishment. These he held to be intuitive truths, needing no proof, and
virtually believed by all men. This may be considered as the confession of
Faith of all Deists, and even of those Rationalists who admit a supernatural
revelation; for such revelation, they maintain, can only authenticate what
reason itself teaches. Other writers quickly followed in the course opened by
Lord Herbert; as, Toland in his "Christianity without Mystery," 1696, a work
which excited great attention, and drew out numerous refutations. Toland ended
by avowing himself a Pantheist. Hobbes was a Materialist. Lord Shaftesbury,
who died 1773, in his "Characteristics," "Miscellaneous Treatises," and
"Moralist," made ridicule the test of truth. He declared revelation and
inspiration to be fanaticism. Collins (died 1729) was a more serious writer.
His principal works were, "An Essay on Free-thinking," and "The Grounds and
Reasons of Christianity." Lord Bolingbroke, Secretary of State under Queen
Anne, "Letters on the Study and Utility of History." Matthew Tindal,
"Christianity as Old as the Creation " Tindal, instead of attacking
Christianity in detail, attempted to construct a regular system of Deism. He
maintained that God could not intend that men should ever be without a
religion adequate to all their necessities, and therefore that a revelation
can only make known what every man has in his own reason. This internal and
universal revelation contains the two truths: 1. The existence of God. 2. That
God created man not for his own sake, but for man's. By far the most able and
influential of the writers of this class was David Hume. His "Essays" in four
volumes contain his theological views. The most important of these are those
on the Natural History of Religion, and on Miracles. His "Dialogues on Natural
Religion" is regarded as the ablest work ever written in support of the
Deistical, or rather, Atheistical system.
From England the spirit of infidelity extended into
France. Voltaire, Rousseau, La Mettrie, Holbach, D'Alembert, Diderot, and
others, succeeded for a time in overthrowing all religious faith in the
governing classes of society.
Rationalism in Germany.
In Germany the Rationalistic defection began with such
men as Baumgarten, Ernesti, and John David Michaelis, who did not deny the
divine authority of the Scriptures, but explained away their doctrines. These
were followed by such men as Semler, Morus, and Eichhorn, who were thoroughly
neological. During the latter part of the last, and first part of the present
century, most of the leading church historians, exegetes, and theologians of
Germany, were Rationalists. The first serious blow given to their system was
by Kant. The Rationalists assumed that they were able to demonstrate the
truths of natural religion on the principles of reason. Kant, in his "Critic
of Pure Reason," undertook to show that reason is incompetent to prove any
religious truth. The only foundation for religion he maintained was our moral
consciousness. That consciousness involved or implied the three great
doctrines of God, liberty, and immortality. His successors, Fichte and
Schelling, carried out the principles which Kant adopted to prove that the
outward world is an unknown something, to show that there was no such world;
that there was no real distinction between the ego and non-ego, the subjective
and objective; that both are modes of the manifestation of the absolute. Thus
all things were merged into one. This idealistic Pantheism having displaced
Rationalism, has already yielded the philosophic throne to a subtle form of
Materialism.
Bretschneiders "Entwickelung aller in der Dogmatik
vorkommenden Begriffe," gives a list of fifty-two works on the rationalistic
controversy in Germany. The English books written against the Rationalists or
Deists of Great Britain, and on the proper office of reason in matters of
religion, are scarcely less numerous. Some of the more important of these
works are the following: "Boyle on Things above Reason," Butler's "Analogy of
Religion and Nature," Conybeare's "Defence of Religion," "Hulsean Lectures,"
Jackson's "Examination," "Jew's Letters to Voltaire," Lardner's "Credibility
of the Gospel History," Leland's "Advantage and Necessity of Revelation,"
Leslie's "Short and Easy Method with Deists." Warburton's "View of
Bolingbroke's Philosophy," and his "Divine Legation of Moses," John Wilson's
"Dissertation on Christianity," etc., etc. See Staudlin's "Geschichte des
Rationalismus," and a concise and instructive history of theology during the
eighteenth century, by Dr. Tholuck in "Biblical Repertory and Princeton
Review" for 1828. Leibnitz's "Discours de la Conformite de la Foi avec la
Raison," in the Preface to his "Theodicee," and Mansel's "Limits of Religious
Thought," deserve the careful perusal of the theological student. The most
recent works on this general subject are Lecky's "History of Rationalism in
Europe, and "History of Rationalism, embracing a survey of the present state
of Protestant Theology," by Rev. John F. Hurst, A. M. The latter is the most
instructive publication in the English language on modern skepticism.
§ 4. Dogmatism, or the Third
Form of Rationalism.
A. Meaning of the Term.
It was a common objection made in the early age of the
Church against Christianity, by the philosophical Greeks, that its doctrines
were received upon authority, and not upon rational evidence. Many of the
Fathers, specially those of the Alexandrian school, answered that this was
true only of the common people. They could not be expected to understand
philosophy. They could receive the high spiritual truths of religion only on
the ground of authority. But the educated classes were able and were bound to
search after the philosophical or rational evidence of the doctrines taught in
the Bible, and to receive those doctrines on the ground of that evidence. They
made a distinction, therefore, between pi,stij and
gnw/sij,faith and knowledge. The former was for the
oommon people, the latter for the cultivated. The objects of faith were the
doctrinal statements of the Bible in the form in which they are there
presented. The ground of faith is simply the testimony of the Scriptures as
the Word of God. The objects of knowledge were the speculative or
philosophical ideas which underlie the doctrines of the Bible, and the ground
on which those ideas or truths are received and incorporated in our system of
knowledge, is their own inherent evidence. They are seen to be true by the
light of reason. Faith is thus elevated into knowledge, and Christianity
exalted into a philosophy. This method was carried out by the Platonizing
fathers, and continued to prevail to a great extent among the schoolmen.
During the Middle Ages the authority of the Church was paramount, and the
freest thinkers did not venture openly to impugn the doctrines which the
Church had sanctioned. For the most part they contented themselves with
philosophizing about those doctrines, and endeavoring to show that they
admitted of a philosophical explanation and proof.
Wolfianism.
As remarked in the preceding chapter, this method was
revived and extensively propagated by Wolf (1679-1754, Professor at Halle and
Marburg). His principal works were "Theologia Naturalis," 1736, "Philos.
Practicalis Universalis," 1738, "Philos. Moralis s. Ethica," 1750, "Vernunftige
Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen
uberhaupt," 1720. Wolf unduly exalted the importance of natural religion.
Although he admitted that the Scriptures revealed doctrines undiscoverable by
the unassisted reason of man, he yet insisted that all doctrines, in order to
be rationally received as true, should be capable of demonstration on the
principles of reason. "He maintained," says Mr. Rose (in his "State of
Protestantisin in Germany," p. 39), "that philosophy was indispensable to
religion, and that, together with Biblical proofs, a mathematical or strictly
demonstrative dogmatical system, according to the principles of reason, was
absolutely necessary. His own works carried this theory into practice, and
after the first clamors had subsided, his opinions gained more attention, and
it was not long before he had a school of vehement admirers, who far
outstripped him in the use of his own principles. We find some of them not
content with applying demonstration to the truth of the system, but
endeavoring to establish each separate dogma, the Trinity, the nature of the
Redeemer, the Incarnation, the eternity of punishment, on philosophical, and
strange as it may appear, some of these truths on mathematical grounds." The
language of Wolf himself on this subject has already been quoted on page 5. He
expressly states that the office of revelation is to supplement natural
religion, and to present propositions which the philosopher is bound to
demonstrate. By demonstration is not meant the adduction of proof that the
proposition is sustained the Scriptrres, but that the doctrine must be
admitted as true on the principles of reason. It is philosophical
demonstration that is intended. "Theological Dogmatism," says Mansel3,
"is an application of reason to the support and defense of preexisting
statements of Scripture. . . . Its end is to produce a coincidence between
what we believe and what we think; to remove the boundary which separates the
comprehensible from the incomprehensible."4
It attempts, for example, to demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity from the
nature of an infinite being; the doctrine of the Incarnation from the nature
of man and his relation to God, etc. Its grand design is to transmute faith
into knowledge, to elevate Christianity as a system of revealed truth into a
system of Philosophy.
B. Refutation.
The objections to Dogmatism, as thus understood, are,
-- That it is essentially Rationalistic. The Rationalist demands philosophical
proof of the doctrines which he receives. He is not willing to believe on the
simple authority of Scripture. He requires his reason to be satisfied by a
demonstration of the truth independent of the Bible. This demand the Dogmatist
admits to be reasonable, and he undertakes to furnish the required proof. In
this essential point, therefore, in making the reception of Christian doctrine
to rest on reason and not on authority, the Dogmatist and the Rationalist are
on common ground. For although the former admits a supernatural revelation,
and acknowledges that for the common people faith must rest on authority, yet
he maintains that the mysteries of religion admit of rational or philosophical
demonstration, and that such demonstration cultivated minds have a right to
demand.
2. In thus shifting faith from the foundation of divine
testimony, and making it rest on rational demonstration, it is removed from
the Rock of Ages to a quicksand. There is all the difference between a
conviction founded on the well-authenticated testimony of God, and that
founded on so-called philosophical demonstration, that there is between God
and man, the divine and human. Let any man read the pretended philosophical
demonstrations of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the resurrection of the body,
or any other of the great truths of the Bible, and he will feel at liberty to
receive or to reject it at pleasure. It has no authority or certainty. It is
the product of a mind like his own, and therefore can have no more power than
belongs to the fallible human intellect.
3. Dogmatism is, therefore, in its practical effect,
destructive of faith. In transmuting Christianity into a philosophy, its whole
nature is changed and its power is lost. It takes its place as one of the
numberless phases of human speculation, which in the history of human thought
succeed each other as the waves of the sea, -- no one ever abides.
4. It proceeds on an essentially false principle. It
assumes the competency of reason to judge of things entirely beyond its
sphere. God has so constituted our nature, that we are authorized and
necessitated to confide in the well-authenticated testimony of our senses,
within their appropriate sphere. And in like manner, we are constrained to
confide in the operation of our minds and in the conclusions to which they
lead, within the sphere which God has assigned to human reason. But the senses
cannot sit in judgment on rational truths. We cannot study logic with the
microscope or scalpel. It is no less irrational to depend upon reason, or
demand rational or philosophical demonstration for truths which become the
objects of knowledge only as they are revealed. From the nature of the case
the truths concerning the creation, the probation, and apostasy of man, the
purpose and plan of redemption, the person of Christ, the state of the soul in
the future world, the relation of God to his creatures, etc., not depending on
general principles of reason, but in great measure on the purposes of an
intelligent, personal Being, can be known only so far as He chooses to reveal
them, and must be received simply on his authority.
The Testimony of the Scriptures against
Dogmatism.
5. The testimony of the Scriptures is decisive on this
subject. From the beginning to the end of the Bible the sacred writers present
themselves in the character of witnesses. They demand faith in their teachings
and obedience to their commands not on the ground of their own superiority in
wisdom or excellence; not on the ground of rational demonstration of the truth
of what they taught, but simply as the organs of God, as men appointed by Him
to reveal his will. Their first and last, and sufficient reason for faith is,
"Thus saith the Lord." The New Testament writers, especially, repudiate all
claim to the character of philosophers. They taught that the Gospel was not a
system of truth derived from reason or sustained by its authority, but by the
testimony of God. They expressly assert that its doctrines were matters of
revelation, to be received on divine testimony. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear
heard, neither have entered into the heart of man the things which God hath
prepared for them that love him. But God hath revealed them unto us by his
Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For
what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him?"
(1 Cor. ii. 9-11.) Such being the nature of the Gospel, if received at all it
must be received on authority. It was to be believed or taken on trust, not
demonstrated as a philosophical system. Nay, the Bible goes still further. It
teaches that a man must become a fool in order to be wise; he must renounce
dependence upon his own reason or wisdom, in order to receive the wisdom of
God. Our Lord told his disciples that unless they were converted and became as
little children, they could not enter into the kingdom of God. And the Apostle
Paul, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, and in those addressed to the
Ephesians and Colossians, that is, when writing to those imbued with the Greek
and with the oriental philosophy, made it the indispensable condition of their
becoming Christians, that they should renounce philosophy as a guide in
matters of religion, and receive the Gospel on the testimony of God. Nothing,
therefore, can be more opposed to the whole teaching and spirit of the Bible,
than this disposition to insist on philosophical proof of the articles of our
faith. Our duty, privilege, and security are in believing, not in knowing; in
trusting God, and not our own understanding. They are to be pitied who have no
more trustworthy teacher than themselves.
6. The instructions of the Bible on this subject are
abundantly confirmed by the lessons of experience. From the time of the
Gnostics, and of the Platonizing fathers, the attempt has been made in every
age to exalt faith into knowledge, to transmute Christianity into philosophy,
by demonstrating its doctrines on the principles of reason. These attempts
have always failed. They have all proved ephemeral and worthless, -- each
successive theorizer viewing with more or less contempt the speculations of
his predecessors, yet each imagining that he has the gifts for comprehending
the Almighty.
These attempts are not only abortive, they are always
evil in their effects upon their authors and upon all who are influenced by
them. So far as they succeed to the satisfaction of those who make them, they
change the relation of the soul to the truth, and, of course, to God. The
reception of the truth is not an act of faith or of trust in God; but of
confidence in our own speculations. Self is substituted for God as the ground
of confidence. The man's whole inward state is thereby changed. History,
moreover, proves that Dogmatism is the predecessor of Rationalism. The natural
tendency and the actual consequences of the indulgence of a disposition to
demand philosophical demonstration for articles of faith, is a state of mind
which revolts at authority, and refuses to admit as true what it cannot
comprehend and prove. And this state of mind, as it is incompatible with
faith, is the parent of unbelief and of all its consequences. There is no
safety for us, therefore, but to remain within the limits which God has
assigned us. Let us rely on our senses, within the sphere of our sense
perceptions; on our reason within the sphere of rational truths; and on God,
and God alone, in all that relates to the things of God. He only truly knows,
who consents with the docility of a child to be taught of God.
§ 5. Proper Office of Reason in
Matters of Religion.
A. Reason Necessary for the Reception of a
Revelation.
Christians, in repudiating Rationalism in all its
forms, do not reject the service of reason in matters of religion. They
acknowledge its high prerogatives, and the responsibility involved in their
exercise.
In the first place, reason is necessarily presupposed
in every revelation. Revelation is the communication of truth to the mind. But
the communication of truth supposes the capacity to receive it. Revelations
cannot he made to brutes or to idiots. Truths, to be received as objects of
faith, must be intellectually apprehended A proposition, to which we attach no
meaning, however important the truth it may contain, cannot be an object of
faith. If it be affirmed that the soul is immortal, or God is a spirit, unless
we know the meaning of the words nothing is communicated to the mind, and the
mind can affirm or deny nothing on the subject. In other words, knowledge is
essential to faith. In believing we affirm the truth of the proposition
believed. But we can affirm nothing of that of which we know nothing. The
first and indispensable office of reason, therefore, in matters of faith, is
the cognition, or intelligent apprehension of the truths proposed for our
reception. This is what theologians are accustomed to call the usus
organicus, seu, instrumentalis, rationis. About this there can be no
dispute.
Difference between Knowing and Understanding.
It is important, however, to bear in mind the
difference between knowing and understanding, or comprehending. A child knows
what the words "God is a spirit" mean. No created being can comprehend the
Almighty unto perfection. We must know the plan of salvation; but no one can
comprehend its mysteries. This distinction is recognized in every department.
Men know unspeakably more than they understand. We know that plants grow; that
the will controls our voluntary muscles; that Jesus Christ is God and man in
two distinct natures, and one person forever; but here as everywhere we are
surrounded by the incomprehensible. We can rationally believe that a thing is,
without knowing how or why it is. It is enough for the true dignity of man as
a rational creature, that he is not called upon by his Creator to believe
without knowledge, to receive as true propositions which convey no meaning to
the mind. This would be not only irrational, but impossible.
B. Reason must judge of the Credibility of a
Revelation.
In the second place, it is the prerogative of reason to
judge of the credibility of a revelation. The word "credible" is sometimes
popularly used to mean, easy of belief, i. e., probable. In its proper
sense, it is antithetical to incredible. The incredible is that which cannot
be believed. The credible is that which can be believed. Nothing is incredible
but the impossible. What may be, may be rationally (i. e., on adequate
grounds) believed.
A thing may be strange, unaccountable, unintelligible,
and yet perfectly credible. What is strange or unaccountable to one mind may
be perfectly familiar and plain to another. For the most limited intellect or
experience to make itself the standard of the possible and true, would be as
absurd as a man's making his visible horizon the limit of space. Unless a man
is willing to believe the incomprehensible, he can believe nothing, and must
dwell forever in cuter darkness. The most skeptical form of modern philosophy,
which reduces faith and knowledge to a minimum, teaches that the
incomprehensible is all we know namely, that force is, and that it is
persistent. It is most unreasonable, therefore, to urge as an objection to
Christianity that it demands faith in the incomprehensible.
The Impossible cannot be believed.
While this is true and plain, it is no less true that
the impossible is incredible, and therefore cannot be an object of faith.
Christians concede to reason the judicium contradictionis, that is, the
prerogative of deciding whether a thing is possible or impossible. If it is
seen to be impossible, no authority, and no amount or kind of evidence can
impose the obligation to receive it as true. Whether, however, a thing be
possible or not, is not to be arbitrarily determined. Men are prone to
pronounce everything impossible which contradicts their settled convictions,
their preconceptions or prejudices, or which is repugnant to their feelings.
Men in former times did not hesitate to say that it is impossible that the
earth should turn round on its axis and move through space with incredible
rapidity, and yet we not perceive it. It was pronounced absolutely impossible
that information should be transmitmed thousands of miles in the fraction of a
second. Of course it would be folly to reject all evidence of such facts as
these on the ground of their being impossible. It is no less unreasonable for
men to reject the truths of revelation on the assumption that they involve the
impossible, when they contradict our previous convictions, or when we cannot
see how they can be. Men say that it is impossible that the same person can be
both God and man; and yet they admit that man is at once material and
immaterial, mortal and immortal, angel and animal. The impossible cannot be
true; but reason in pronouncing a thing impossible must act rationally and not
capriciomisly. Its judgments must be guided by principles which commend
themselves to the commnon consciousness of men. Such principles are the
following: -
What is Impossible.
(1.) That is impossible which involves a contradiction;
as, that a thing is and is not; that right is wrong, and wrong right. (2.) It
is imnossible that God should do, approve, or command what is morahy wrong.
(3.) It is impossible that He should require us to believe what contradicts
any of the laws of belief which He has impressed upon our nature. (4.) It is
impossible that one truth should contradict another. It is impossible,
therefore, that God should reveal anything as true which contradicts any well
authenticated truth, whether of intuition, experience, or previous revelation.
Men may abuse this prerogative of reason, as they abuse
their free agency. But the prerogative itself is not to be denied. We have a
right to reject as untrue whatever it is impossible that God should require us
to believe. He can no more require us to believe what is absurd than to do
what is wrong.
Proof of this Prerogative of Reason.
1. That reason has the prerogative of the judicium
contradictionis, is plain, in the first place, from the very nature of the
case. Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it
is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it
sees cannot by possibility be true. This would be to affirm and deny, to
believe and disbelieve, at the samne time. From the very constitution of our
nature, therefore, we are forbidden to believe the impossible. We are,
consequently, not only authorized, but required to pronounce anathema an
apostle or angel from heaven, who should call upon us to receive as a
revelation from God anything absurd, or wicked, or inconsistent with the
intellectual or moral nature with which He has endowed us. The subjection of
the human intelligence to God is indeed absolute; but it is a subjection to
infinite wisdom and goodness. As it is impossible that God should contradict
himself, so it is impossible tlmat He should, by an external revelation,
declare that to be true which by the laws of our nature He has rendered it
impossible we should believe.
2. This prerogative of reason is constantly recognized
in Scripture. The prophets called upon the people to reject the doctrines of
the heathen, because they could not be true. They could not be true because
they involved contradictions and absurdities; because they were in
contradiction to our moral nature, and inconsistent with known truths. Moses
taught that nothing was to be believed, no matter what amount of external
evidence should be adduced in its support, which contradicted a previous, duly
authenticated revelation from God. Paul does the same thing when he calls upon
us to pronounce even an angel accursed, who should teach another gospel. He
recognized the paramount authority of the intuitive judgments of the mind. He
says that the damnation of any man is just who calls upon us to believe that
right is wrong, or that men should do evil that good may come.
3. The ultimate ground of faith and knowledge is
confidence in God. We can neither believe nor know anything unless we confide
in those laws of belief which God has implanted in our nature. If we can be
required to believe what contradicts those laws, then the foundations are
broken up. All distinction between truth and falsehood, between right and
wrong, would disappear. All our ideas of God and virtue would be confounded,
and we should become the victims of every adroit deceiver, or minister of
Satan, who, by lying wonders, should call upon us to believe a lie. We are to
try the spirits. But how can we try them without a standard? and what other
standard can there be, except the laws of our nature and the authenticated
revelations of God.
C. Reason must judge of the Evidences of a
Revelation.
In the third place, reason must judge of the evidence
by which a revelation is supported.
On this point it may be remarked, --
1. That as faith involves assent, and assent is
conviction produced by evidence, it follows that faith without evidence is
either irrational or impossible.
2. This evidence must be appropriate to the nature of
the truth believed. Historical truth requires historical evidence; empirical
truths, the testimony of experience; mathematical truth, mathematical
evidence; moral truth, moral evidence; and "the things of the Spirit," the
demonstration of the Spirit. In many cases different kinds of evidence concur
in the support of the same truth. That Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the
living God, for example, is sustained by evidence, historical, moral, and
spiritual, so abundant that our Lord says of those who reject it, that the
wrath of God abideth on them.
3. Evidence must be not only appropriate, but adequate.
That is, such as to command assent in every well-constituted mind to which it
is presented.
As we cannot believe without evidence, and as that
evidence must be appropriate and adequate, it is clearly a prerogative of
reason to judge of these several points. This is plain.
1. From the nature of faith, which is not a blind,
irrational assent, but an intelligent reception of the truth on adequate
grounds.
2. The Scriptures never demand faith except on the
ground of adequate evidence. "If I had not done among them," says our Lord,
"the works which none other man did, they had not had sins" (John xv. 24);
clearly recognizing the principle that faith cannot be required without
evidence. The Apostle Paul proves that the heathen are justly liable to
condemnation for their idolatry and immorality, because such a revelation of
the true God and of the moral law had been made to them, as to leave them
withoul excuse.
3. The Bible regards unbelief as a sin, and the great
sin for which men will be condemned at the bar of God. This presumes that
unbelief cannot arise from the want of appropriate and adoquate evidence, but
is to be referred to the wicked rejection of the truth notwithstanding the
proof by which it is attended. The popular misconception that men are not
responsible for their faith arises from a confusion of ideas. It is true that
men are not blameworthy for not believing in speculative truths, when the
cause of their unbelief is ignorance of the fact or of its evidence. It is no
sin not to believe that he earth moves round the sun, if one be ignorant of
the fact or of the evidence of its truth. But wherever unbelief arises from an
evil heart, then it involves all the guilt which belongs to the cause whence
it springs. If the wicked hate the good and believe them to be as wicked as
themselves, this is only a proof of their wickedness. If a man does not
believe in the moral law; if he holds that might is right, that the strong may
rob, murder, or oppress the weak, as some philosophers teach, or if he
disbelieve in the existence of God, then it is evident to men and angels that
he has been given up to a reprobate mind. There is an evidence of beauty to
which nothing but want of taste can render one insensible; there is evidence
of moral excellence to which nothing but an evil heart can render us blind.
Why did the Jews reject Christ, notwithstanding all the evidence presented in
his character, in his words, and in his works, that he was the Son of God? "He
that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is
condemnned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only
begotten Son of God." (John iii. 18.) The fact, however, that unbelief is a
great sin, and the special ground of the condemnation of men, of necessity
supposes that it is inexcusable, that it does not arise from ignorance or want
of evidence. "How shall they believe," asks the Apostle, "in him of whom they
have not heard." (Rom. x. 14.) And our Lord says, "This is the condemnation,
that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light,
because their deeds were evil." (John iii. 19.)
4. Another evidence that the Scriptures recognize the
necessity of evidence in order to faith, and the right of those to whom a
revelation is addressed to judge of that evidence, is found in the frequent
command to consider, to examine, to try the spirits, i.e., those who
claim to be the organs of the Spirit of God. The duty of judging is enjoined,
and the standard of judgment is given. And then men are held respousible for
their decision.
Christians, therefore, concede to reason all the
prerogatives it can rightfully claim. God requires nothing irrational of his
rational creatures. He does not require faith without knowledge, or faith in
the impossible, or faith without evidence. Christianity is equally opposed to
superstition and Rationalism. The one is faith without appropriate evidence,
the other refuses to believe what it does not understand, in despite of
evidence which should command belief. The Christian, conscious of his
imbecility as a creature, and his ignorance and blindness as a sinner, places
himself before God, in the posture of a child, and receives as true everything
which a God of infinite intelligence and goodness declares to be worthy of
confidence. And in thus submitting to be taught, he acts on the highest
principles of reason.
§ 6. Relation of Philosophy
and Revelation.
Cicero5defines
philosophy as "Rerum divinarum et humanarum, causarumque quibus hae res
continentur, scientia." Peemans6
says, "Philosophia est scientia rerum per causas primas, recto rationis usu
comparata." Or, as Ferrier7
more concisely expresses it, "Philosophy is the attainment of truth by the way
of reason." These and other definitions are to be found in Fleming's
"Vocabulary of Philosophy."
There is, however, a philosophia prima, or first
philosophy, which is concerned not so much with what is to be known, as with
the faculty of knowledge, which examines the cognitive faculty, determines its
laws and its limits. It is the philosophy of philosophy.
Whether we take the word to mean the knowledge of God
and nature attained by reason, or the principles which should guide all
efforts for the attainment of knowledge, the word is intended to cover the
whole domain of human intelligence. Popularly, we distinguish between
philosophy and science; the former having for its sphere the spiritual, the
latter, the material. Commonly, philosophy is understood as comprising both
departments. Hence we speak of natural philosophy as well as of the philosophy
of mind. Such being the compass of the domain which philosophers claim as
their own, the proper relation between philosophy and theology becomes a
question of vital importance. This is, indeed, the great question at issue in
the Rationalistic controversy; and therefore, at the conclusion of this
chapter, all that remains to be done is to give a concise statement of
familiar principles.
Philosophy and Theology occupy Common Ground.
1. Philosophy and Theology occupy common ground. Both
assume to teach what is true concerning God, man, the world, and the relation
in which God stands to his creatures.
2. While their objects are so far identical, both
striving to attain a knowledge of the same truths, their methods are
essentially different. Philosophy seeks to attain knowledge by speculation and
induction, or by the exercise of our own intellectual faculties. Theology
relies upon authority, receiving as truth whaterer God in his Word has
revealed.
3. Both these methods are legitimate. Christians do not
deny that our senses and reason are reliable informants; that they enable us
to arrive at certainty as to what lies within their sphere.
4. God is the author of our nature and the maker of
heaven and earth, therefore nothing which the laws of our nature or the facts
of the external world prove to be true, can contradict the teaching of God's
Word. Neither can the Scriptures contradict the truths of philosophy or
science.
Philosophers and Theologians should Strive
after Unity.
5. As these two great sources of knowledge must be
consistent in their valid teachings, it is the duty of all parties to endeavor
to exhibit that consistency. Philosophers should not ignore the teachings of
the Bible, and theologians should not ignore the teachings of science. Much
less should either class needlessly come into collision with the other. It is
unreasonable and irreligious for philosophers to adopt and promulgate theories
inconsistent with the facts of the Bible, when those theories are sustained by
only plausible evidence, which does not command the assent even of the body of
scientific men themselves. On the other hand, it is unwise for theologians to
insist on an interpretation of Scripture which brings it into collision with
the facts of science. Both of these mistakes are often made. The Bible, for
example, clearly teaches the unity of the existing races of men, both as to
origin and species. Many Naturalists, however, insist that they are diverse,
some say, both in origin and kind, and others, in origin if not in species.
This is done not only on merely plausible evidence, being one of several
possible ways of accounting for acknowledged diversities, but in opposition to
the most decisive proof to the contrary. This proof, so far as it is
historical and philological, does not fall within the sphere ot natural
science, and therefore the mere Naturalist disregards it. Comparative
philologists hold up their hands at the obtuseness of men of science, who
maintain that races have had different origins, whose languages render it
clear to demonstration that they have been derived from a comnion stock.
Considering the overwhelming weight of evidence of the divine authority of the
Scriptures, and the unspeakable importance of that authority being maintained
over the minds and hearts of men, it evinces fearful recklessness on the part
of those who wantonly impugn its teachings. On the other hand, it is unwise in
theologians to array themselves needlessly against the teachings of science.
Romanists and Protestants vainly resisted the adoption of the Copernican
theory of our solar system. They interpreted the Bible in a sense
contradictory to that theory. So far as in them lay, they staked the authority
of the Bible on the correctness of their interpretation. The theory proved to
be true, and the received interpretation had to be given up. The Bible,
however, has received no injury, although theologians have been taught an
important lesson; that is, to let science take its course, assured that the
Scriptures will accommodate themselves to all well-authenticated scientific
facts in time to come, as they have in time past.
The Authority of Facts.
6. The relation between Revelation and Philosophy
(taking the word in its restricted sense) is different from that between
Revelation and Science. Or, to express the same idea in different words, the
relation between revelation and facts is one thing; and the relation between
revelation and theories another thing. Facts do not admit of denial. They are
determined by the wisdom and will of God. To deny facts, is to deny what God
affirms to be true. This the Bible cannot do. It cannot contradict God. The
theologian, therefore, acknowledges that the Scriptures must be interpreted in
accordance with established facts. He has a right, however, to demand that
those facts should be verified beyond the possibility of doubt. Scientific men
in one age or country affirm the truth of facts, which others deny or
disprove. It would be a lamentable spectacle to see the Church changing its
doctrines, or its interpretation of Scripture, to suit the constantly changing
representations of scientific men as to matters of fact.
While acknowledging their obligation to admit
undeniable facts, theologians are at liberty to receive or reject the theories
deduced from those facts. Such theories are human speculations, and can have
no higher authority than their own inherent probability. The facts of light,
electricity, magnetism, are permanent. The theories concerning them are
constantly changing. The facts of geology are to be admitted; the theories of
geologists have no coercive authority. The facts of physiology and comparative
anatomy may be received; but no man is bound to receive any of the various
conflicting theories of development. Obvious as this distinction between facts
and theories is, it is nevertheless often disregarded. Scientific men are
disposed to demand for their theories, the authority due only to established
facts. And theologians, because at liberty to reject theories, are sometimes
led to assert their independence of facts.
The Authority of the Bible higher than that of
Philosophy.
7. Philosophy, in its widest sense, being the
conclusions of the human intelligence as to what is true, and the Bible being
the declaration of God, as to what is true, it is plain that where the two
contradict each other, philosophy must yield to revelation; man must yield to
God. It has been admitted that revelation cannot contradict facts; that the
Bible must be interpreted in accordance with what God has clearly made known
in the constitution of our nature and in the outward world. But the great body
of what passes for philosophy or science, is merely human speculation. What is
the philosophy of the Orientals, of Brahmins and Buddhists, of the early
Gnostics, of the Platonists, of the Scotists in the Middle Ages; of Leibnitz
with his monads and preestabhished harmony; of Des Cartes and his vortices; of
Kant and his categories; of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, with their different
theories of idealistic pantheism? The answer to that question is, that these
systems of philosophy are so many forms of human speculation; and consequently
that so far as these speculations agree with the Bible they are true; and so
far as they differ from it, they are false and worthless. This is the ground
which every believer, learned or unlearned, is authorized and bound to take.
If the Bible teaches that God is a person, the philosophy that teaches that an
infinite being cannot be a person, is false. If the Bible teaches that God
creates, controls, regenerates, the philosophy that forbids the assumption
that He acts in time, is to be rejected. If the Bible teaches that the soul
exists after the dissolution of the body, the philosophy which teaches that
man is only the ephemeral manifestation of a generic life in connection with a
given corporoal organization, is to be dismnissed without further examination.
In short, the Bible teaches certain doctrines concerning the nature of God and
his relation to the world; concerning the origin, nature, and destiny of man;
concerning the nature of virtue, the ground of moral obligation, human liberty
and responsibility; what is the rule of duty, what is right and what is wrong
in all our relations to God and to our fellow creatures. These are subjects on
which philosophy undertakes to speculate and dogmatize; if in any case these
speculations come into conflict with what is taught or necessarily implied in
the Bible, they are thereby refuted, as by a reductio ad absurdum. And
the disposition which refuses to give up these speculations in obedience to
the teaching of the Bible, is inconsistent with Christianity. It is the
indispensable condition of salvation through the gospel, that we receive as
true whatever God has revealed in his Word. We must make our choice between
the wisdom of men and the wisdom of God. The wisdom of men is foolishness with
God; and the wisdom of God is foolishness to the wise of this world.
The relation, therefore, between philosophy and revelation,
as determined by the Scriptures themselves, is what every right-minded man
must approve. Everything is conceded to philosophy and science, which they can
rightfully demand. It is admitted that they have a large and important sphere
of investigation. It is admitted that within that sphere they are entitled to
the greatest deference. It is cheerfully conceded that they have accomplished
much, not only as means of mental discipline, but in the enlargement of the
sphere of human knowledge, and in promoting the refinement and well-being of
men. It is admitted that theologians are not infallible, in the interpretation
of Scripture. It may, therefore, happen in the future, as it has in the past,
that interpretations of the Bible, long confidently received, must be modified
or abandoned, to bring revelation into harmony with what God teaches in his
works. This change of view as to the true meaning of the Bible may be a
painful trial to the Church, but it does not in the least impair the authority
of the Scriptures. They remain infallible; we are merely convicted of having
mistaken their meaning.
§ 7. Office of the Senses in
Matters of Faith.
The question, What authority is due to the senses in
matters of faith, arose out of the controversy between Romanists and
Protestants. The doctrine of transubstantiation, as taught by the Romish
Church, contradicts the testimnony of our senses of sight, taste, and touch.
It was natural for Protestants to appeal to this contradiction as decisive
evidence against the doctrine. Romanists reply by denying the competency of
the senses to bear testimony in such cases.
Protestants maintain the validity of that testimony on
the following grounds: (1.) Confidence in the well-authenticated testimony of
our senses, is one of those laws of belief which God has impressed upon our
nature; from the authority of those laws it is impossible that we should
emancipate ourselves. (2.) Confidence in our senses is, therefore, one form of
confidence in God. It supposes him to have placed us under the necessity of
error, to assume that we cannot safely trust the guides in which, by a law of
our nature, he constrains us to confide. (3.) All ground of certainty in
matters either of faith or knowledge, is destroyed, if confidence in the laws
of our nature be abandoned. Nothing is then possible but absolute skepticism.
We, in that case, cannot know that we ourselves exist, or that the world
exists, or that there is a God, or a moral law, or any responsibility for
character or conduct. (4.) All external supernatural revelation is addressed
to the senses. Those who heard Christ had to trust to their sense of hearing;
those who read the Bible have to trust to their sense of sight; those who
receive the testimony of the Church, receive it through their senses. It is
suicidal, therefore, in the Romanists to say that the senses are not to be
trusted in matters of faith.
All the arguments derived from the false judgments of
men when misled by the senses, are answered by the simple statement of the
proposition, that the senses are to be trusted only within their legitimate
sphere. The eye may indeed deceive us when the conditions of correct vision
are not present; but this does not prove that it is not to be trusted within
its appropriate limits.
Endnotes
1. Page 47, edit. Boston, 1859.
2. First Principles of a New Philosophy, p. 42.
3. Limits of Religious Thought, p. 47
4. Ibid. p. 50.
5. De Officiis, lib. ii. c. 2.
6. Inst. of Metaphys. p. 2.
7. Introd. ad Philosophiam, sect. 107.
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