De Servo Arbitrio
"On the Enslaved Will"
Or
The Bondage of
the Will
By
Dr. Martin Luther
Table of Contents
-
Atherton's Preface
-
Translator's Preface
-
Introduction
-
Erasmus' Preface Reviewed (Sections 1)
-
Erasmus' Scepticism (Sections 2—6)
-
The Necessity of Knowing God and His
Power (Sections 7—8)
-
The Sovereignty of God (Sections 9—27)
-
Exordium (Sections 28—40)
-
Discussion: First Part (Sections 41—75)
-
Discussion: Second Part (Sections
76—134)
-
Discussion: Third Part (Sections
135—166)
-
Conclusion: (Sections 167—168)
-
Appendix: Martin Luther's Judgment of
Erasmus of Rotterdam
-
Appendix: Martin Luther to Nicolas
Armsdoff Concerning Erasmus of Rotterdam
PREFACE
BY
HENRY ATHERTON,
Minister of Grove Chapel, Camberwell, S. E.
AND
General Secretary of The Sovereign Grace Union.
THIS EXCELLENT
WORK of that eminent servant of God, Martin
Luther—one of the noble Reformers is acknowledged to be one of the greatest,
if not the greatest of Luther's productions. Luther himself considered it
his best publication.
I had purposed writing a short account of
each of the Opponents—Erasmus and Luther—who come before us in the book, and
of the controversy, but from lack of time owing to many calls, and wishing
to get the volume into the hands of lovers of Luther as soon as possible, I
had to forego this privilege.
I believe I have succeeded in producing
the best English edition of this Masterpiece of Luther that has been
published. Cole's translation has been used with slight alterations from
Vaughan.
My task has been a difficult one,
especially as I am ignorant of the German Language. Luther's Scriptural
quotations are of course in the German Tongue, and as he often seemed to
quote them from memory and as no references to verses, and sometimes none to
chapters are given, and sometimes the wrong name of the Book is given,
English Concordances have been of very little help to me, and often no use
at all; yet I trust this edition will prove a success in spite of my
handicaps.
Although Luther used certain words that I
should not employ, yet I have adhered faithfully to his own phraseology as
translated by Cole. Luther speaks for himself.
This book is most needful at the present
day. The teachings of many so-called Protestants are more in accordance with
the Dogmas of the Papists, or the ideas of Erasmus, than with the Principles
of the Reformers; they are more in harmony with the Canons and Decrees of
the Council of Trent than with any Protestant or Reformed Confessions of
Faith.
If the Lord should be pleased to open the
eyes and understanding of some of these so-called Protestants to whom I have
referred—through the perusal of this work of the great
Reformer—Luther—enabling them to see that they are at present believing and
teaching awful delusions contrary to the Word of God, and the Protestant
Reformed Religion, and causing them to return to The Old Paths, the labours
of "THE SOVEREIGN GRACE UNION" will not have been in vain.
The labour involved in the preparation of
this work for publication in its present form has been enjoyable, although
it has often been carried out in much pain, and sometimes during sleepless
nights. I rejoice in being able to issue it, and do earnestly pray that the
Lord will bless it to the Ingathering of His Elect, and to the maintenance
of His Cause and Truth in the days in which our lot has been cast.
Grove Chapel Parsonage,
Camberwell Grove, S.E.S.
June, 1931.
PREFACE
BY
THE TRANSLATOR.
THE Translator has long had it in
meditation, to present the British Church with an English version of a
choice Selection from the Works of that great Reformer, MARTIN
LUTHER: and in November last, he issued
Proposals for such a publication. He considers it however necessary to
state, that this Treatise on the BONDAGE OF THE WILL,
formed no part of his design when those Proposals were sent forth.
But receiving, subsequently, an application from several Friends to
undertake the present Translation, he was induced not only to accede to
their request, but also to acquiesce in the propriety of their suggestion,
that this work should precede those mentioned in the Proposals. The
unqualified encomium bestowed upon it by a Divine so eminent as the late
Reverend AUGUSTUS MONTAGUE TOPLADY,
who considered it a masterpiece of polemical composition, had justly
impressed the minds of those friends with a correct idea of the value of the
Treatise; and it was their earnest desire that the plain sentiments and
forcible arguments of Luther upon the important subject which it contained,
should be presented to the Church, unembellished by any superfluous
ornament, and unaltered from the original, except as to their appearance in
an English version. In short, they wished to see a correct and faithful
Translation of LUTHER ON THE BONDAGE
OF THE WILL—without note or comment! In
this wish, the Translator fully concurred: and having received and accepted
the application, he sat down to the work immediately: which was, on Monday,
December 23rd, 1822.
As it respects the character of the version itself—the
Translator, after much consideration of the eminence of his Author as a
standard authority in the Church of God, and the importance of deviating
from the original text in any shape whatever, at last decided upon
translating according to the following principle; to which, it is his design
strictly to adhere in every future translation with which he may present the
public—to deliver FAITHFULLY the MIND
of LUTHER; retaining LITERALLY, as much of his
own WORDING, PHRASEOLOGY, and
EXPRESSION, as could be admitted into the English version.—With what
degree of fidelity he has adhered to this principle in the present work, the
public are left to decide.
The addition of the following few remarks shall suffice
for observation.
1. The Work is translated from Melancthon's Edition,
which he published immediately after Luther's death.
2. The division-heads of the Treatise, which are not
distinctively expressed in the original, are so expressed in the
Translation, to facilitate the Reader's view of the whole work and all its
parts. The Heads are these—Introduction, Preface, Exordium, Discussion part
the First, part the Second, part the Third, and Conclusion.
3. The subdividing Sections of the matter, which, in the
original, are distinguished by a very large capital at the commencement,
are, in the Translation, for typographical reasons, distinguished by
Sections I, II, III, IV, &c.
4. The Quotations from the Diatribe, are, in the
Translation, preceded and followed by a dash and inverted commas: but with
this distinction—where Erasmus' own words are quoted in the original the
commas are double; but single, where the substance of his sentiments only is
quoted. The reader will observe, however, that this distinction was not
adopted till after the first three sheets were printed: which will account
for all the quotations, in those sheets, being preceded and followed by
double commas. Though it is presumed, there will be no difficulty in
discovering which are Erasmus' own words, and which are his sentiments in
substance only.
5. The portions of Scripture adduced by Luther, are, in
some instances, translated from his own words, and not given according to
our English version. This particular was attended to, in those few places
where Luther's reading varies a little from our version, as being more
consistent with a correct Translation of the author, but not with any view
to favour the introduction of innovated and diverse readings of the Word of
God.
With these few and brief preliminary observations, the
Translator presents this profound Treatise of the immortal Luther on the
Bondage of the Will to the Public. And he trusts he has a sincere desire,
that his own labour may prove to be, in every respect, a faithful
Translation: and that the work itself may be found, under the Divine
blessing, to be—an invaluable acquisition to the Church—"a sharp threshing
instrument having teeth" for the exposure of subtlety and error—a banner in
defence of the truth—and a means of edification and establishment to all
those, who are willing to come to the light to have their deeds made
manifest, and to be taught according to the oracles of God!
HENRY COLE.
London, March, 1823.
INTRODUCTION.
Martin Luther, to the venerable D. Erasmus of
Rotterdam, wishing Grace and Peace in Christ.
THAT I have been so long answering your
DIATRIBE on FREE-WILL,
venerable Erasmus, has happened contrary to the expectation of all, and
contrary to my own custom also. For hitherto, I have not only appeared to
embrace willingly opportunities of this kind for writing, but even to seek
them of my own accord. Some one may, perhaps, wonder at this new and unusual
thing, this forbearance or fear, in Luther, who could not be roused up by so
many boasting taunts, and letters of adversaries, congratulating Erasmus on
his victory and singing to him the song of Triumph—What that Maccabee, that
obstinate assertor, then, has at last found an Antagonist a match for him,
against whom he dares not open his mouth!
But so far from accusing them, I myself openly concede
that to you, which I never did to any one before:—that you not only by far
surpass me in the powers of eloquence, and in genius, (which we all concede
to you as your desert, and the more so, as I am but a barbarian and do all
things barbarously,) but that you have damped my spirit and impetus, and
rendered me languid before the battle; and that by two means. First, by art:
because, that is, you conduct this discussion with a most specious and
uniform modesty; by which you have met and prevented me from being incensed
against you. And next, because, on so great a subject, you say nothing but
what has been said before: therefore, you say less about, and attribute more
unto "Free-will," than the Sophists have hitherto said and attributed: (of
which I shall speak more fully hereafter.) So that it seems even superfluous
to reply to these your arguments, which have been indeed often refuted by
me; but trodden down, and trampled under foot, by the incontrovertible Book
of Philip Melancthon "Concerning Theological Questions:" a book, in my
judgment, worthy not only of being immortalized, but of being included in
the ecclesiastical canon: in comparison of which, your Book is, in my
estimation, so mean and vile, that I greatly feel for you for having defiled
your most beautiful and ingenious language with such vile trash; and I feel
an indignation against the matter also, that such unworthy stuff should be
borne about in ornaments of eloquence so rare; which is as if rubbish, or
dung, should he carried in vessels of gold and silver. And this you yourself
seem to have felt, who were so unwilling to undertake this work of writing;
because your conscience told you, that you would of necessity have to try
the point with all the powers of eloquence; and that, after all, you would
not be able so to blind me by your colouring, but that I should, having torn
off the deceptions of language, discover the real dregs beneath. For,
although I am rude in speech, yet, by the grace of God, I am not rude in
understanding. And, with Paul, I dare arrogate tomyself understanding and
with confidence derogate it from you; although I willingly, and deservedly,
arrogate eloquence and genius to you, and derogate it from myself.
Wherefore, I thought thus—If there be any who have not
drank more deeply into, and more firmly held my doctrines, which are
supported by such weighty Scriptures, than to be moved by these light and
trivial arguments of Erasmus, though so highly ornamented, they are not
worthy of being healed by my answer. Because, for such men, nothing could be
spoken or written of enough, even though it should be in many thousands of
volumes a thousands times repeated: for it is as if one should plough the
seashore, and sow seed in the sand, or attempt to fill a cask, full of
holes, with water. For, as to those who have drank into the teaching of the
Spirit in my books, to them, enough and an abundance has been administered,
and they at once contemn your writings. But, as to those who read without
the Spirit, it is no wonder if they be driven to and fro, like a reed, with
every wind. To such, God would not have said enough, even if all his
creatures should be converted into tongues. Therefore it would, perhaps,
have been wisdom, to have left these offended at your book, along with those
who glory in you and decree to you the triumph.
Hence, it was not from a multitude of engagements, nor
from the difficulty of the undertaking, nor from the greatness of your
eloquence, nor from a fear of yourself; but from mere irksomeness,
indignation, and contempt, or (so to speak) from my judgment of your
Diatribe, that my impetus to answer you was damped. Not to observe, in the
mean time, that, being ever like yourself, you take the most diligent care
to be on every occasion slippery and pliant of speech; and while you wish to
appear to assert nothing, and yet, at the same time, to assert something,
more cautious than Ulysses, you seem to be steering your course between
Scylla and Charybdis. To meet men of such a sort, what, I would ask, can be
brought forward or composed, unless any one knew how to catch Proteus
himself? But what I may be able to do in this matter, and what profit your
art will be to you, I will, Christ cooperating with me, hereafter shew.
This my reply to you, therefore, is not wholly without
cause. My brethren in Christ press me to it, setting before me the
expectation of all; seeing that the authority of Erasmus is not to be
despised, and the truth of the Christian doctrine is endangered in the
hearts of many. And indeed, I felt a persuasion in my own mind, that my
silence would not be altogether right, and that I was deceived by the
prudence or malice of the flesh, and not sufficiently mindful of my office,
in which I am a debtor, both to the wise and to the unwise; and especially,
since I was called to it by the entreaties of so many brethren.
For although our cause is such, that it requires more
than the external teacher, and, beside him that planteth and him that
watereth outwardly, has need of the Spirit of God to give the increase, and,
as a living Teacher, to teach us inwardly living things, (all which I was
led to consider;) yet, since that Spirit is free, and bloweth, not where we
will, but where He willeth, it was needful to observe that rule of Paul, "Be
instant in season, and out of season." (2 Tim. iv. 2.) For we know not at
what hour the Lord cometh. Be it, therefore, that those who have not yet
felt the teaching of the Spirit in my writings, have been overthrown by that
Diatribe—perhaps their hour was not yet come.
And who knows but that God may even condescend to visit
you, my friend Erasmus, by me His poor weak vessel; and that I may (which
from my heart I desire of the Father of mercies through Jesus Christ our
Lord) come unto you by this Book in a happy hour, and gain over a dearest
brother. For although you think and write wrong concerning "Free-will," yet
no small thanks are due unto you from me, in that you have rendered my own
sentiments far more strongly confirmed, from my seeing the cause of
"Free-will" handled by all the powers of such and so great talents, and so
far from being bettered, left worse than it was before which leaves an
evident proof, that "Free-will" is a downright lie; and that, like the woman
in the gospel, the more it is taken in hand by physicians, the worse it is
made. Therefore the greater thanks will be rendered to you by me, if you by
me gain more information, as I have gained by you more confirmation. But
each is the gift of God, and not the work of our own endeavours. Wherefore,
prayer must be made unto God, that He would open the mouth in me, and the
heart in you and in all; that He would be the Teacher in the midst of us,
who may in us speak and hear.
But from you, my friend Erasmus, suffer me to obtain the
grant of this request; that, as I in these matters bear with your ignorance,
so you in return, would bear with my want of eloquent utterance. God giveth
not all things to each; nor can we each do all things. Or, as Paul saith,
"there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit." (1 Cor. xii. 4.) It
remains, therefore, that these gifts render a mutual service; that the one,
with his gift, sustain the burden and what is lacking in the other; so shall
we fulfill the law of Christ (Gal. vi. 2.)
ERASMUS' PREFACE REVIEWED.
Sect. 1.—FIRST of all, I would
just touch upon some of the heads of your PREFACE; in
which, You somewhat disparage our cause and adorn your own. In the first
place, I would notice your censuring in me, in all your former books, an
obstinacy of assertion; and saying, in this book,—"that you are so far from
delighting in assertions, that you would rather at once go over to the
sentiments of the skeptics, if the inviolable authority of the Holy
Scriptures, and the decrees of the church, would permit you: to which
authorities You willingly submit yourself in all things, whether you follow
what they prescribe, or follow it not."—These are the principles that please
you.
I consider, (as in courtesy bound,) that these things are
asserted by you from a benevolent mind, as being a lover of peace. But if
any one else had asserted them, I should, perhaps, have attacked him in my
accustomed manner. But, however, I must not even allow you, though so very
good in your intentions, to err in this opinion. For not to delight in
assertions, is not the character of the Christian mind: nay, he must delight
in assertions, or he is not a Christian. But, (that we may not be mistaken
in terms) by assertion, I mean a constant adhering, affirming,
confessing, defending, and invincibly persevering. Nor do I believe the term
signifies any thing else, either among the Latins, or as it is used by us at
this day. And moreover, I speak concerning the asserting of those things,
which are delivered to us from above in the Holy Scriptures. Were it not so,
we should want neither Erasmus nor any other instructor to teach us, that,
in things doubtful, useless, or unnecessary; assertions, contentions, and
strivings, would be not only absurd, but impious: and Paul condemns such in
more places than one. Nor do you, I believe, speak of these things, unless,
as a ridiculous orator, you wish to take up one subject, and go on with
another, as the Roman Emperor did with his Turbot; or, with the madness of a
wicked writer, you wish to contend, that the article concerning "Free-will"
is doubtful, or not necessary.
Be skeptics and academics far from us Christians; but be
there with us assertors twofold more determined than the stoics themselves.
How often does the apostle Paul require that assurance of faith; that is,
that most certain, and most firm assertion of Conscience, calling it (Rom.
x. 10), confession, "With the mouth confession is made unto salvation?" And
Christ also saith, "Whosoever confesseth Me before men, him will I confess
before My Father." (Matt. x. 32.) Peter commands us to "give a reason of the
hope" that is in us. (1 Pet. iii. 15.) But why should I dwell upon this;
nothing is more known and more general among Christians than assertions.
Take away assertions, and you take away Christianity. Nay, the Holy Spirit
is given unto them from heaven, that He may glorify Christ, and confess Him
even unto death; unless this be not to assert—to die for confession and
assertion. In a word, the Spirit so asserts, that He comes upon the whole
world and reproves them of sin (John xvi. 8) thus, as it were, provoking to
battle. And Paul enjoins Timothy to reprove, and to be instant out of
season. (2 Tim. iv. 2.) But how ludicrous to me would be that reprover, who
should neither really believe that himself, of which he reproved, nor
constantly assert it!—Why I would send him to Anticyra, to be cured.
But I am the greatest fool, who thus lose words and time
upon that, which is clearer than the sun. What Christian would bear that
assertions should be contemned? This would be at once to deny all piety and
religion together; or to assert, that religion, piety, and every doctrine,
is nothing at all. Why therefore do you too say, that you do not delight in
assertions, and that you prefer such a mind to any other?
But you would have it understood that you have said
nothing here concerning confessing Christ, and His doctrines.—I receive the
admonition. And, in courtesy to you, I give up my right and custom, and
refrain from judging of your heart, reserving that for another time, or for
others. In the mean time, I admonish you to correct your tongue, and your
pen, and to refrain henceforth from using such expressions. For, how upright
and honest soever your heart may be, your words, which are the index of the
heart, are not so. For, if you think the matter of "Free-will" is not
necessary to be known, nor at all concerned with Christ, you speak honestly,
but think wickedly: but, if you think it is necessary, you speak wickedly,
and think rightly. And if so, then there is no room for you to complain and
exaggerate so much concerning useless assertions and contentions: for what
have they to do with the nature of the cause?
ERASMUS' SCEPTICISM.
Sect. 2.—BUT what will you say to
these your declarations, when, be it remembered, they are not confined to
"Free-will" only, but apply to all doctrines in general throughout the
world—that, "if it were permitted you by the inviolable authority of the
sacred Writings and decrees of the church, you would go over to the
sentiments of the Sceptics?"—
What an all-changeable Proteus is there in these
expressions, "inviolable authority" and "decrees of the church!" As though
you could have so very great a reverence for the Scriptures and the church,
when at the same time you signify, that you wish you had the liberty of
being a Skeptic! What Christian would talk in this way? But if you say this
in reference to useless and doubtful doctrines, what news is there in what
you say? Who, in such things, would not wish for the liberty of the
skeptical profession? Nay, what Christian is there who does not actually use
this liberty freely, and condemn all those who are drawn away with, and
captivated by ever opinion? Unless you consider all Christians to be such
(as the term is generally understood) whose doctrines are useless, and for
which they quarrel like fools, and contend by assertions. But if you speak
of necessary things, what declaration more impious can any one make, than
that he wishes for the liberty of asserting nothing in such matters?
Whereas, the Christian will rather say this—I am so averse to the sentiments
of the Sceptics, that wherever I am not hindered by the infirmity of the
flesh, I will not only steadily adhere to the Sacred Writings every where,
and in all parts of them, and assert them, but I wish also to be as certain
as possible in things that are not necessary, and that lie without the
Scripture; for what is more miserable than uncertainty.
What shall we say to these things also, where you add—"To
which authorities I submit my opinion in all things; whether I follow what
they enjoin, or follow it not."—
What say you, Erasmus? Is it not enough that you submit
your opinion to the Scriptures? Do you submit it to the decrees of the
church also? What can the church decree, that is not decreed in the
Scriptures? If it can, where then remains the liberty and power of judging
those who make the decrees? As Paul, 1 Cor. xiv., teaches "Let others
judge." Are you not pleased that there should be any one to judge the
decrees of the church, which, nevertheless, Paul enjoins? What new kind of
religion and humility is this, that, by our own example, you would take away
from us the power of judging the decrees of men, and give it unto men
without judgment? Where does the Scripture of God command us to do this?
Moreover, what Christian would so commit the injunctions
of the Scripture and of the church to the winds,—as to say "whether I follow
them, or follow them not?" You submit yourself, and yet care not at all
whether you follow them or not. But let that Christian be anathema, who is
not certain in, and does not follow, that which is enjoined him. For how
will he believe that which he does not follow?—Do you here, then, mean to
say, that following is understanding a thing certainly, and not
doubting of it at all in a skeptical manner? If you do, what is there in any
creature which any one can follow, if following be understanding, and seeing
and knowing perfectly? And if this be the case, then it is impossible that
any one should, at the same time, follow some things, and not follow others:
whereas, by following one certain thing, God, he follows all things; that
is, in Him, whom whoso followeth not, never followeth any part of His
creature.
In a word, these declarations of yours amount to
this—that, with you, it matters not what is believed by any one, any where,
if the peace of the world be but undisturbed; and if every one be but
allowed, when his life, his reputation, or his interest is at stake, to do
as he did, who said, "If they affirm, I affirm, if they deny, I deny:" and
to look upon the Christian doctrines as nothing better than the opinions of
philosophers and men: and that it is the greatest of folly to quarrel about,
contend for, and assert them, as nothing can arise therefrom but contention,
and the disturbance of the public peace: "that what is above us, does not
concern us." This, I say, is what your declarations amount to.—Thus, to put
an end to our fightings, you come in as an intermediate peace-maker, that
you may cause each side to suspend arms, and persuade us to cease from
drawing swords about things so absurd and useless.
What I should cut at here, I believe, my friend Erasmus,
you know very well. But, as I said before, I will not openly express myself.
In the mean time, I excuse your very good intention of heart; but do you go
no further; fear the Spirit of God, who searcheth the reins and the heart,
and who is not deceived by artfully contrived expressions. I have, upon this
occasion, expressed myself thus, that henceforth you may cease to accuse our
cause of pertinacity or obstinacy. For, by so doing, you only evince that
you hug in your heart a Lucian, or some other of the swinish tribe of the
Epicureans; who, because he does not believe there is a God himself,
secretly laughs at all those who do believe and confess it. Allow us
to be assertors, and to study and delight in assertions: and do you favour
your Sceptics and Academics until Christ shall have called you also. The
Holy Spirit is not a Skeptic, nor are what he has written on our hearts
doubts or opinions, but assertions more certain, and more firm, than life
itself and all human experience.
Sect. 3.—Now I come to the next head, which is connected
with this; where you make a "distinction between the Christian doctrines,"
and pretend that some are necessary, and some not necessary." You say, that
"some are abstruse, and some quite clear." Thus you merely sport the sayings
of others, or else exercise yourself, as it were, in a rhetorical figure.
And you bring forward, in support of this opinion, that passage of Paul, Rom
xi. 33, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and goodness of God!"
And also that of Isaiah xl. 13, "Who hath holpen the Spirit of the Lord, or
who hath been His counselor?"
You could easily say these things, seeing that, you
either knew not that you were writing to Luther, but for the world at large,
or did not think that you were writing against Luther: whom, however, I hope
you allow to have some acquaintance with, and judgment in, the Sacred
Writings. But, if you do not allow it, then, behold, I will also twist
things thus. This is the distinction which I make; that I also may act a
little the rhetorician and logician—God, and the Scripture of God, are two
things; no less so than God, and the Creature of God. That there are in God
many hidden things which we know not, no one doubts: as He himself saith
concerning the last day: "Of that day knoweth no man but the Father." (Matt.
xxiv. 36.) And (Acts i. 7.) "It is not yours to know the times and seasons."
And again, "I know whom I have chosen," (John xiii. 18.) And Paul, "The Lord
knoweth them that are His," (2 Tim. ii. 19.). And the like.
But, that there are in the Scriptures some things
abstruse, and that all things are not quite plain, is a report spread abroad
by the impious Sophists by whose mouth you speak here, Erasmus. But they
never have produced, nor ever can produce, one article whereby to prove this
their madness. And it is with such scare-crows that Satan has frightened
away men from reading the Sacred Writings, and has rendered the Holy
Scripture contemptible, that he might cause his poisons of philosophy to
prevail in the church. This indeed I confess, that there are many places
in the Scriptures obscure and abstruse; not from the majesty of the
thing, but from our ignorance of certain terms and grammatical particulars;
but which do not prevent a knowledge of all the things in the
Scriptures. For what thing of more importance can remain hidden in
the Scriptures, now that the seals are broken, the stone rolled from the
door of the sepulcher, and that greatest of all mysteries brought to light,
Christ made man: that God is Trinity and Unity: that Christ suffered for us,
and will reign to all eternity? Are not these things known and proclaimed
even in our streets? Take Christ out of the Scriptures, and what will you
find remaining in them?
All the things, therefore, contained in the
Scriptures; are made manifest, although some places, from the words
not being understood, are yet obscure. But to know that all things in
the Scriptures are set in the clearest light, and then, because a few words
are obscure, to report that the things are obscure, is absurd and
impious. And, if the words are obscure in one place, yet they are clear
in another. But, however, the same thing, which has been most
openly declared to the whole world, is both spoken of in the Scriptures in
plain words, and also still lies hidden in obscure words. Now, therefore, it
matters not if the thing be in the light, whether any certain
representations of it be in obscurity or not, if, in the mean while, many
other representations of the same thing be in the light. For who would say
that the public fountain is not in the light, because those who are in some
dark narrow lane do not see it, when all those who are in the Open market
place can see it plainly?
Sect. 4.—WHAT you adduce,
therefore, about the darkness of the Corycian cavern, amounts to nothing;
matters are not so in the Scriptures. For those things which are of the
greatest majesty, and the most abstruse mysteries, are no longer in the dark
corner, but before the very doors, nay, brought forth and manifested openly.
For Christ has opened our understanding to understand the Scriptures, Luke
xxiv. 45. And the Gospel is preached to every creature. (Mark xvi. 15, Col.
i. 23.) "Their sound is gone out into all the earth." (Psalm xix. 4.) And
"All things that are written, are written for our instruction." (Rom. xv.
4.) And again, "All Scripture is inspired from above, and is profitable for
instruction." (2 Tim. iii. 16.)
Therefore come forward, you and all the Sophists
together, and produce any one mystery which is still abstruse in the
Scriptures. But, if many things still remain abstruse to many, this does not
arise from obscurity in the Scriptures, but from their own blindness or want
of understanding, who do not go the way to see the all-perfect clearness of
the truth. As Paul saith concerning the Jews, 2 Cor. iii. 15. "The veil
still remains upon their heart." And again, "If our gospel be hid it is hid
to them that are lost, whose heart the god of this world hath blinded." (2
Cor. iv. 3-4.) With the same rashness any one may cover his own eyes, or go
from the light into the dark and hide himself, and then blame the day and
the sun for being obscure. Let, therefore, wretched men cease to impute,
with blasphemous perverseness, the darkness and obscurity of their own heart
to the all-clear Scriptures of God.
You, therefore, when you adduce Paul, saying, "His
judgments are incomprehensible," seem to make the pronoun His (ejus)
refer to Scripture (Scriptura). Whereas Paul does not say, The
judgments of the Scripture are incomprehensible, but the judgments of God.
So also Isaiah xl. 13, does not say, Who has known the mind of the
Scripture, but, who has known "the mind of the Lord?" Although Paul asserts
that the mind of the Lord is known to Christians: but it is in those things
which are freely given unto us: as he saith also in the same place, 1 Cor.
ii. 10, 16. You see, therefore, how sleepily you have looked over these
places of the Scripture: and you cite them just as aptly as you cite nearly
all the passages in defense of "Free-will."
In like manner, your examples which you subjoin, not
without suspicion and bitterness, are nothing at all to the purpose. Such
are those concerning the distinction of Persons: the union of the Divine and
human natures: the unpardonable sin: the ambiguity attached to which, you
say, has never been cleared up.—If you mean the questions of Sophists that
have been agitated upon those subjects, well. But what has the all-innocent
Scripture done to you, that you impute the abuse of the most wicked of men
to its purity? The Scripture simply confesses the Trinity of God, the
humanity of Christ, and the unpardonable sin. There is nothing here of
obscurity or ambiguity. But how these things are the Scripture does
not say, nor is it necessary to be known. The Sophists employ their dreams
here; attack and condemn them, and acquit the Scripture.—But, if you mean
the reality of the matter, I say again, attack not the Scriptures, but the
Arians, and those to whom the Gospel is hid, that, through the working of
Satan, they might not see the all-manifest testimonies concerning the
Trinity of the Godhead, and the humanity of Christ.
But to be brief. The clearness of the Scripture is
twofold; even as the obscurity is twofold also. The one is
external, placed in the ministry of the word; the other internal,
placed in the understanding of the heart. If you speak of the internal
clearness, no man sees one iota in the Scriptures, but he that hath the
Spirit of God. All have a darkened heart; so that, even if they know how to
speak of, and set forth, all things in the Scripture, yet, they cannot feel
them nor know them: nor do they believe that they are the creatures of God,
nor any thing else: according to that of Psalm xiv, 1. "The fool hath said
in his heart, God is nothing." For the Spirit is required to understand the
whole of the Scripture and every part of it. If you speak of the external
clearness, nothing whatever is left obscure or ambiguous; but all things
that are in the Scriptures, are by the Word brought forth into the clearest
light, and proclaimed to the whole world.
Sect. 5.—BUT this is still more
intolerable,—Your enumerating this subject of "Free-will" among those things
that are "useless, and not necessary;" and drawing up for us, instead of it,
a "Form" of those things which you consider "necessary unto Christian
piety." Such a form as, certainly, any Jew or any Gentile utterly ignorant
of Christ, might draw up. For of Christ you make no mention in one iota. As
though you thought, that there may be Christian piety without Christ, if God
be but worshipped with all the powers as being by nature most merciful.
What shall I say here, Erasmus? To me, you breathe out
nothing but Lucian, and draw in the gorging surfeit of Epicurus. If you
consider this subject "not necessary" to Christians, away, I pray you, out
of the field; I have nothing to do with you. I consider it necessary.
If, as you say, it be "irreligious," if it be "curious,"
if it be "superfluous," to know, whether or not God foreknows any thing by
contingency; whether our own will does any thing in those things which
pertain unto eternal salvation, or is only passive under the work of grace;
whether or not we do, what we do of good or evil, from necessity, or rather
from being passive; what then, I ask, is religious; what is grave; what is
useful to be known? All this, Erasmus, is to no purpose whatever. And it is
difficult to attribute this to your ignorance, because you are now old, have
been conversant with Christians, and have long studied the Sacred Writings:
therefore you leave no room for my excusing you, or having a good thought
concerning you.
And yet the Papists pardon and put up with these
enormities in you: and on this account, because you are writing against
Luther: otherwise, if Luther were not in the case, they would tear you in
pieces tooth and nail. Plato is a friend; Socrates is a friend; but Truth is
to be honoured above all. For, granting that you have but little
understanding in the Scriptures and in Christian piety, surely even an enemy
to Christians ought to known what Christians consider useful and necessary,
and what they do not. Whereas you, a theologian, a teacher of Christians,
and about to draw up for them a "Form" of Christianity, not only in your
skeptical manner doubt of what is necessary and useful to them, but go away
into the directly opposite, and, contrary to your own principles, by an
unheard of assertion, declare it to be your judgment, that those things are
"not necessary:" whereas, if they be not necessary, and certainly known,
there can remain neither God, nor Christ, nor Gospel, nor Faith, nor any
thing else, even of Judaism, much less of Christianity! In the name of the
Immortal God, Erasmus, what an occasion, yea, what a field do you open for
acting and speaking against you! What could you write well or correctly
concerning "Free-will," who confess, by these your declarations, so great an
ignorance of the Scripture and of Godliness? But I draw in my sails: nor
will I here deal with you in my words (for that perhaps I shall do
hereafter) but in your own.
Sect. 6.—THE "Form" of
Christianity set forth by you, among other things, has this—"That we should
strive with all our powers, have recourse to the remedy of repentance, and
in all ways try to gain the mercy of God; without which, neither human will,
nor endeavour, is effectual." Also, "that no one should despair of pardon
from a God by nature most merciful."—
These statements of yours are without Christ, without the
Spirit, and more cold than ice: so that, the beauty of your eloquence is
really deformed by them. Perhaps a fear of the Popes and those tyrants,
extorted them from you their miserable vassal, lest you should appear to
them a perfect atheist. But what they assert is this—That there is ability
in us; that there is a striving with all our powers; that there is mercy in
God; that there are ways of gaining that mercy; that there is a God, by
nature just, and most merciful, &c.—But if a man does not know what these
powers are; what they can do, or in what they are to be passive; what their
efficacy, or what their inefficacy is; what can such an one do? What will
you set him about doing?
"It is irreligious, curious, and superfluous, (you say)
to wish to know, whether our own will does any thing in those things which
pertain unto eternal salvation, or whether it is wholly passive under the
work of grace."—But here, you say the contrary: that it is Christian piety
to "strive with all the powers;" and that, "without the mercy of God the
will is ineffective."
Here you plainly assert, that the will does something in
those things which pertain unto eternal salvation, when you speak of it as
striving: and again, you assert that it is passive, when you say, that
without the mercy of God it is ineffective. Though, at the same time, you do
not define how far that doing, and being passive, is to be understood: thus,
designedly keeping us in ignorance how far the mercy of God extends, and how
far our own will extends; what our own will is to do, in that which you
enjoin, and what the mercy of God is to do. Thus, that prudence of yours,
carries you along; by which, you are resolved to hold with neither side, and
to escape safely through Scylla and Charybdis; in order that, when you come
into the open sea, and find yourself overwhelmed and confounded by the
waves, you may have it in your power, to assert all that you now deny, and
deny all that you now assert.
THE NECESSITY OF KNOWING GOD AND HIS POWER.
Sect. 7.—BUT I will set your
theology before your eyes by a few similitudes.—What if any one, intending
to compose a poem, or an oration, should never think about, nor inquire into
his abilities, what he could do, and what he could not do, nor what the
subject undertaken required; and should utterly disregard that precept of
Horace, "What the shoulders can sustain, and what they must sink under;" but
should precipitately dash upon the undertaking and think thus—I must strive
to get the work done; to inquire whether the learning I have, the eloquence
I have, the force of genius I have, be equal to it, is curious and
superfluous:—Or, it any one, desiring to have a plentiful crop from his
land, should not be so curious as to take the superfluous care of examining
the nature of the soil, (as Virgil curiously and in vain teaches in his
Georgics,) but should rush on at once, thinking of nothing but the work, and
plough the seashore, and cast in the seed wherever the soil was turned up,
whether sand or mud:—Or if any one, about to make war, and desiring a
glorious victory, or intending to render any other service to the state,
should not be so curious as to deliberate upon what it was in his power to
do; whether the treasury could furnish money, whether the soldiers were fit,
whether any opportunity offered; and should pay no regard whatever to that
of the historian, "Before you act, there must be deliberation, and when you
have deliberated, speedy execution;" but should rush forward with his eyes
blinded, and his ears stopped, only exclaiming war! war! and should be
determined on the undertaking:—What, I ask you, Erasmus, would you think of
such poets, such husbandmen, such generals, and such heads of affairs? I
will add also that of the Gospel—If any one going to build a tower, sits not
down first and counts the cost, whether he has enough to finish it,—What
does Christ say of such an One? (Luke xiv. 28-32).
Thus you also enjoin us works only. But you forbid us to
examine, weigh, and know, first, our ability, what we can do, and what we
cannot do, as being curious, superfluous, and irreligious. Thus, while with
your over-cautious prudence you pretend to detest temerity, and make a show
of sobriety, you go so far, that you even teach the greatest of all
temerity. For, although the Sophists are rash and mad in reality while they
pursue their curious inquiries, yet their sin is less enormous than yours;
for you even teach and enjoin men to be mad, and to rush on with temerity.
And to make your madness still greater, you persuade us, that this temerity
is the most exalted and Christian piety, sobriety, religious gravity, and
even salvation. And you assert, that if we exercise it not, we are
irreligious, curious, and vain: although you are so great an enemy to
assertions. Thus, in steering clear of Charybdis, you have, with excellent
grace, escaped Scylla also. But into this state you are driven by your
confidence in your own talents. You believe, that you can by your eloquence,
so impose upon the understandings of all, that no one shall discover the
design which you secretly hug in your heart, and what you aim at in all
those your pliant writings. But God is not mocked, (Gal. vi. 7,) upon whom
it is not safe to run.
Moreover, had you enjoined us this temerity in composing
poems, in preparing for fruits, in conducting wars or other undertakings, or
in building houses; although it would have been intolerable, especially in
so great a man, yet you might have been deserving of some pardon, at least
from Christians, for they pay no regard to these temporal things. But when
you enjoin Christians themselves to become rash workers, and charge them not
to be curious about what they can do and what they cannot do, in obtaining
eternal salvation; this, evidently, and in reality, is the sin unpardonable.
For while they know not what or how much they can do, they will not know
what to do; and if they know not what to do, they cannot repent when they do
wrong; and impenitence is the unpardonable sin: and to this, does that
moderate and skeptical theology of yours lead us.
Therefore, it is not irreligious, curious, or
superfluous, but essentially wholesome and necessary, for a Christian to
know, whether or not the will does any thing in those things which pertain
unto Salvation. Nay, let me tell you, this is the very hinge upon which our
discussion turns. It is the very heart of our subject. For our object is
this: to inquire what "Free-will" can do, in what it is passive, and how it
stands with reference to the grace of God. If we know nothing of these
things, we shall know nothing whatever of Christian matters, and shall be
far behind all People upon the earth. He that does not feel this, let
him confess that he is no Christian. And he that despises and laughs at it,
let him know that he is the Christian's greatest enemy. For, if I know not
how much I can do myself, how far my ability extends, and what I can do
God-wards; I shall be equally uncertain and ignorant how much God is to do,
how far His ability is to extend, and what He is to do toward me: whereas it
is "God that worketh all in all." (1 Cor. xii. 6.) But if I know not the
distinction between our working and the power of God,
I know not God Himself. And if I know not God, I cannot worship
Him, praise Him, give Him thanks, nor serve Him; for I shall not know how
much I ought to ascribe unto myself, and how much unto God. It is necessary,
therefore, to hold the most certain distinction, between the power of God
and our power, the working of God and our working, if we would live in His
fear.
Hence you see, this point, forms another part of the
whole sum of Christianity; on which depends, and in which is at stake, the
knowledge of ourselves, and the knowledge and glory of God. Wherefore,
friend Erasmus, your calling the knowledge of this point irreligious,
curious, and vain, is not to be borne in you. We owe much to you, but we owe
all to the fear of God. Nay you yourself see, that all our good is to be
ascribed unto God, and you assert that in your Form of Christianity: and in
asserting this, you certainly, at the same time assert also, that the mercy
of God alone does all things, and that our own will does nothing, but is
rather acted upon: and so it must be, otherwise the whole is not ascribed
unto God. And yet, immediately afterwards, you say, that to assert these
things, and to know them, is irreligious, impious, and vain. But at this
rate a mind, which is unstable in itself, and unsettled and inexperienced in
the things of godliness, cannot but talk.
Sect. 8.—ANOTHER part of the sum
of Christianity is, to know, whether God foreknows any thing by contingency,
or whether we do all things from necessity. This part also you make to be
irreligious, curious, and vain, as all the wicked do: the devils , and the
damned also, make it detestable and execrable. And you shew your wisdom in
keeping yourself clear from such questions, wherever you can do it. But
however, you are but a very poor rhetorician and theologian, if you pretend
to speak of "Free-will" without these essential parts of it. I will
therefore act as a whetstone, and though no rhetorician myself, will tell a
famed rhetorician what he ought to do—If, then, Quintilian, purposing to
write on Oratory, should say, "In my judgment, all that superfluous nonsense
about invention, arrangement, elocution, memory, pronunciation, need not be
mentioned; it is enough to know, that Oratory, is the art of speaking
well"—would you not laugh at such a writer? But you act exactly like this:
for pretending to write on "Free-will," you first throw aside, and cast
away, the grand substance and all the parts of the subject on which you
undertake to write. Whereas, it is impossible that you should know what
"Free-will" is, unless you know what the human will does, and what God does
or foreknows.
Do not your rhetoricians teach, that he who undertakes to
speak upon any subject, ought first to show, whether the thing exist; and
then, what it is, what its parts are, what is contrary to it, connected with
it, and like unto it, &c.? But you rob that miserable subject in itself,
"Free will," of all these things: and define no one question concerning it,
except this first, viz., whether it exist: and even this with such arguments
as we shall presently see: and so worthless a book on "Free-will" I never
saw, excepting the elegance of the language. The Sophists, in reality, at
least argue upon this point better than you, though those of them who have
attempted the subject of "Free-will," are no rhetoricians; for they define
all the questions connected with it: whether it exists, what it does, and
how it stands with reference to, &c.: although they do not effect what they
attempt. In this book, therefore, I will push you, and the Sophists
together, until you shall define to me the power of "Free-will," and what it
can do: and I hope I shall so push you, (Christ willing) as to make you
heartily repent that you ever published your Diatribe.
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD.
Sect. 9.—THIS, therefore, is also
essentially necessary and wholesome for Christians to know: That God
foreknows nothing by contingency, but that He foresees, purposes, and does
all things according to His immutable, eternal, and infallible will. By
this thunderbolt, "Free-will" is thrown prostrate, and utterly dashed to
pieces. Those, therefore, who would assert "Free-will," must either deny
this thunderbolt, or pretend not to see it, or push it from them. But,
however, before I establish this point by any arguments of my own, and by
the authority of Scripture, I will first set it forth in your words.
Are you not then the person, friend Erasmus, who just now
asserted, that God is by nature just, and by nature most merciful? If this
be true, does it not follow that He is immutably just and merciful?
That, as His nature is not changed to all eternity, so neither His justice
nor His mercy? And what is said concerning His justice and His mercy, must
be said also concerning His knowledge, His wisdom, His goodness, His will,
and His other Attributes. If therefore these things are asserted
religiously, piously, and wholesomely concerning God, as you say yourself,
what has come to you, that, contrary to your own self, you now assert, that
it is irreligious, curious, and vain, to say, that God foreknows of
necessity? You openly declare that the immutable will of God is to be
known, but you forbid the knowledge of His immutable prescience. Do
you believe that He foreknows against His will, or that He wills in
ignorance? If then, He foreknows, willing, His will is eternal and
immovable, because His nature is so: and, if He wills, foreknowing, His
knowledge is eternal and immovable, because His nature is so.
From which it follows unalterably, that all things which
we do, although they may appear to us to be done mutably and contingently,
and even may be done thus contingently by us, are yet, in reality, done
necessarily and immutably, with respect to the will of God. For the will of
God is effective and cannot be hindered; because the very power of God is
natural to Him, and His wisdom is such that He cannot be deceived. And as
His will cannot be hindered, the work itself cannot be hindered from being
done in the place, at the time, in the measure, and by whom He foresees and
wills. If the will of God were such, that, when the work was done,
the work remained but the will ceased, (as is the case with
the will of men, which, when the house is built which they wished to
build, ceases to will, as though it ended by death) then, indeed, it
might be said, that things are done by contingency and mutability. But here,
the case is the contrary; the work ceases, and the will remains.
So far is it from possibility, that the doing of the work or its
remaining, can be said to be from contingency or mutability. But, (that we
may not be deceived in terms) being done by contingency, does not, in
the Latin language, signify that the work itself which is done is
contingent, but that it is done according to a contingent and mutable
will—such a will as is not to be found in God! Moreover, a work cannot be
called contingent, unless it be done by us unawares, by contingency, and, as
it were, by chance; that is, by our will or hand catching at it, as
presented by chance, we thinking nothing of it, nor willing any thing about
it before.
Sect. 10.—I COULD wish, indeed,
that we were furnished with some better term for this discussion, than this
commonly used term, necessity, which cannot rightly be used, either
with reference to the human will, or the divine. It is of a signification
too harsh and ill-suited for this subject, forcing upon the mind an idea of
compulsion, and that which is altogether contrary to will; whereas,
the subject which we are discussing, does not require such an idea: for
Will, whether divine or human, does what it does, be it good or evil, not by
any compulsion but by mere willingness or desire, as it were, totally free.
The will of God, nevertheless, which rules over our mutable will, is
immutable and infallible; as Boëtius sings, "Immovable Thyself, Thou
movement giv'st to all." And our own will, especially our corrupt will,
cannot of itself do good; therefore, where the term fails to express the
idea required, the understanding of the reader must make up the deficiency,
knowing what is wished to be expressed—the immutable will of God, and the
impotency of our depraved will; or, as some have expressed it, the
necessity of immutability, though neither is that sufficiently
grammatical, or sufficiently theological.
Upon this point, the Sophists have now laboured hard for
many years, and being at last conquered, have been compelled to retreat. All
things take place from the necessity of the consequence, (say they)
but not from the necessity of the thing consequent. What nothingness
this amounts to, I will not take the trouble to show. By the necessity of
the consequence, (to give a general idea of it) they mean this—If God
wills any thing, that same thing must, of necessity be done; but it is not
necessary that the thing done should be necessary: for God alone is
necessary; all other things cannot be so, if it is God that wills.
Therefore, (say they) the action of God is necessary, where He wills, but
the act itself is not necessary; that is, (they mean) it has not
essential necessity. But what do they effect by this playing upon words?
Only this, that the act itself is not necessary, that is, it has not
essential necessity. This is no more than saying, the act is not God
Himself. This, nevertheless, remains certain, that if the action of God is
necessary, or if there is a necessity of the consequence, every thing takes
place of necessity, how much soever the act be not necessary; that is, be
not God Himself, or have not essential necessity. For, if I be not made of
necessity, it is of little moment with me, whether my existence and being be
mutable or not, if, nevertheless, I, that contingent and mutable being, who
am not the necessary God, am made.
Wherefore, their ridiculous play upon words, that all
things take place from the necessity of the consequence, but not from
the necessity of the thing consequent, amounts to nothing more than
this—all things take place of necessity, but all the things that do take
place are not God Himself. But what need was there to tell us this? As
though there were any fear of our asserting, that the things done were God
Himself, or possessed divine or necessary nature. This asserted truth,
therefore, stands and remains invincible—that all things take place
according to the immutable will of God! which they call the necessity of the
consequence. Nor is there here any obscurity or ambiguity. In Isaiah he
saith, "My counsel shall stand, and My will shall be done." (Isa. xlvi. 10.)
And what schoolboy does not under-stand the meaning of these expressions,
"Counsel," "will," "shall be done," "shall stand?"
Sect. 11.—BUT why should these
things be abstruse to us Christians, so that it should be considered
irreligious, curious, and vain, to discuss and know them, when heathen
poets, and the very commonalty, have them in their mouths in the most
frequent use? How often does Virgil alone make mention of Fate? "All things
stand fixed by law immutable." Again, "Fixed is the day of every man."
Again, "If the Fates summon you." And again, "If thou shalt break the
binding chain of Fate." All this poet aims at, is to show, that in the
destruction of Troy, and in raising the Roman empire, Fate did more than all
the devoted efforts of men. In a word, he makes even their immortal gods
subject to Fate. To this, even Jupiter and Juno must, of necessity, yield.
Hence they made the three Parcae immutable, implacable, and irrevocable in
decree. [See Note]
Those men of wisdom knew that which the event itself,
with experience, proves; that no man's own counsels ever succeeded but that
the event happened to all contrary to what they thought. Virgil's Hector
says, "Could Troy have stood by human arm, it should have stood by mine."
Hence that common saying was on every one's tongue, "God's will be done."
Again, "If God will, we will do it." Again, "Such was the will of God."
"Such was the will of those above." "Such was your will," says Virgil.
Whence we may see, that the knowledge of predestination and of the
prescience of God, was no less left in the world than the notion of the
divinity itself. And those who wished to appear wise, went in their
disputatious so far, that, their hearts being darkened, they became fools,"
(Rom. i. 21-22,) and denied, or pretended not to know, those things which
their poets, and the commonalty, and even their own consciences, held to be
universally known, most certain, and most true.
Sect. 12.—I OBSERVE further, not
only how true these things are (concerning which I shall speak more at large
hereafter out of the Scriptures) but also how religious, pious, and
necessary it is to know them; for if these things be not known there can be
neither faith, nor any worship of God: nay, not to know them, is to be in
reality ignorant of God, with which ignorance salvation, it is well known,
cannot consist. For if you doubt, or disdain to know that God foreknows and
wills all things, not contingently, but necessarily and immutably, how can
you believe confidently, trust to, and depend upon His promises? For when He
promises, it is necessary that you should be certain that He knows, is able,
and willing to perform what He promises; otherwise, you will neither hold
Him true nor faithful; which is unbelief, the greatest of wickedness, and a
denying of the Most High God!
And how can you be certain and secure, unless you are
persuaded that He knows and wills certainly, infallibly, immutably, and
necessarily, and will perform what He promises? Nor ought we to be certain
only that God wills necessarily and immutably, and will perform, but also to
glory in the same; as Paul, (Rom. iii. 4,) "Let God be true, but every man a
liar." And again, "For the word of God is not without effect." (Rom. ix. 6.)
And in another place, "The foundation of God standeth sure, having this
seal, the Lord knoweth them that are His." (2 Tim. ii. 19.) And, "Which God,
that cannot lie, promised before the world began." (Titus i. 2.) And, "He
that cometh, must believe that God is, and that He is a rewarder of them
that hope in Him." (Heb. xi. 6.)
If, therefore, we are taught, and if we believe, that we
ought not to know the necessary prescience of God, and the necessity of the
things that are to take place, Christian faith is utterly destroyed, and the
promises of God and the whole Gospel entirely fall to the ground; for the
greatest and only consolation of Christians in their adversities, is the
knowing that God lies not, but does all things immutably, and that His will
cannot be resisted, changed, or hindered.
Sect. 13.—Do you now, then, only observe, friend Erasmus,
to what that most moderate, and most peace-loving theology of yours would
lead us. You call us off, and forbid our endeavouring to know the prescience
of God, and the necessity that lies on men and things, and counsel us to
leave such things, and to avoid and disregard them; and in so doing, you at
the same time teach us your rash sentiments; that we should seek after an
ignorance of God, (which comes upon us of its own accord, and is engendered
in us), disregard faith, leave the promises of God, and account the
consolations of the Spirit and the assurances of conscience, nothing at all!
Such counsel scarcely any Epicure himself would give!
Moreover, not content with this, you call him who should
desire to know such things, irreligious, curious, and vain; but him who
should disregard them, religious, pious, and sober. What else do these words
imply, than that Christians are irreligious, curious, and vain? And that
Christianity is a thing of nought, vain, foolish, and plainly impious? Here
again, therefore, while you wish by all means to deter us from temerity,
running, as fools always do, directly into the contrary, you teach nothing
but the greatest temerity, impiety, and perdition. Do you not see, then,
that in this part, your book is so impious, blasphemous, and sacrilegious,
that its like is not any where to be found.
I do not, as I have observed before, speak of your heart;
nor can I think that you are so lost, that from your heart, you wish these
things to be taught and practiced. But I would shew you what enormities that
man must be compelled unknowingly to broach, who undertakes to support a bad
cause. And moreover, what it is to run against divine things and truths,
when, in mere compliance with others and against our own conscience, we
assume a strange character and act upon a strange stage. It is neither a
game nor a jest, to undertake to teach the sacred truths and godliness: for
it is very easy here to meet with that fall which James speaks of, "he that
offendeth in one point is guilty of all." (James ii. 10.) For when we begin
to be, in the least degree, disposed to trifle, and not to hold the sacred
truths in due reverence, we are soon involved in impieties, and overwhelmed
with blasphemies: as it has happened to you here, Erasmus—May the Lord
pardon, and have mercy upon you!
That the Sophists have given birth to such numbers of
reasoning questions upon these subjects, and have intermingled with them
many unprofitable things, many of which you mention, I know and confess, as
well as you: and I have inveighed against them much more than you have. But
you act with imprudence and rashness, when you liken the purity of the
sacred truths unto the profane and foolish questions of the impious, and
mingle and confound it with them. "They have defiled the gold with dung, and
changed the good colour," (Lam. iv. 1., as Jeremiah saith.) But the gold is
not to be compared unto, and cast away with the dung; as you do it. The gold
must be wrested from them, and the pure Scripture separated from their dregs
and filth; which it has ever been my aim to do, that the divine truths may
be looked upon in one light, and the trifles of these men in another. But it
ought not to be considered of any service to us, that nothing has been
effected by these questions, but their causing us to favour them less with
the whole current of our approbation, if, nevertheless, we still desire to
be wiser than we ought. The question with us is not how much the Sophists
have effected by their reasonings, but how we may become good men, and
Christians. Nor ought you to impute it to the Christian doctrine that the
impious do evil. That is nothing to the purpose: you may speak of that
somewhere else, and spare your paper here.
Sect. 14.—UNDER your third head,
you attempt to make us some of those very modest and quiet Epicureans. With
a different kind of advice indeed, but no better than that, with which the
two forementioned particulars are brought forward:—"Some things (you say)
are of that nature, that, although they are true in themselves, and might be
known, yet it would not be prudent to prostitute them to the ears of every
one."—
Here again, according to your custom, you mingle and
confound every thing, to bring the sacred things down to a level with the
profane, without making any distinction whatever: again falling into the
contempt of, and doing an injury to God. As I have said before, those things
which are either found in the sacred Writings, or may be proved by them, are
not only plain, but wholesome; and therefore may be, nay, ought to be,
spread abroad, learnt, and known. So that your saying, that they ought not
to be prostituted to the ears of every one, is false: if, that is, you speak
of those things which are in the Scripture: but if you speak of any other
things, they are nothing to me, and nothing to the purpose: you lose time
and paper in saying any thing about them.
Moreover, you know that I agree not with the Sophists in
any thing: you may therefore spare me, and not bring me in at all as
connected with their abuse of the truth. You had, in this book of yours, to
speak against me. I know where the Sophists are wrong, nor do I want you for
my instructor, and they have been sufficiently inveighed against by me:
this, therefore, I wish to be observed once for all, whenever you shall
bring me in with the Sophists, and disparage my side of the subject by their
madness. For you do me an injury; and that you know very well.
Sect. 15.—NOW let us see your
reasons for giving this advice—'you think, that, although it may be true,
that God, from His nature, is in a beetle's hole, or even in a sink, (which
you have too much holy reverence to say yourself, and blame the Sophists for
talking in such a way) no less than in Heaven, yet it would be unreasonable
to discuss such a subject before the multitude.'—
First of all, let them talk thus, who can talk thus. We
do not here argue concerning what are facts in men, but concerning justice
and law: not that we may live, but that we may live as we ought. Who among
us lives and acts rightly? But justice and the doctrine of law are not
therefore condemned: but rather they condemn us. You fetch from afar these
irrelevant things, and scrape together many such from all quarters, because
you cannot get over this one point, the prescience of God: and since you
cannot overthrow it in any way, you want, in the mean time, to tire out the
reader with a multiplicity of empty observation. But of this, no more. Let
us return to the point.
What then is your intention, in observing that there are
some things which ought not to be spoken of openly? Do you mean to enumerate
the subject of "Free-will" among those things? If you do, the whole that I
have just said concerning the necessity of knowing what "Free-will" is, will
turn round upon you. Moreover, if so, why do you not keep to your own
principles, and have nothing to do with your Diatribe? But, if you do well
in discussing "Free-will," why do you speak against such discussion? and if
it is a bad subject, why do you make it worse? But if you do not enumerate
it among those things, then, you leave your subject-point; and like an
orator of words only, talk about those irrelevant things that have nothing
to do with the subject.
Sect. 16.—NOR are you right in the
use of this example; nor in condemning the discussion of this subject before
the multitude, as useless—that God is in a beetle's hole and even in a sink!
For your thoughts concerning God are too human. I confess indeed, that there
are certain fantastical preachers, who, not from any religion, or fear of
God, but from a desire of vain-glory, or from a thirst after some novelty,
or from impatience of silence, prate and trifle in the lightest manner. But
such please neither God nor men, although they assert that God is in the
Heaven of Heavens. But when there are grave and pious preachers, who teach
in modest, pure, and sound words; they, without any danger, nay, unto much
profit, speak on such a subject before the multitude.
Is it not the duty of us all to teach, that the Son of
God was in the womb of the Virgin, and proceeded forth from her belly? And
in what does the human belly differ from any other unclean place? Who,
moreover, may not describe it in filthy and shameless terms? But such
persons we justly condemn; because, there are numberless pure words, in
which we speak of that necessary subject, even with decency and grace. The
body also of Christ Himself was human, like ours. Than which body, what is
more filthy? But shall we, therefore, not say what Paul saith, that God
dwelt in it bodily? (Col. ii. 9.) What is more unclean than death? What more
horrible than hell? Yet the prophet glorieth that God was with him in death,
and left him not, in hell. (Ps. xvi 10, Ps. cxxxix. 8.)
The pious mind, therefore, is not shocked at hearing that
God was in death and in hell: each of which is more horrible, and more
loathsome, than either a hole or a sink. Nay, since the Scripture testifies
that God is every where, and fills all things, such a mind, not only says
that He is in those places, but will, of necessity learn and know that He is
there. Unless we are to suppose that if I should at any time be taken and
cast into a prison or a sink, (which has happened to many saints,) I could
not there call upon God, or believe that He was present with me, until I
should come into some ornamented church. If you teach us that we are thus to
trifle concerning God, and if you are thus offended at the places of His
essential presence, by and by you will not even allow that He dwells with us
in Heaven. Whereas, "the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain Him," (1 Kings
viii. 27.); or, they are not worthy. But, as I said before, you, according
to your custom, thus maliciously point your sting at our cause, that you may
disparage and render if hateful, because you find it stands against you
insuperable, and invincible.
Sect. 17.—IN the example
concerning confession and satisfaction, it is wonderful to observe with what
dexterous prudence you proceed. Throughout the whole, according to your
custom, you move along on the tiptoe of caution, lest you should seem,
neither plainly to condemn my sentiments nor to oppose the tyranny of the
Popes: a path which you found to be by no means safe. Therefore, throwing
off, in this matter, both God and conscience, (for what are these things to
Erasmus? What has he to do with them? What profit are they to him?) you rush
upon the external bugbear, and attack the commonalty.
—'That they, from their depravity, abuse the preaching of
a free confession and of satisfaction, to an occasion of the flesh. But,
nevertheless, (you say) by the necessity of confessing, they are, in a
measure, restrained.'—
O memorable and excellent speech! Is this teaching
theology? To bind souls by laws, and, (as Ezekiel saith, xiii. 18,) to hunt
them to death, which are not bound by God! Why, by this speech you bring
upon us the universal tyranny of the laws of the Popes, as useful and
wholesome; because, that by them also the depravity of the commonalty is
restrained.
But I will not inveigh against this place as it deserves.
I will descant upon it thus briefly—A good theologian teaches, that the
commonalty are to be restrained by the external power of the sword, where
they do evil: as Paul teaches. (Rom. xiii. 1-4.) But their consciences are
not to be fettered by false laws, that they might be tormented with sins
where God wills there should be no sins at all. For consciences are bound by
the law of God only. So that, that intermediate tyranny of Popes, which
falsely terrifies and murders the souls within, and vainly wearies the
bodies without is to be taken entirely out of the way. Because, although it
binds to confession and other things, outwardly, yet the mind is not, by
these things restrained, but exasperated the more into the hatred both of
God and men. And in vain does it butcher the body by external things, making
nothing but hypocrites.—So that tyrants, with laws of this kind, are nothing
else but ravening wolves, robbers, and plunderers of souls. And yet you, an
excellent counselor of souls, recommend these to us again: that is, you are
an advocate for these most barbarous soul-murderers, who fill the world with
hypocrites, and with such as blaspheme God and hate Him in their hearts, in
order that they may restrain them a little from outward sin. As though there
were no other way of restraining, which makes no hypocrites, and is wrought
without any destroying of consciences.
Sect. 18.—HERE you produce
similitudes (in which you aim at appearing to abound, and to use very
appropriately); that is,—'that there are diseases, which may be borne with
less evil than they can be cured: as the leprosy, &c.' You add, moreover,
the example of Paul, who makes a distinction between those things that are
lawful, and those that are not expedient. "It is lawful (you say) to speak
the truth; but, before every one, at all times, and in every way, it is not
expedient."—
How copious an orator! And yet you understand nothing of
what you are saying. In a word, you treat this discussion, as though it were
some matter between you and me only, about the recovering of some money that
was at stake, or some other trivial thing, the loss of which, as being of
much less consideration than the general peace of the community, ought not
so to concern any one, but that he may yield, act and suffer upon the
occasion, in any way that may prevent the necessity of the whole world being
thrown into a tumult. Wherein, you plainly evince, that this peace and
tranquility of the flesh, are, with you, a matter of far greater
consideration than faith, than conscience, than salvation, than the Word of
God, than the glory of Christ, than God Himself! Wherefore, let me tell you
this; and I entreat you to let it sink deep into your mind—I am, in this
discussion, seeking an object solemn and essential; nay, such, and so great,
that it ought to be maintained and defended through death itself; and that,
although the whole world should not only be thrown into tumult and set in
arms thereby, but even if it should be hurled into chaos and reduced to
nothing.—If you cannot receive this, or if you are not affected by it, do
you mind your own business, and allow us to receive it and to be affected by
it, to whom it is given of God.
For, by the grace of God, I am not so great a fool or
madman, as to have desired to sustain and defend this cause so long, with so
much fortitude and so much firmness, (which you call obstinacy) in the face
of so many dangers of my life, so much hatred, so many traps laid for me; in
a word, in the face of the fury of men and devils—I have not done this for
money, for that I neither have nor desire; nor for vain-glory, for that, if
I wished, I could not obtain in a world so enraged against me, nor for the
life for my body, for that cannot be made sure of for an hour.—Do you think,
then, that you only have a heart that is moved by these tumults? Yet, I am
not made of stone, nor was I born from the Marpesian rocks. But since it
cannot be otherwise, I choose rather to be battered in temporal tumult,
happy in the grace of God, for God's word's sake, which is to be maintained
with a mind incorrupt and invincible, than to be ground to powder in eternal
tumult, under the wrath of God and torments intolerable! May Christ grant,
what I desire and hope, that your heart may not be such—but certainly your
words imply, that, with Epicurus, you consider the Word of God and a future
life, to be mere fables. For, in your instructions, you would have us, for
the sake of the Popes, the heads, and the peace of the community, to put
off, upon an occasion, and depart from the all-certain word of God: whereas,
if we put off that, we put off God, faith, salvation and all Christianity
together. How far different from this is the instruction of Christ: that, we
should rather despise the whole world!
Sect. 19.—BUT you say these
things, because you either do not read or do not observe, that such is most
constantly the case with the word of God, that because of it, the world is
thrown into tumult. And that Christ openly declares: "I came not (says He)
to send peace but a sword." (Matt. x. 34.) And in Luke, "I came to send fire
upon the earth." (Luke xii. 49.) And Paul, (2 Cor. vi. 5,) "In tumults," &c.
And the Prophet, in the Second Psalm, abundantly testifies the same:
declaring, that the nations are in tumult, the people roaring, the kings
rising up, and the princes conspiring against the Lord and against His
Christ. As though He had said, multitude, height, wealth, power, wisdom,
righteousness, and whatever is great in the world, sets itself against the
word of God.
Look into the Acts of the Apostles, and see what happened
in the world on account of the word of Paul only (to say nothing of the
other apostles): how he alone throws both the Gentiles and Jews into
commotion: or, as the enemies themselves express it, "turns
the world upside down." (Acts xvii. 6.) Under Elijah, the kingdom of Israel
was thrown into commotion: as king Ahab complains. (1 Kings xviii. 17.) What
tumult was there under the other prophets, while they are all either killed
at once or stoned to death; while Israel is taken captive into Assyria, and
Judah also to Babylon! Was all this peace? The world and its god (2 Cor. iv.
4,) cannot and will not bear the Word of the true God: and the true God
cannot and will not keep silence. While, therefore, these two Gods are at
war with each other, what can there be else in the whole world, but tumult?
Therefore, to wish to silence these tumults, is nothing
else, than to wish to hinder the Word of God, and to take it out of the way.
For the Word of God, wherever it comes, comes to change and to renew the
world. And even heathen writers testify, that changes of things cannot take
place, without commotion and tumult, nor even without blood. It therefore
belongs to Christians, to expect and endure these things, with a stayed
mind: as Christ says, "When ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars, be
not dismayed, for these things must first come to pass, but the end is not
yet." (Matt. xxiv. 6.) And as to myself, if I did not see these tumults, I
should say the Word of God was not in the world. But now, when I do see
them, I rejoice from my heart, and fear them not: being surely persuaded,
that the kingdom of the Pope, with all his followers, will fall to the
ground: for it is especially against this, that the word of God, which now
runs, is directed.
I see indeed, my friend Erasmus, that you complain in
many books of these tumults, and of the loss of peace and concord; and you
attempt many means whereby to afford a remedy, and (as I am inclined to
believe) with a good intention. But this gouty foot laughs at your doctoring
hands. For here, in truth, as you say, you sail against the tide; nay, you
put out fire with straw. Cease from complaining, cease from doctoring; this
tumult proceeds, and is carried on, from above, and will not cease until it
shall make all the adversaries of the word as the dirt of the streets.
Though I am sorry that I find it necessary to teach you, so great a
theologian, these things, like a disciple, when you ought to be a teacher of
others.
Your excellent sentiment, then, that some diseases may be
borne with less evil than they can be cured applies here: which sentiment
you do not appositely use. Rather call these tumults, commotions,
perturbations, seditions, discords, wars, and all other things of the same
kind with which the world is shaken and tossed to and fro on account of the
Word of God,—the diseases. These things, I say, as they are temporal, are
borne with less evil than inveterate and evil habits; by which all souls
must be destroyed if they be not changed by the word of God: which being
taken away, eternal good, God, Christ, and the Spirit, must be taken away
with it.
But how much better is it to lose the whole world, than
to lose God the Creator of the world, who can create innumerable worlds
again, and is better than infinite worlds? For what are temporal things when
compared with eternal? This leprosy of temporal things, therefore, is rather
to be borne, than that every soul should be destroyed and eternally damned,
and the world kept in peace, and preserved from these tumults, by their
blood and perdition: whereas, one soul cannot be redeemed with the price of
the whole world!
You certainly have command of elegant and excellent
similitudes, and sentiments: but, when you are engaged in sacred
discussions, you apply them childishly, nay, pervertedly: for you crawl upon
the ground, and enter in thought into nothing above what is human. Whereas,
those things which God works, are neither puerile, civil, nor human, but
divine; and they exceed human capacity. Thus, you do not see, that these
tumults and divisions increase throughout the world, according to the
counsel, and by the operation of God; and therefore, you fear lest heaven
should tumble about our ears. But I, by the grace of God, see these things
clearly; because, I see other tumults greater than these that will arise in
the age to come in comparison of which, these appear but as the whispering
of a breath of air, or the murmuring of a gentle brook.
Sect. 20.—BUT, the doctrine
concerning the liberty of confession and satisfaction, you either deny, or
know not that there is the Word of God.—And here arises another inquiry. But
we know, and are persuaded, that there is a Word of God, in which the
Christian liberty is asserted, that we might not suffer ourselves to be
ensnared into bondage by human traditions and laws. This I have abundantly
shewn elsewhere. But if you wish to enter the lists, I am prepared to
discuss the point with you, and to fight it out. Though upon these subjects
I have books extant not a few.
But,—"the laws of the Popes (you say,) may at the same
time be borne with and observed, in charity; if perchance thus, eternal
salvation by the word of God, and the peace of the world, may together
consist, without tumult."—
I have said before, that cannot be. The prince of this
world will not allow the Pope and his high priests, and their laws to be
observed in liberty, but his design is, to entangle and bind consciences.
This the true God will not bear. Therefore, the Word of God, and the
traditions of men, are opposed to each other with implacable discord; no
less so, than God Himself and Satan; who each destroy the works and
overthrow the doctrines of the other, as regal kings each destroying the
kingdom of the other. "He that is not with Me (saith Christ) is against Me."
(Luke xi. 23.)
And as to—"a fear that many who are depravedly inclined,
will abuse this liberty"—
This must be considered among those tumults, as a part of
that temporal leprosy which is to be borne, and of that evil which is to be
endured. But these are not to be considered of so much consequence, as that,
for the sake of restraining their abuse, the word of God should be taken out
of the way. For if all cannot be saved, yet some are saved; for whose sake
the word of God is sent; and these, on that account, love it the more
fervently, and assent to it the more solemnly. For, what evils did not
impious men commit before, when there was no word? Nay, what good did they
do? Was not the world always drowned in war, fraud, violence, discord, and
every kind of iniquity? For if Micah (vii. 4) compares the best among them
to a thorn hedge, what do you suppose he would call the rest?
But now the Gospel is come, men begin to impute unto it,
that the world is evil. Whereas, the truth is, that by the good Gospel, it
is more manifest how evil it was, while, without the Gospel, it did all its
works in darkness. Thus also the illiterate attribute it to learning, that,
by its flourishing, their ignorance becomes known. This is the return we
make for the word of life and salvation!—And what fear must we suppose there
was among the Jews, when the Gospel freed all from the law of Moses? What
occasion did not this great liberty seem to give to evil men? But yet, the
Gospel was not, on that account, taken away; but the impious were left, and
it was preached to the pious, that they might not use their liberty to an
occasion of the flesh. (Gal. v. 13.)
Sect. 21.—NOR is this part of your
advice, or your remedy, to any purpose, where you say—"It is lawful to speak
the truth but it is not expedient, either before every one, or at all times,
or in every manner." And ridiculously enough, you adduce Paul, where he
says, "All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient."—(1
Cor. vi. 12.)
But Paul does not there speak of teaching doctrine or the
truth; as you would confound his words, and twist them which way you please.
On the contrary, he will have the truth spoken every where, at all times,
and in every manner. So that he even rejoices that Christ is preached even
through envy and strife. Nay, he declares in plain words, that he rejoices,
let Christ be preached in any way. (Phil. i. 15-18.)
Paul is speaking of facts, and the use of doctrine: that
is, of those, who, seeking their own, had no consideration of the hurt and
offence given to the weak. Truth and doctrine, are to be preached always,
openly, and firmly, and are never to be dissembled or concealed; for there
is no offence in them; they are the staff of uprightness.—And who gave you
the power, or committed to you, the right, of confining the Christian
doctrine to persons, places, times, and causes, when Christ wills it to be
proclaimed, and to reign freely, throughout the world? For Paul saith, "the
Word of God is not bound," (2 Tim. ii. 9,) but Erasmus bounds the word. Nor
did God give us the word that it should be had with respect of places,
persons, or times: for Christ saith, "Go ye out into the whole world,": He
does not say, as Erasmus does,—go to this place and not to that. Again,
"Preach the Gospel to every creature." (Mark xvi. 15.) He does not
say—preach it to some and not to others. In a word, you enjoin, in the
administration of the word of God, a respect of persons, a respect of
places, a respect of customs, and a respect of times: whereas, the one and
especial part of the glory of the word consists in this,—that, as Paul saith,
there is, with it, no respect of persons; and that God is no respecter of
persons. You see therefore, again, how rashly you run against the Word of
God, as though you preferred far before it, your own counsel and
cogitations.
Hence, if we should demand of you that you would
determine for us, the times in which, the persons to whom, and the manner in
which, the truth is to be spoken, when would you come to an end? The world
would sooner compute the termination of time and its own end, than you would
settle upon any one certain rule. In the meantime, where would remain the
duty of teaching? Where that of teaching the soul? And how could you, who
know nothing of the nature of persons, times, and manner, determine upon any
rule at all? And even if you should know them perfectly, yet you could not
know the hearts of men. Unless, with you, the manner, the time, and the
person be this:—teaching the truth so, that the Pope be not indignant,
Caesar be not enraged, and that many be not offended and made worse! But
what kind of counsel this is, you have seen above.—I have thus rhetorically
figured away in these vain words, lest you should appear to have said
nothing at all.
How much better is it for us wretched men to ascribe unto
God, who knoweth the hearts of all men, the glory of determining the manner
in which, the persons to whom, and the times in which the truth is to be
spoken. For He knows what is to be spoken to each, and when, and how it is
to be spoken. He then, determines that His Gospel which is necessary unto
all, should be confined to no place, no time; but that it should be preached
unto all, at all times and in all places. And I have already proved, that
those things which are handed down to us in the Scriptures, are such, that
they are quite plain and wholesome, and of necessity to be proclaimed
abroad; even as you yourself determined in your Paraclesis was right to be
done; and that, with much more wisdom than you advise now. But let those who
would not that souls should be redeemed, such as the Pope and his
adherents—let it be left to them to bind the Word of God, and hinder men
from life and the kingdom of heaven, that they might neither enter in
themselves nor suffer others to enter:—to whose fury you, Erasmus, by this
advice of yours, are perniciously subservient.
Sect. 22.—OF the same stamp with
this, is that prudence of yours also, with which you next give it as your
advice—'that, if any thing were settled upon, in the councils, that was
wrong, it ought not to be openly confessed: lest, a handle should be thereby
afforded, for contemning the authority of the fathers.'—
This, indeed, is just what the Pope wished you to say!
And he hears it with greater pleasure than the Gospel itself, and will be a
most ungrateful wretch, if he do not honour you in return, with a cardinal's
cap together with all the revenues belonging to it. But in the mean time,
friend Erasmus, what will the souls do that shall be bound and murdered by
that iniquitous statute? Is that nothing to you? But however, you always
think, or pretend to think, that human statutes can be observed together
with the Word of God, without peril. If they could, I would at once go over
to this your sentiment.
But if you are yet in ignorance, I tell you again, that
human statutes cannot be observed together with the Word of God: because,
the former bind consciences, the latter looses them. They are directly
opposed to each other, as water to fire. Unless, indeed, they could be
observed in liberty; that is, not to bind the conscience. But this the Pope
wills not, nor can he will it, unless he wishes his kingdom to be destroyed
and brought to an end: for that stands only in ensnaring and binding those
consciences, which the Gospel pronounces free. The authority of the fathers,
therefore, is to be accounted nought: and those statutes which have been
wrongly enacted, (as all have been that are not according to the Word of
God) are to be rent in sunder and cast away: for Christ is better than the
authority of the fathers. In a word, if it be concerning the Word of God
that you think thus, you think impiously; if it be concerning other things,
your verbose disputing about your sentiment is nothing to me: I am disputing
concerning the Word of God!
Sect. 23.—IN the last part of your
Preface, where you deter us from this kind of doctrine, you think your
victory is almost gained.
"What (you say) can be more useless than that this
paradox should be proclaimed openly to the world—that whatever is done by
us, is not done by Free-will, but from mere necessity. And that of Augustine
also—that God works in us both good and evil: that He rewards His good works
in us, and punishes His evil works in us." (You are mightily copious here in
giving, or rather, in expostulating concerning a reason.) "What a flood-gate
of iniquity (you say) would these things, publicly proclaimed, open unto
men! What bad man would amend his life! Who would believe that he was loved
of God! Who would war against his flesh!"
I wonder, that in so great vehemency, and contending
zeal, you did not remember our main subject, and say—where then would be
found "Free-will."
My friend, Erasmus! here, again, I also say, if you
consider that these paradoxes are the inventions of men, why do you contend
against them? Why are you so enraged? Against whom do you rail? Is there any
man in the world, at this day, who has inveighed more vehemently against the
doctrines of men, than Luther! This admonition of yours, therefore, is
nothing to me! But if you believe that those paradoxes are the words of God,
where is your countenance, where is your shame, where is, I will not say
your modesty, but that fear of, and that reverence which is due to the true
God, when you say, that nothing is more useless to be proclaimed than that
Word of God! What! shall your Creator, come to learn of you His creature,
what is useful, and what not useful to be preached? What! did that foolish
and unwise God, know not what is necessary to be taught, until you His
instructor prescribed to Him the measure, according to which He should be
wise, and according to which He should command? What! did He not know before
you told Him, that that which you infer would be the consequence of this His
paradox? If, therefore, God willed that such things should be spoken of and
proclaimed abroad, without regarding what would follow,—who art thou that
forbiddest it?
The apostle Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans,
discourses on these same things, not "in a corner," but in public and before
the whole world, and that with a freely open mouth, nay in the harshest
terms, saying, "whom He will He hardeneth." (Rom. ix. 18.) And again, "God,
willing to shew forth His wrath," &c. (Rom ix. 22.) What is more severe,
that is to the flesh, than that word of Christ "Many are called but few
chosen?" (Matt. xxii. 14.) And again, "I know whom I have chosen?" (John
xiii. 18.) According to your judgment then, all these things are such, that
nothing can be more uselessly spoken; because that by these things, impious
men may fall into desperation, hatred, and blasphemy.
Here then, I see, you suppose that the truth and the
utility of the Scripture are to be weighed and judged of according to the
opinion of men, nay, of men the most impious; so that, what pleases them or
seems bearable, should be deemed true, divine, and wholesome: and what has
the contrary effect upon them, should at once be deemed useless, false, and
pernicious. What else do you mean by all this, than that the words of God
should depend on, stand on, and fall by, the will and authority of men?
Whereas the Scripture, on the contrary saith, that all things stand and fall
by the will and authority of God: and in a word, that "all the earth keeps
silence before the face of the Lord." (Hab. ii. 20.) He who could talk as
you do, must imagine that the living God is nothing but a kind of trifling
and inconsiderate pettifogger declaiming on a certain rostrum, whose words
you may if you be disposed, interpret, understand, and refute as you please,
because He merely spoke as He saw a set of impious men to be moved and
affected.
Here you plainly discover how much your advice
above,—'that the majesty of the judgments of God should be reverenced,'—was
from your heart! There, when we were speaking of the doctrines of the
Scripture only, where there was no need of reverencing things abstruse and
hidden, because there were no such doctrines, you awed us, in the most
religious terms, with the darkness of the Corycian cavern, lest we should
rush forward with too much curiosity; so that, by the awe, you well nigh
frightened us from reading the Scriptures altogether; (to the reading of
which Christ and His apostles urge and persuade us, as well as you do
yourself elsewhere.) But here, where we are come not to the doctrines of the
Scripture, nor to the Corycian cavern only, but to the very, and greatly to
be reverenced secrets of the divine Majesty, viz., why He works thus?—here,
as they say, you burst open all bars and rush in; all but, openly
blaspheming! What indignation against God do you not discover, because you
cannot see His reason why, and His design in this His counsel! Why do you
not here frame, as an excuse, obscurity and ambiguity? Why do you not
restrain yourself, and deter others from prying into these things which God
wills should be hidden from us, and which He has not delivered to us in the
Scriptures? It is here the hand is to be laid upon the mouth, it is here we
are to reverence what lies hidden, to adore the secret counsels of the
divine Majesty, and to exclaim with Paul, "Who art thou, O man, that
contendest with God?" (Rom. ix. 20.)
Sect. 24.—"WHO (you say) will
endeavour to amend his life?"—I answer, No man! no man can! For your
self-amenders without the Spirit, God regardeth not, for they are
hypocrites. But the Elect, and those that fear God, will be amended by the
Holy Spirit; the rest will perish unamended. Nor does Augustine say, that
the works of none, nor that the works of all are crowned, but
the works of some. Therefore, there will be some, who shall
amend their lives.
"Who will believe (you say) that he is loved of God?"—I
answer, no man will believe it! No man can! But the Elect shall believe it;
the rest shall perish without believing it, filled with indignation and
blaspheming, as you here describe them. Therefore, there will be some
who shall believe it.
And as to your saying that—"by these doctrines the
flood-gate of iniquity is thrown open unto men"—be it so. They pertain to
that leprosy of evil to be borne, spoken of before. Nevertheless, by the
same doctrines, there is thrown open to the Elect and to them that fear God,
a gate unto righteousness,—an entrance into heaven—a way unto God! But if,
according to your advice, we should refrain from these doctrines, and should
hide from men this Word of God, so that each, deluded by a false persuasion
of salvation, should never learn to fear God, and should never be humbled,
in order that through this fear he might come to grace and love; then,
indeed, we should shut up your flood-gate to purpose! For in the room of it,
we should throw open to ourselves and to all, wide gates, nay, yawning
chasms and sweeping tides, not only unto iniquity, but unto the depths of
hell! Thus, we should not enter into Heaven ourselves, and them that were
entering in we should hinder.
—"What utility therefore (you say) is there in, or
necessity for proclaiming such things openly, when so many evils seem likely
to proceed therefrom?"—
I answer. It were enough to say—God has willed that they
should be proclaimed openly: but the reason of the divine will is not to be
inquired into, but simply to be adored, and the glory to be given unto God:
who, since He alone is just and wise, doth evil to no one, and can do
nothing rashly or inconsiderately, although it may appear far otherwise unto
us. With this answer those that fear God are content. But that, from the
abundance of answering matter which I have, I may say a little more than
this, which might suffice;—there are two causes which require such things to
be preached. The first is, the humbling of our pride, and the knowledge of
the grace of God. The second is, Christian faith itself.
First, God has promised certainly His grace to the
humbled: that is, to the self-deploring and despairing. But a man cannot be
thoroughly humbled, until he comes to know that his salvation is utterly
beyond his own powers, counsel, endeavours, will, and works, and absolutely
depending on the will, counsel, pleasure, and work of another, that is, of
God only. For if, as long as he has any persuasion that he can do even the
least thing himself towards his own salvation, he retain a confidence in
himself and do not utterly despair in himself, so long he is not humbled
before God; but he proposes to himself some place, some time, or some work,
whereby he may at length attain unto salvation. But he who hesitates not to
depend wholly upon the good-will of God, he totally despairs in himself,
chooses nothing for himself, but waits for God to work in him; and such an
one, is the nearest unto grace, that he might be saved.
These things, therefore, are openly proclaimed for the
sake of the Elect: that, being by these means humbled and brought down to
nothing, they might be saved. The rest resist this humiliation; nay, they
condemn the teaching of self-desperation; they wish to have left a little
something that they may do themselves. These secretly remain proud, and
adversaries to the grace of God. This, I say, is one reason—that those who
fear God, being humbled, might know, call upon, and receive the grace of
God.
The other reason is—that faith is, in things not seen.
Therefore, that there might be room for faith, it is necessary that all
those things which are believed should be hidden. But they are not
hidden more deeply, than under the contrary of sight, sense, and experience.
Thus, when God makes alive, He does it by killing; when He justifies, He
does it by bringing in guilty: when He exalts to Heaven, He does it by
bringing down to hell: as the Scripture saith, "The Lord killeth and maketh
alive, He bringeth down to the grave and raiseth up, " (I Sam. ii. 6.);
concerning which, there is no need that I should here speak more at large,
for those who read my writings, are well acquainted with these things. Thus
He conceals His eternal mercy and loving-kindness behind His eternal wrath:
His righteousness, behind apparent iniquity.
This is the highest degree of faith—to believe that He is
merciful, who saves so few and damns so many; to believe Him just, who
according to His own will, makes us necessarily damnable, that He may seem,
as Erasmus says, 'to delight in the torments of the miserable, and to be an
object of hatred rather than of love.' If, therefore, I could by any means
comprehend how that same God can be merciful and just, who carries the
appearance of so much wrath and iniquity, there would be no need of faith.
But now, since that cannot be comprehended, there is room for exercising
faith, while such things are preached and openly proclaimed: in the same
manner as, while God kills, the faith of life is exercised in death. Suffice
it to have said thus much upon your PREFACE.
In this way, we shall more rightly consult for the
benefit of those who dispute upon these paradoxes, than according to your
way: whereby, you wish to indulge their impiety by silence, and a refraining
from saying any thing: which is to no profit whatever. For if you believe,
or even suppose these things to be true, (seeing they are paradoxes of no
small moment,) such is the insatiable desire of mortals to search into
secret things, and the more so the more we desire to keep them secret, that,
by this admonition of yours, you will absolutely make them public; for all
will now much more desire to know whether these paradoxes be true or not:
thus they will, by your contending zeal, be so roused to inquiry, that not
one of us ever afforded such a handle for making them known, as you yourself
have done by this over-religious and zealous admonition. You would have
acted much more prudently, had you said nothing at all about being cautious
in mentioning these paradoxes, if you wished to see your desire
accomplished. But, since you do not directly deny that they are true, your
aim is frustrated: they cannot be concealed: for, by their appearance of
truth, they will draw all men to search into them. Therefore, either deny
that they are true altogether, or else hold your own tongue first, if you
wish others to hold theirs.
Sect. 25.—AS to the other paradox
you mention,—that, 'whatever is done by us, is not done by Free-will, but
from mere necessity'—
Let us briefly consider this, lest we should suffer any
thing most perniciously spoken, to pass by unnoticed. Here then, I observe,
that if it be proved that our salvation is apart from our own strength and
counsel, and depends on the working of God alone, (which I hope I shall
clearly prove hereafter, in the course of this discussion,) does it not
evidently follow, that when God is not present with us to work in us, every
thing that we do is evil, and that we of necessity do those things which are
of no avail unto salvation? For if it is not we ourselves, but God only,
that works salvation in us, it must follow, whether or no, that we do
nothing unto salvation before the working of God in us.
But, by necessity, I do not mean compulsion;
but (as they term it) the necessity of immutability, not of
compulsion; that is, a man void of the Spirit of God, does not evil
against his will as by violence, or as if he were taken by the neck and
forced to it, in the same way as a thief or cut-throat is dragged to
punishment against his will; but he does it spontaneously, and with a
desirous willingness. And this willingness and desire of doing evil he
cannot, by his own power, leave off, restrain, or change; but it goes on
still desiring and craving. And even if he should be compelled by force to
do any thing outwardly to the contrary, yet the craving will
within remains averse to, and rises in indignation against that which
forces or resists it. But it would not rise in indignation, if it were
changed, and made willing to yield to a constraining power. This is what we
mean by the necessity of immutability:—that the will cannot change itself,
nor give itself another bent; but rather the more it is resisted, the more
it is irritated to crave; as is manifest from its indignation. This would
not be the case if it were free, or had a "Free-will." Ask experience, how
hardened against all persuasion they are, whose inclinations are fixed upon
any one thing. For if they yield at all, they yield through force, or
through something attended with greater advantage; they never yield
willingly. And if their inclinations be not thus fixed, they let all things
pass and go on just as they will.
But again, on the other hand, when God works in us, the
will, being changed and sweetly breathed on by the Spirit of God,
desires and acts, not from compulsion, but responsively, from
pure willingness, inclination, and accord; so that it cannot be turned
another way by any thing contrary, nor be compelled or overcome even by the
gates of hell; but it still goes on to desire, crave after, and love that
which is good; even as before, it desired, craved after, and loved that
which was evil. This, again, experience proves. How invincible and unshaken
are holy men, when, by violence and other oppressions, they are only
compelled and irritated the more to crave after good! Even as fire, is
rather fanned into flames than extinguished, by the wind. So that neither is
there here any willingness, or "Free-will," to turn itself into another
direction, or to desire any thing else, while the influence of the Spirit
and grace of God remain in the man.
In a word, if we be under the god of this world, without
the operation and Spirit of God, we are led captives by him at his will, as
Paul saith. (2 Tim. ii. 26.) So that, we cannot will any thing but that
which he wills. For he is that "strong man armed," who so keepeth his
palace, that those whom he holds captive are kept in peace, that they might
not cause any motion or feeling against him; otherwise, the kingdom of
Satan, being divided against itself, could not stand; whereas, Christ
affirms it does stand. And all this we do willingly and desiringly,
according to the nature of will: for if it were forced, it would be
no longer will. For compulsion is (so to speak) unwillingness.
But if the "stronger than he" come and overcome him, and take us as His
spoils, then, through the Spirit, we are His servants and captives (which is
the royal liberty) that we may desire and do, willingly, what He wills.
Thus the human will is, as it were, a beast between the
two. If God sit thereon, it wills and goes where God will: as the Psalm
saith, "I am become as it were a beast before thee, and I am continually
with thee." (Ps. lxxiii. 22-23.) If Satan sit thereon, it wills and goes as
Satan will. Nor is it in the power of its own will to choose, to which rider
it will run, nor which it will seek; but the riders themselves contend,
which shall have and hold it.
Sect. 26.—AND now, what if I prove
from your own words, on which you assert the freedom of the will, that there
is no such thing as "Free-will" at all! What if I should make it manifest
that you unknowingly deny that, which, with so much policy, you labour to
affirm. And if I do not this, actually, I vow that I will consider all that
I advance in this book against you, revoked; and all that your Diatribe
advances against me, and aims at establishing, confirmed.
You make the power of "Free-will" to be—'that certain
small degree of power, which, without the grace of God, is utterly
ineffective.'
Do you not acknowledge this?—Now then, I ask and demand
of you, if the grace of God be wanting, or, if it be taken away from that
certain small degree of power, what can it do of itself? 'It is ineffective
(you say) and can do nothing of good.' Therefore, it cannot do what God or
His grace wills. And why? because we have now separated the grace of God
from it; and what the grace of God does not, is not good. And hence it
follows, that "Free-will," without the grace of God is, absolutely, not
FREE; but, immutably, the servant and bond-slave of evil; because, it
cannot turn itself unto good. This being determined, I will allow you to
make the power of "Free-will," not only a certain small degree of power, but
to make it evangelical if you will, or, if you can, to make it divine:
provided that, you add to it this doleful appendage—that, without the grace
of God, it is ineffective. Because, then you will at once take from it all
power: for, what is ineffective power, but plainly, no power at all?
Therefore, to say, that the will is FREE,
and that it has indeed power, but that it is ineffective, is what
