The Arminian objection against foreordination bears with equal force against
the foreknowledge of God. What God foreknows must, in the very nature of the
case, be as fixed and certain as what is foreordained; and if one is
inconsistent with the free agency of man, the other is also. Foreordination
renders the events certain, while foreknowledge presupposes that they are
certain.
Now if future events are foreknown to God,
they cannot by any possibility take a turn contrary to His knowledge. If the
course of future events is foreknown, history will follow that course as
definitely as a locomotive follows the rails from New York to Chicago. The
Arminian doctrine, in rejecting foreordination, rejects the theistic basis for
foreknowledge. Common sense tells us that no event can be foreknown unless by
some means, either physical or mental, it has been predetermined. Our choice
as to what determines the certainty of future events narrows down to two
alternatives — the foreordination of the wise and merciful heavenly Father, or
the working of blind, physical fate. The Socinians and Unitarians, while not
so evangelical as the Arminians, are at this point more consistent; for after
rejecting the foreordination of God, they also deny that He can foreknow the
acts of free agents. They hold that in the very nature of the case it cannot
be known how the person will act until the time comes and the choice is made.
This view of course reduces the prophecies of Scripture to shrewd guesses at
best, and destroys the historic Christian view of the Inspiration of the
Scriptures. It is a view which has never been held by any recognized Christian
church. Some of the Socinians and Unitarians have been bold enough and honest
enough to acknowledge that the reason which led them to deny God's certain
foreknowledge of the future acts of men, was, that if this be admitted it
would be impossible to disprove the Calvinistic doctrine of Predestination.
Many Arminians have felt the force of this
argument, and while they have not followed the Unitarians in denying God's
foreknowledge, they have made it plain that they would very willingly deny it
if they could, or dared. Some have spoken disparagingly of the doctrine of
foreknowledge and have intimated that, in their opinion, it was not of much
importance whether one believed it or not. Some have gone so far as to tell us
plainly that men had better reject foreknowledge than admit Predestination.
Others have suggested that God may voluntarily neglect to know some of the
acts of men in order to leave them free; but this of course destroys the
omniscience of God. Still others have suggested that God's omniscience may
imply only that He can know all things, if He chooses,—just as His omnipotence
implies that He can do all things, if He chooses. But the comparison will not
hold, for these certain acts are not merely possibilities but realities,
although yet future; and to ascribe ignorance to God concerning these is to
deny Him the attribute of omniscience. This explanation would give us the
absurdity of an omniscience that is not omniscient.
When the Arminian is confronted with the
argument from the foreknowledge of God, he has to admit the certainty or
fixity of future events. Yet when dealing with the problem of free agency he
wishes to maintain that the acts of free agents are uncertain and ultimately
dependent on the choice of the person,—which is plainly an inconsistent
position. A view which holds that the free acts of men are uncertain,
sacrifices the sovereignty of God in order to preserve.the freedom of men.
Furthermore, if the acts of free agents are
in themselves uncertain, God must then wait until the event has had its issue
before making His plans. In trying to convert a soul, then He would be
conceived of as working in the same manner that Napoleon is said to have gone
into battle-with three or four plans in mind, so that if the first failed, he
could fall back upon the second, and if that failed, then the third, and so
on, —a view which is altogether inconsistent with a true view of His nature.
He would then be ignorant of much of the future and would daily be gaining
vast stores of knowledge. His government of the world also, in that case,
would be very uncertain and changeable, dependent as it would be on the
unforeseen conduct of men.
To deny God the perfections of foreknowledge
and immutability is to represent Him as a disappointed and unhappy being who
is often checkmated and defeated by His creatures. But who can really believe
that in the presence of man the Great Jehovah must sit waiting, inquiring,
"What will he do?" Yet unless Arminianism denies the foreknowledge of God, it
stands defenseless before the logical consistency of Calvinism; for
foreknowledge implies certainty and certainty implies foreordination.
Speaking through the prophet Isaiah the Lord
said: "I am God, and there is none like me; declaring the end from the
beginning, and from ancient times things that are not yet done; saying, My
counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure," Is. 46:10. "Thou
understandest my thoughts afar off," said the psalmist, 139:2. He "knoweth the
heart," Acts 15:8. "There is no creature that is not manifest in His sight;
but all things are naked and laid open before the eyes of Him with whom we
have to do," Heb. 4:13.
Much of the difficulty in regard to the
doctrine of Predestination is due to the finite character of our mind, which
can grasp only a few details at a time, and which understands only a part of
the relations between these. We are creatures of time, and often fail to take
into consideration the fact that God is not limited as we are. That which
appears to us as "past...... present," and "future," is all "present" to His
mind. It is an eternal "now." He is "the high and lofty One that inhabits
eternity," Is. 57:15. "A thousands years in thy sight are but as yesterday
when it is past, And as a watch in the night," Ps. 90:4. Hence the events
which we see coming to pass in time are only the events which He appointed and
set before Him from eternity. Time is a property of the finite creation and is
objective to God. He is above it and sees it, but is not conditioned by it. He
is also independent of space, which is another property of the finite
creation. Just as He sees at one glance a road leading from New York to San
Francisco, while we see only a small portion of it as we pass over it, so He
sees all events in history, past, present, and future at one glance. When we
realize that the complete process of history is before Him as an eternal
"now," and that He is the Creator of all finite existence, the doctrine of
Predestination at least becomes an easier doctrine.
In the eternal ages back of the creation
there could not have been any certainty as to future events unless God had
formed a decree in regard to them. Events pass from the category of things
that may or may not be, to that of things that shall certainly be, or from
possibility to fruition, only when God passes a decree to that effect. This
fixity or certainty could have had its ground in nothing outside of the divine
Mind, for in eternity nothing else existed. Says Dr. R. L. Dabney: "The only
way in which any object can by any possibility have passed from God's vision
of the possible into His foreknowledge of the actual, is by His purposing to
effectuate it Himself, or intentionally and purposely to permit its
effectuation by some other agent whom He expressly purposed to bring into
existence. This is clear from this fact. An effect conceived in posse only
rises into actuality by virtue of an efficient cause or causes. When God was
looking forward from the point of view of His original infinite prescience,
there was but one cause, Himself. If any other cause or agent is ever to
arise, it must be by God's agency. If effects are embraced in God's infinite
prescience, which these other agents are to produce, still, in willing these
other agents into existence, with infinite prescience, God did virtually will
into existence, or purpose, all the effects of which they were to be
efficients." (Theology, P. 212)
And to the same effect the Baptist
theologian, Dr. A. B. Strong, who for a number of years was President and
Professor in the Rochester Theological Seminary, writes: "In eternity there
could have been no cause of the future existence of the universe, outside of
God Himself, since no being existed but God Himself. In eternity God foresaw
that the creation of the world and the Institution of its laws would make
certain its actual history even to the most insignificant details. But God
decreed to create and to institute these laws. In so decreeing He necessarily
decreed all that was to come. In fine, God foresaw the future events of the
universe as certain, because He had decreed to create; but this determination
to create involved also a determination of all the actual results of that
creation; or, in other words, God decreed those results."
Foreknowledge must not be confused with
foreordination. Foreknowledge presupposes foreordination, but is not itself
foreordination. The actions of free agents do not take place because they are
foreseen, but they are foreseen because they are certain to take place. Hence
Strong says, "Logically, though not chronologically, decree comes before
foreknowledge. When I say, 'I know what I will do,' it is evident that I have
determined already, and that my knowledge does not precede determination, but
follows it and is based upon it."
Since God's foreknowledge is complete, He
knows the destiny of every person, not merely before the person has made his
choice in this life, but from eternity. And since He knows their destiny
before they are created, and then proceeds to create, it is plain that the
saved and the lost alike fulfill His plan for them; for if He did not plan
that any particular ones should be lost, He could at least refrain from
creating them.
We conclude, then, that the Christian
doctrine of the Foreknowledge of God proves also His Predestination. Since
these events are foreknown, they are fixed and settled things; and nothing can
have fixed and settled them except the good pleasure of God, — the great first
cause,— freely and unchangeably foreordaining whatever comes to pass. The
whole difficulty lies in the acts of free agents being certain; yet certainty
is required for foreknowledge as well as for foreordination. The Arminian
arguments, if valid, would disprove both foreknowledge and foreordination. And
since they prove too much we conclude that they prove nothing at all.
—END—
